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THE LOPEZ EXPEDITIONS 
TO CUBA 



1848-1851 



A DISSERTATION 

presented to the 

Faculty of Princeton University 

in Candidacy for the Degree 

of Doctor of Philosophy 

BY 

ROBERT GRANVILLE CALDWELL 

Assistant Professor of History 

Rice Institute, Houston, Texas 



PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS 
PRINCETON 

LONDON: HUMPHREY MILFORD 

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 

1915 



H7?f 
• C/5T 



Published October, 1915 

Accepted by the Department of History and Politics 
January, 1912 



n •- u 






O 






^ 
-» 




CONTENTS 

Preface x 

I. Political and Economic Conditions in Cuba 

in 1850 3 

II. Public Opinion in Cuba 19 

III. American Attitude Toward Cuba 28 

IV. Narciso Lopez and the Round Island Expe- 

dition 43 

V. The Cardenas Expedition 57 

VI. The Cleopatra and the Pampero 83 

VII. The Last Attempt 9 1 

VIII. Results IX 4 

Bibliography I22 



PREFACE 

It is my purpose to write the story of the Lopez' expeditions 
to Cuba in such a way as to throw light on both American and 
Cuban conditions in 1850. The single existing monograph on 
this subject was written to be read by the author before the 
Filson Club of Louisville, Kentucky, from material collected 
for a historical novel. It therefore deals especially with the 
biographical details connected with the Kentuckians who took 
part in the expedition. The author, Mr. A. C. Quisenberry, 
has written with much charm of style, but it lay beyond his 
purpose to consider the broader aspects of the subject. His 
account does not aim to be critical, nor has he used any of the 
Spanish sources. The newspaper accounts seem to have been 
followed somewhat too readily. The brief account in the first 
volume of Mr. James Ford Rhodes' History of the United 
States is remarkable for its fairness and clearness, but neces- 
sarily omits details, while the recent volume by Admiral Chad- 
wick entitled "The Relations of the United States and Spain- 
Diplomacy" treats almost exclusively the diplomatic results of 
the expedition. The only other account of importance is con- 
i tained in a large volume by Dr. Vidal Morales, "Iniciadores y 
Primeros Martires de la Revolution Cubana." This volume is 
essentially a collection of documents printed in full, with com- 
ments by the author. These documents are of varying import- 
ance, and serve to throw light on the Cuban aspects of the 
subject. 

The sources which have been here made use of are described 
in the bibliographical appendix. Especially valuable are the 
memoirs by Concha and manuscripts in the Archives at Ha- 
vana, of which a list is given by Mr. L. M. Perez in his "Guide 
to the Materials for American History in Cuban Archives." 

The story has a threefold interest: First, by means of it 
we can see the character of Spanish government in Cuba, and 
discover some of the roots of the process which ended in 1898 
in the separation of Cuba from Spain ; second, the larger move- 
ment of which the expeditions were a part served to disclose at 



the very first the inherent weakness of the compromise of 
1850; and third, the whole story throws an interesting side 
light on the views and characters of many Americans in 1850, 
bringing out heroic qualities which showed themselves among 
much that was ignoble in these stirring adventures. I believe 
that the importance of these events, whether measured by their 
immediate significance or by their results, far transcends their 
mere military interest. Perhaps there is no other single inci- 
dent which might equally serve to make clear American politi- 
cal and foreign relations in the year of the great Compromise. 

The author wishes to acknowledge very gratefully the kind 
assistance of Professor Shipman of Princeton University who 
suggested this particular topic, of Professor Corwin who made 
some very helpful suggestions with regard to the method of 
work, of Professor Myers who read the original manuscript 
and made some important corrections, and of Professor Mc- 
Elroy whose original encouragement and continued assistance 
have been of the greatest value. 



CHAPTER I. 
Political and Economic Conditions in Cuba in 1850 

Since the Lopez expeditions were essentially part of a much 
larger movement both in Cuba and in the United States, it is 
convenient to begin with some account of the political and com- 
mercial conditions of the island in 1850. 

The head of the government was the Captain General. By 
the famous decree of May 28, 1825 this official had seemingly 
been given almost absolute authority. This edict was the out- 
come of the French reactionary occupation of Spain, and was 
issued in the name of Fernando VII: "His majesty being 
formally persuaded that at no time and under no circumstances 
will the principle of rectitude and love to his royal person 
which characterizes your excellency ever be weakened ; and his 
majesty, desiring to obviate any difficulties which might arise 
in extraordinary cases from a division of authority and the 
complication of command and control by the respective officers, 
and to the important end of preserving in that precious island 
his legitimate sovereign rule and the public peace, has been 
pleased, in accordance with the judgment of his council of min- 
isters, to invest your excellency with full authority, conferring 
all the powers which by royal decree are conceded to the gov- 
ernors of cities in a state of siege. His majesty consequently 
invests your excellency with full and unlimited authority to 
detach from the island, and to send to this Peninsula all officials 
and persons employed in whatsoever capacity, and of whatso- 
ever rank and class or condition, whose presence may appear 
prejudicial, or whose public or private conduct may inspire 
you with suspicion, replacing them in the interim with faithful 
servants of his majesty who are deserving of the confidence of 
your excellency, and furthermore to suspend the execution of 
any orders or general regulations issued in whatever branch 
of the administration to whatever extent your excellency may 
consider convenient to the royal service; such measures to be 
always provisional, and a report thereof to be sent by your 

3 



excellency for the royal approval of his majesty. In dispensing 
to your excellency this signal proof of his royal favor and the 
high confidence which his majesty places in your perfect loyalty, 
he hopes that, worthily cooperating, you will use the greatest 
prudence and circumspection, together with indefatigable activ- 
ity ; and he trusts that your excellency, being endowed through 
this same favor of his royal goodness with a greater responsi- 
bility, will redouble your vigilance in seeing that the laws are 
observed, that justice is administered, and that the faithful 
subjects of his majesty be rewarded ; at the same time punishing 
without delay or hesitation the misdeeds of those who, forget- 
ting their obligations and what they owe to the best and most 
beneficent of sovereigns, violate the laws and give vent to sin- 
ister machinations by infraction of said laws and of the admin- 
istrative ordinances relating thereto." 1 

While this decree had never been repealed and gave to the 
Captain General a degree of authority which would seem the 
sheerest despotism to the Anglo-Saxon, there were in 1850 
certain very real limitations to this despotic power. These 
limitations were not meant to safeguard the rights of individ- 
uals after the fashion of American and English constitutional 
limitations, but are rather a good example of Spanish jealousy 
of officials who were so often corrupt. 

The control of the finances in Cuba had never been exclu- 
sively in the hands of the Governor General, and, with the 
creation of the office of Intendant in 1764, this fiscal officer, who 
received orders directly from the Crown, was made practically 
equal in rank to the Captain General. 1 " In 181 2 subordinate 

1 Royal decree, May 28, 1825. Text translated by Chadwick in his 
"Relations of the United States and Spain — Diplomacy" (1009), pp. 224, 
225. Chadwick regards this decree as the true constitution of Cuba, 
but further study clearly shows that the real power of the captain 
general was not so great as it would seem to be from this order. In 
fact Captain General Concha took advantage of the Lopez expeditions 
to complain of the lack of centralization of authority and to secure 
greater power — a change which made Cuba increasingly a military 
despotism. The whole subject of the power of the Captain General 
is discussed at length in a letter from Concha himself "Al Presidente 
del Consejo de Ministros" dated April 1, 1851. The full Spanish text 
is given in B olefin del Archivo, IV, 107. (Havana.) 

la The Captain General dealt with the Minister of the Interior, while 
the Intendant dealt with the Treasury at Madrid. Real Ordenes, Feb. 
18, 1835. 



fiscal officers or Intendants were appointed at Santiago and 
Puerto Principe, while the previous Intendant was now known 
as Superintendant. In 1844 the rank of the Governor General 
was declared supreme ; but it was not until 1853 that the office 
of Superintendant was merged with that of Captain General, 
when the power in the government was centralized along the 
lines advocated by Concha. 2 The Superintendant in the days 
of his power presided over a "Tribunal de Cuentas" which pass- 
ed on all proposed expenditures, audited all accounts, and in 
addition exercised judicial functions in cases where the treas- 
ury or its officials were involved. The dealings of this Tribunal 
were directly with the Minister of Finance in Madrid. 

The navy was under a special commander not subordinate 
to the Captain General, 3 while special "juntas," or administra- 
tive boards, cared for the civic administration in its various de- 
partments. Over these the Captain General presided, but had 
no other powers than to vote as a member and to carry out their 
decrees. Of the various boards the Junta de Fomento, or Board 
of Agriculture and Public Works, was the most powerful and 
independent. The Captain General presided over it, but its 
members were elected from the landed and merchant class. 

2 In addition to the real cedula of Oct. 21, 1853 'by which the Captain 
General became also Superintendant, another decree of August 17, 
1854 made the juntas merely advisory bureaus entirely subordinate to 
the Captain General. This was precisely in line with Concha's recom- 
mendations. These changes were direct results of the Lopez expeditions. 

3 The separation of naval and military power in Cuba was not due 
originally to a desire to lessen the power of the Captain General, but 
to the fact that Cuba was the center of the naval forces of all Spanish 
America, and that the defence of all those regions was directed from 
Havana. It was clearly important that the naval commander should 
not be under the orders of the ruler of any one colony. With the loss 
of all her other possessions, the separate naval administration was still 
continued, to the great annoyance of the Captain General. The three 
chief officers, the Intendant, the Admiral, and the Captain General, met 
in a Board or Junta de Autoridades to attempt to bring some unity into 
their diverse functions. Jealousies crept in constantly, for example 
with regard to the authority over the Contoy prisoners in 1850. 

Memorias Sobre el Estado Politico, Gobierno, y Administracion de 
la isla de Cuba, por el Teniente General, Don Jose de la Concha, Mad- 
rid, 1853, p. 37. See also for friction between the Junta and Captain 
General Alcoy, Zaragoza, Insurrecciones en Cuba, I, 600. 



This board which Concha says was "almost on a democratic 
basis" was a special thorn in his side. 4 

In spite of these limitations, the Captain General had a great 
variety of functions. For example he was regularly President 
of the Council of Havana, and could at any time preside over 
any city council. He was also President of the various Juntas 
or Bureaus. He was directly in charge of the mails, and had 
the care of prisoners. 5 One of his duties was to act as a Cor- 
regidor, practically a police magistrate, in connection with his 
office of President of the city council of Havana. The idea 
of the town and the township, with functions separate from 
those of the central government and with their own local gov- 
ernment, an idea which is so fundamental in Anglo Saxon in- 
stitutions, was foreign to the constitution of the Cuban govern- 
ment. Thus, in Havana, as well as in other cities, certain petty 
details of local government fell to officers whose duties were 
of national, and, in the case of the Captain General, of inter- 
national importance. In fact, before the days of Concha's re- 
forms, a great deal of the time of the Captain General was 
taken up in making out and signing papers of no real importance 
simply because they brought fees which made up his salary. 6 

The Captain General's military supremacy was unquestioned, 
and this fact brought him close to the administration of the 
smallest localities. Cuba was divided for military and adminis- 
trative purposes into three districts : The western with its 
capital at Havana, the central of which Puerto Principe was 
the capital, and the eastern, with Santiago de Cuba for a capital. 
These were under Governors who received instructions directly 
from the Captain General. Within the provinces were districts 
of two ranks. The larger towns and their neighborhoods were 
under Lieutenant Governors who had certain civil duties, 
among them that of presiding over the Ayuntamientos, or town 
councils. The Lieutenant Governors also commanded the mil- 
itary forces. The less populous rural districts were under 
Captains who had almost absolute power in the absence of 
Ayuntamientos or township governments of any sort. Each of 
these officers, nominated by the Captain General and appointed 

4 For a treatment of this whole subject see Perez: — "Guide to the 

Materials for American History in Cuban Archives," pp. 28-33. 
6 Concha, p. 50. 
8 Concha, op cit. pp. 160-174. 

6 



by the Crown, bore the relation of a subordinate to his military 
chief. The pay of Governors and Lieutenant Governors was 
nominally that of their regular military rank, but they all exer- 
cised the functions of judges in both civil and criminal cases 
and received certain fees in cases tried before them. The 
Captains had no fixed salary at all and had to depend for an 
income on one-third of the fines which they collected. 

Popular government, so far as it existed at all in Cuba, was 
represented in 1850 by the Ayuntamientos and Audiencias. 
The Ayuntamientos, corresponding to our city councils, were 
corporations containing hereditary members, members who 
bought their seats from the government, members selected by 
the government of Cuba, and, in some cases, elected members, 
as seems to have been the case especially in Puerto Principe. 
They chose their own Alcalde, or mayor. They existed only 
in the older towns, some new and important towns having no 
Ayuntamientos at all. The oldest, that of Havana, dated from 
1574. They were subject to the orders of the Governor or 
Lieutenant Governor, and also to the authority of the Audien- 
cia of their district, which exercised certain administrative 
supervision over them. In financial affairs they had to get the 
sanction of the Junta de Proprios y Arbitrios, which was an 
independent organization. They were naturally inefficient and 
corrupt, having acquired customs during the centuries which 
were followed to the detriment of public interests. At the 
same time they were tenacious of their rights and, like the 
Parliaments of France in 1789, were useful as starting points 
of opposition. 7 

The Audiencias were ancient courts with mixed judicial and 
administrative functions. They acted in an advisory capacity 
to the Captain General. This advice the Captain General was 
quite free to disregard, but it served as a means of protest and 
petition which was especially displeasing to a Captain General 
like Concha, who regarded the presence of the ancient court 
in Puerto Principe as tending to encourage pride and insubor- 
dination: "Even suppose its members endowed with an ex- 
ceptional prudence," says Concha, "yet, the commanding- 
general and the governor of the province, if not actually held 
back, are sure to be embarrassed at least, by the judgments and 
■deliberations of that Tribunal. This Audiencia, being the old- 

7 Concha, pp. 81-94. 



est in the Indies (since the first which was established in 
Espanola was later removed to Puerto Principe) had in its 
favor the prestige given by antiquity, by its acquired customs, 
by the solemnity of its proceedings, and by the very title of 
'nobleza' (Highness) given to it by law; and by its side must 
be obscured, weakened and lessened the military authority, 
which being newer, has not yet had time to accustom the towns 
to obedience, submission and respect." 8 From the point of 
view of Concha, the suppression of the Audiencia would have 
certain splendid results. The educated lawyers and others 
connected with the court would have to come to Havana to 
make a living, where they could be under the surveillance of 
the government. The wealth of Puerto Principe as well as its 
importance would be greatly lessened, and the money spent in 
keeping up this important court of justice could be used in the 
defence of the island. 

Judicial functions in both criminal and civil suits belonged, 
(i) to the "Alcades Mayores" of whom there were five in 
Havana, (2) to the Captains and Governors, (3) to the Au- 
diencias, (4) in special cases, to Juntas and their committees, 
especially to the Junta de Fomentos, and (5) even to the navy 
department. 

The administration of justice was costly and slow. Saco, an 
eminent Cuban scholar, who made a study of the complicated 
system of court procedure and expenses, declared in 1837: — 
"The condition in which the branch of judicial administration 
is found is deplorable." Judges, even when found guilty of 
flagrant offences, could not be punished. Prisoners could be 
taken from the jurisdiction of native judges and condemned by 
a court-martial in which every guarantee of individual rights 
was absent. The tribunals were only independent in name, for 
the Captain General could interfere at any time in the adminis- 
tration of justice. 9 

The government which Concha came to head in 1850 was 
notoriously and almost unavoidably corrupt. Indeed, mer- 
chants in their stores and shipmasters at the wharves spoke 
openly and contemptuously of the proceedings of government 

8 Captain General Concha to the minister of Justice, dated Havana 
June 9, 185 1. Boletin del Archivo Nacional, Havana, Ano IV, Numero 3. 

9 Perez, Estudio Sabre las Ideas Politicas de Jose Antonio Saco. 
Havana, 1906. Pp. 36, 37 ; Saco. Obras, N. Y. 1853, III, 37-iSo. 



officials and counted on certain necessary expenses in the way 
of bribes. The government attorneys refused to proceed 
against prominent malefactors. The captains were almost uni- 
versally corrupt, while even the governors and lieutenant gov- 
ernors were exercising their functions oppressively. When 
one of these was removed by Concha the town celebrated in 
true Spanish style. Houses were illuminated, the town was dec- 
orated, and dances were given to indicate joy and relief. The 
removals were wholesale, especially among those engaged in 
the work of the courts. Nor were all these removals entirely 
for corruption and inefficiency. The Lieutenant Governor of 
Pinar del Rio was removed for political causes and replaced by 
Colonel Elizalde who was to take a prominent part in the diffi- 
culties of 185 1. 9a 

The censorship of the press had always existed in Cuba ex- 
cept for two brief periods, in 1812, and from 1820 to 1823. In 
the period of our story it was particularly strict, for it was the 
purpose of Captain General Concha to err on that side rather 
than on the side of too great leniency. In spite of all precau- 
tions, however, El Faro Industrial, edited by an American 
named Thrasher, would sometimes contain an article or a poem 
with allegorical significance, or phrases would appear, at first 
sight entirely harmless, but in reality having a double meaning 
and, in the eyes of the Captain General, appearing both insult- 
ing and dangerous. Nevertheless it was impossible to find any 
plausible excuse for suppressing the paper, until the death of 
General Ena, who was killed in battle with Lopez. The brief 
account of his death taken from another newspaper was im- 
mediately followed by an article prominently headed, "Laugh- 
ter" (La Sonrisa). The insult, in the state of public opinion, 
seemed at this time sufficiently evident and the paper was 
suppressed. 10 

So soon as the Faro Industrial was suppressed and the daily 
papers of Havana were reduced to three, Concha did away with 
the two highly salaried Royal censors and appointed a clerk 
who should carry on the censorship under his own immediate 
direction. 11 

The most important periodical in Havana was El Diario de 

9a Concha, op. cit., pp. 136-142. 
10 Concha, p. 282. 
u iConcha, p. 283. 



la Marina. It had a subscription list of 6,000 and was, of 
course, published entirely in the Spanish interest. Even this 
paper was carefully watched by the censor, one article being 
suppressed by Concha for intimating that the interests of Cuba 
were distinct from those of Spain. 12 

This suppression of the press and the lack of educational 
facilities were evils of which Cuba was becoming increasingly 
aware. The task of the censor was made peculiarly arduous 
from the necessity of not only guarding against what might 
seem dangerous in the Cuban press, but also of excluding the 
publications of a country situated so near as the United States. 
As a result, friction with Americans was constant. 13 

The attitude of the Cuban Government toward foreigners 
was one of extreme jealousy. By the Royal Order of Oct. 21, 
1817, foreigners were divided into three classes: Transients 
who were merely visitors in Cuba, domiciled foreigners, and 
naturalized citizens. Rights of transciency only continued for 
five years by Spanish law. Domiciled foreigners were required 
to declare their intention of settling permanently on the island, 
to profess the Roman Catholic religion, and to swear allegiance 
to Spain, promising to obey the laws and ordinances to Which 

"Concha, p. 287. 

ia iSaco, op. tit. Ill, 225. Perez, op. tit. 37. These difficulties were 
illustrated in the case of Wm. H. Bush, thus described by the Spanish 
Secretary for Foreign Affairs to Calderon de la Barca, the Spanish 
minister at Washington : "Your Excellency knows that the paper called 
La Verdad, published in New York, is printed with the specific 
object of awakening among the inhabitants of Cuba and Porto Rico the 
sentiment of rebellion, and to propagate the idea of annexation to the 
United States. The Captain General of the island, in fulfilment of his 
duty, prohibited the entrance and circulation of this newspaper in the 
island, and tried to investigate the ramifications in the island of this 
conspiracy against the rights of Spain, and against the peace of the 
country. As a result of the efforts made with this object, it was dis- 
covered that although not numerous, there were in Havana some 
wicked Spaniards charged with the task of collecting money to sustain 
the subversive publications, and to distribute its copies to those who 
should care to read them. Among the accomplices in this crime of high 
treason was found a certain Wm. H. Bush, an American citizen, and 
purser of the American frigate Childe Harold. This person seemed to 
be charged with carrying the correspondence of the conspirators and 
the copies of La Verdad." (Spanish Secretary for Foreign Affairs to 
Calderon de la Barca, Spanish minister at Washington, Ian. 2, 1848. 
Unpublished Mss. Havana, Archives.) 

10 



Spaniards were subjected. Naturalized citizens were regarded 
as in every sense Spanish subjects. 14 The question of the treat- 
ment of foreigners gained in importance and the causes for 
friction under Spanish restrictions largely increased, with the 
beginning of the great rush to California by way of Panama. 
Thousands of foreigners passed through Havana, as a port of 
call, on their way to the gold fields. 15 In addition to these 
transients, at least 400 machinists and engineers came annually 
from the United States to work on the great plantations during 
the gathering of the sugar crop. These returned with from 
$800 to $1500 each and without having paid any taxes. During 
their stay on the island they were natural centers for the 
spreading of ideas of annexation. 16 The treaty of 1795 be- 
tween the United States and Spain had an important provision 
that "in all cases of seizure, detention or arrest, for debts con- 
tracted, or offences committed by any citizen or subject of the 
one party, within the jurisdiction of the other, the same shall 
be made and prosecuted by order of the law only, and accord- 
ing to the regular course of proceedings usual in such cases. 
The citizens and subjects of both parties shall be allowed to 
employ such advocates, solicitors, notaries, agents, and factors 
as they may judge proper in all their affairs and in all their 
trials at law in which they may be concerned before the trib- 
unals of the other party ; and such agents shall have free ac- 
cess to be present at the proceedings in such cases and at the 
taking of all examinations and evidence which may be exhibited 
in the said trials." 17 Now it is perfectly evident that in cases 
where American citizens were charged with high treason for 
offences which seemed to an Anglo Saxon trivial, it was es- 
pecially important to be able readily to invoke the safeguards 
of this treaty. But neither the Captain General nor the Ameri- 
can Consul were granted any diplomatic functions, so that no 
direct complaint would be regarded, and an American citizen 

"For a discussion of the status of foreigners with the opinion of 
the legal advisers of the Captain General on the case of John Thrasher 
see the documents listed in "Perez' Guide," number 248, and in the 
Appendix to this thesis, especially the opinion of the Real Acuerdo to 
the Captain General, Havana, Oct. 20, 1851. 

15 Concha, op. cit. p. 95- 

18 Concha, pp. 246, 247. Zaragoza (1. 617, 618). 

11 State papers, 1, 546-548, for text of treaty. See Chadwick, op. cit., 
Chap. 2, for full story of the treaty. 



11 



might easily suffer long and unjust imprisonment as well as 
much financial loss before the matter could be arranged, by the 
roundabout process, through Washington and Madrid. The 
remarkable international position of Cuba, in the eyes of the 
Spanish Government, is thus described by the Secretary of 
Foreign Affairs : 

"Your Excellency knows that the government of Her Ma- 
jesty has always maintained the position with all foreign 
powers that its colonies are outside of all the promises and 
obligations undertaken by Spain in international agreements. 
With regard to Cuba, the discussions with England to this 
effect are well known, in which the Spanish Government has 
declared that the treaties which form the positive law of Spain 
had been adjusted in times when the Spanish colonies were 
closed to all foreign trade and commerce, and that when in 
1824 these colonies were opened to commerce of other nations 
they were not placed on equal footing with the home country, 
but were kept in the exceptional position of colonies. Of this 
exceptional position of that part of the Spanish dominions, no 
one has more proof than the foreign consuls, since it is evident 
to them that the Spanish government has only endured their 
presence on the condition that they should not exercise other 
functions than those of mere commercial agents. Thus in 1845 
the English government accepted formally the agreement that 
its consul should not demand the fulfilment oi treaties, not 
even of those which refer to the slave trade." 18 In other words, 
the Captain General, in his dealings with individuals, was, 
according to this theory, wholly untrammeled by international 
agreements. Foreigners were to live in Cuba at their own peril. 
Of course, the Spanish government could not really expect to 
be permitted to freely carry out any such policy, but the mere 
attempt to do so made the government of Cuba very different 
from that of most civilized states. 

Our study of the internal and foreign policy of the Cuban 
government has now brought us to the central idea of its con- 
stitution. In contrast with most governments, the chief func- 
tion of that of Cuba was not so much the development of 
the country as its preservation to the Crown of Spain. This 
policy was the immediate result of the annexation of Florida 

18 Spanish Secretary for foreign affairs to Calderon de la Barca, 
Madrid, Jan. 2, 1847. Unpublished Mss. Archives at Havana. 

12 



to the United States. A royal order to the Captain General of 
the period states this duty clearly: "You should remember 
that when once the cession of Florida is made, the importance 
of the command of this island rises greatly on account of the 
nearness of a maritime power which brings close to the island 
the base for future operations. Therefore the defence of the 
island deserves your greatest attention, and it is necessary to 
make ready as soon as possible. When the time arrives to fear 
an attempt by them, prepared in the ports of Florida, the de- 
fence of the island ought to be already systematized and 
planned." 19 This defence of the island continued to be the 
chief care of successive governors. 

While the navy, as we have seen, was under an independent 
commander, there was at least no doubt of the Captain Gen- 
eral's absolute authority over the army. Until the year 1825 
the army of Cuba was composed of three regular battalions, a 
brigade of artillery, and a single regiment of cavalry. The 
defence of the island, aside from these troops, was left to the 
militia of the island. With the soldiers who came to Cuba in 
1850, the regular army then reached sixteen batallions, two 
picked companies of veterans, twelve squadrons of cavalry, two 
brigades of artillery, and two light batteries. Five forts had 
also been constructed since the English occupation. 20 

This task of defence, even with so large a number of troops, 
was made difficult by geographical conditions. With an area 
about the same as that of Ohio, Cuba stretches in a mighty 
crescent for more than 800 miles across the waters of the Gulf, 
separated only by narrow channels from Yucatan, Florida, and 
Hayti. Internal means of communication were wretched 
and most points were accessible only by sea. 20a The sparsely 
settled coast offered many secluded nooks to men like Lopez 
and his followers. In the west a range of small mountains 
sometimes reach a height of 2000 feet, giving an opportunity 
for guerilla warfare. The central part of the island is a coun- 
try of broad plains and shallow valleys. The shore of the 
northern coast is mainly steep and rocky and lies well back of 
islands and coral reefs between which the passages are narrow 
and intricate. It is evident that the island might easily contain 

"Concha, op. cit. p. 46. ™ Concha, op. cit. p. 45. 
200 Three thousand, five hundred and twenty-three coasting vessels en- 
tered Havana in the single year of 1851. 

13 



a large total number of troops, and yet be readily open to 
attack at almost any single point. 21 

During the early part of the eighteenth century the commerce 
of Cuba had been small and unimportant, consisting chiefly of 
the more valuable timber in which the island abounded. The 
first really important steps toward the development of its re- 
sources followed the withdrawal of the English from Havana in 
accordance with the treaty of 1763. One year later 21 " there was 
created the office of Intendant of the island whose functions 
were to organize the customs and to encourage commerce. But 
duties were still so high, and restrictions so onerous, that Cuban 
commerce did not readily grow. In 1778 these restrictions were 
largely removed from Spanish ships and, since these vessels 
did not come in sufficient numbers to supply the needs of the 
island, a decree of the following year allowed the vessels of 
friendly nations to bring foodstuffs to Cuba. As might have 
been expected these foreigners came in swarms, making use 
of the permission accorded them to bring in manufactured arti- 
cles as well. This so aroused the Spaniards that a decree was 
"issued prohibiting the admission of foreign vessels even when 
only making Cuba a port of call. 22 The policy of the govern- 
ment thus vacillated, but the system of prohibitions usually 
prevailed, except in the troubled period of 1809 and 1810, when 
the bonds of Cuba to the mother country were weak and the 
authorities of the island, on their own responsibility, made 
special agreements admitting foreign ships. Thus the Spanish 
government grew to tolerate what it was supposed to prohibit 
until Fernando VII, in 1818, passed a regulation admitting 
foreign ships with no restrictions whatever. But even after 
this decree commerce was by no means free. Duties were high 
and were the gradual accretion of separate orders rather than 
a system. 

The financial situation of Cuba 'had changed greatly since 
the loss of Spanish America. As long as Spain held control of 
Mexico, Cuba was developed from the rich coffers of that great 
empire. It is estimated that Spain used $300,000,000 from 
Mexico in Cuba. In the years from 1789 to 1806 alone the 

21 Standard Guide to Cuba, 1005. 

21a Royal Decree, Oct. 31, 1764. See "Perez' Guide to Archives," 
p. 29. 

22 Royal Decree, Jan. 23, 1784. 

14 



amount reached $50,411,158. Of course, with the loss of all 
her vast continental empire, this condition could no longer en- 
dure. Cuba now no longer received Mexican gold, and instead 
in 1819 the tide of gold began to flow away from Cuba to 
Spain. In the first four years, Cuba's contributions to Spain, 
were small, scarcely reaching $800,000, but from that time 
they grew rapidly, being estimated by a Spanish partisan in the 
period from 1830 to 1850 at $50,000,000. Although these con- 
tributions might be justified by a historical argument, the fact 
that their parents had received gold from Mexico did not tend 
to lessen the discontent of the people who were now obliged 
to pay the taxes. 223 

In spite of these exactions, the prosperity of Cuba had been 
increasing almost as remarkably as that of the United States. 
In 1775 Cuba had only 170,000 inhabitants, a number which in 
1850 reached 1,247,230. The wealth and commerce of Cuba 
had grown proportionately and their importance to the United 
States was especially great. In 1842 the American ships which 
called at Cuban ports were twice as numerous as Spanish ships, 
and four times as numerous as the ships of France and Eng- 
land combined. 23 In 1826, 1471 foreign ships with a tonnage 
of 228,757 entered Cuban ports, while in 1851 these had reach- 
ed 2982 with 727,814 tons burden. 24 Exports and imports were 
also rapidly increasing in spite of Spanish efforts at monopoly. 
The largest items were sugar and tobacco. The exportation of 
coffee had suffered on account of Brazilian competition. 25 

The revenues of Cuba for 1851 were $12,248,712,065. Of 
this $5,964,147,055 came from import duties, the remainder 
from export duties, license fees of various kinds, a govern- 
ment lottery and miscellaneous sources. Counting the free 
population at 600,000, this meant a tax of over $20.00 a head. 26 

222 Torrente, Bosquejo Economico Politico, I, 26, 27, 28. 
23 Torrente, II, 268. * Torrente, II, 269. 

25 From 1786 to 1790 an average of 1,090,438 arrobas of sugar were 
exported annually from Cuba, while from 1845 to 1850 this yearly 
average had reached 18,690,460, an increase of forty-five per cent from 
the period 1840-45. But the trade in coffee had declined from 2,143,574 
arrobas in 1840 to 520,143 in 1850. The output of tobacco had gained 
steadily. Torrente, II, 278, 9. Diaro de la Marina, Jan. 1, 1852. Cited 
De Bow's Review, XIV, 109, no. 

26 Diario de la Marina, Havana, Jan. 1, 1852, cited De Bow's Review, 
XIV, 115. 

15 



The success of the Spanish tariff policy in creating monopoly 
is well illustrated by the duty on flour. Before excessive duties 
were levied, the United States in 1826 exported directly to 
Cuba 113,245 barrels of flour. This number had decreased to 
845 in 1 85 1 and to only 100 in 1852. In the meantime, although 
Spain produced even less flour in 1850 than in 1826 beyond 
her own needs, her exports to Cuba increased from 31,749 
barrels in 1826 to 257,451 in 1850. This simply meant that 
American flour was shipped to Spain and there was trans- 
shipped to Cuba. As a result flour cost two and one-half times 
more in Havana than in New York. Whatever protection was 
involved, it could evidently benefit only Spain, while the whole 
policy was an open invitation to the smuggler. 268 

The expenditure of the sums collected in Cuba was such as 
to give much ground for complaints on account of the large 
amounts for military and naval purposes, and also because of 
the large sums sent to Spain and to support the Spanish em- 
bassy in the United States. In 1850, which seems to be quite 
a typical year, the military expenses were $5,028,889, the naval 
$2,042,003, the amount sent to Spain was $1,506,373, to the 
legation in America $57,138, while the total of civil expenses 
which might be regarded as of direct benefit to Cuba was only 
$i,840,756. 27 The most statesmanlike of Cuban publicists, Saco, 

State of taxation in Cuba and Public Finance — 1848-1851. Torrente 
Vol. II, 365. (These figures are only exact for 1850-1851.) 

Import Duties Export Duties Other Revenues Total 

'48 $6,174,533 $709,325 $4,731,194 $11,635,052 

'49 5,844,783 584,477 4,782,266 11,211,526 

'50 5,639,225 757,071 3,655,149 10,051,443 

'5i 6,364,825 1,793,992 4,821,195 12,180,012 

** Torrente, II, 269. 

27 Torrente (II, 366), an ardent Spaniard, gives these figures: 

Military Naval Sent to Spain To other 

Provinces 

'48 $3,540,8o5 $1,527,746 $1,697,177 $227,773 

'49 3,3i3,5io 1,372,472 1,854,086 214,754 

'50 5,028,889 2,042,003 1,506,373 

'5i 5,085,963 1,965,444 1,590,058 

To Legations in America Civil Expenses 

'48 $63,310 $2,563,891 

'49 80,226 2,531,809 

'50 57,138 1,840,756 

'51 76,738 2,352,475 

The American minister to Spain was instructed June 17, 1848, to try 

16 



wrote in 1835: "Enormous is the load of taxation which 
weighs upon us. . . . Perhaps there is no people in the world 
which in proportion to its resources and population pays as 
much as the island of Cuba; nor a country, perhaps, where 
less care is taken to use on its own soil some part of its great 
sacrifices" 28 ; and again, in 1837, he said : "Almost three-quarters 
of the $9,000,000 which the customs produce are used for the 
army and navy. . . . Great sums are frequently sent to Spain, 
those of 1836, alone, reaching $2,540,598 pesos. But so great 
sacrifices are neither appreciated nor recognized by the very 
hand which compels them; and to quiet the Cubans and make 
them feel less keenly their deep wounds, salaried pens are 
busied in publishing that all the money which goes from Cuba 
to Spain is the excess of its wealth! But may that be called 
'excess' which the island itself urgently demands to satisfy its 
necessities? Can that be called 'excess' which should be sa- 
credly employed in the establishment of schools and literary 
institutions, in the construction of roads, bridges and canals, 
in the development of white population, and in the support of 
the very many needs which are crying aloud in this abandoned 
island? To say that in Cuba there is an excess, is the same 
as to say that a man has an excess who is left hungry and 
naked by taking away the money which he needs to secure 
food and clothing." 29 

But, always, back of minor grievances, in the eyes of thought- 
ful Cubans, lay the despotic character of the government. The 
constitution of 1812, brought to Cuba in 1820, had indeed 
provided for freedom of the press, a native militia, and popu- 
lar elections; the laws of Spain, until 1837, applied, at least 
in theory, also to Cuba, although the act of 1825 30 with regard 
to the Captain General's power was scarcely consistent with 
such a view. In 1836 a liberal constitution was adopted for 
Spain- by an assembly containing Cuban delegates. 303 But Cuban 
liberty ended in 1837. Cuba was denied representation in the 
Spanish Cortes, and a special law decreed that the island 



to secure the reduction of the duty on American flour which at that 
time was $9.50 a barrel. At the same time the duty on Spanish flour 
was $2. Moore: Works of Buchanan, 1909, VIII, 89. 

28 Saco, Papeles III, 86. Perez, 35. 

29 Saco, Papeles, III, 172,3. Perez, 36. 

30 Royal Decree, cited pages, 2, 3, 4. 
"""Clarke, Modern Spain, 1906, p. 135. 

17 



should be ruled by royal orders. Without representation or 
autonomy, tyranny was unavoidable, and even when certain 
governors made despotism benevolent, it was at best compli- 
cated and inefficient. 31 Such was the Cuban government in 
1850. 

S1 On this whole subject see: 

1. Complaint of Cuban Junta, 1852. Given in Morales "Iniciadores 

y Primeros Martires de la Revolucion Cubana" (1901) p. 371. 

2. Torrente, I, 30. 

3. Saco, III, 116. 

4. Concha, 45. 

5. Protesta de los Diputados Electos por la Isla de Cuba a las Cortes 

Generales de la Nacion. Feb. 21, 1837 — Madrid. Signed. Juan 
Montalvoy Castillo. Francisco Arness. Jose Antonio Saco. Van 
Buren Collection, Library of Congress. 

This protest discusses Cuba's historical right to be regarded 
as a part of the Spanish nation. 



18 



CHAPTER II 

Public Opinion in Cuba 

Society in Cuba, in 1850, was essentially aristocratic. The 
nobles of Cuba were twenty-nine marquises and thirty counts, 
usually wealthy planters who bought their titles at prices vary- 
ing from $20,000 to $50,000. Nobility not only gave high social 
position but nobles could only be tried by a high tribunal and 
could not be arrested for debt. In the same way priests could 
only be tried by ecclesiastical courts, and soldiers by military 
tribunals. 1 

The classes of population 2 and the general state of public 
opinion were thus described by Captain General Concha : 

'There are three principal elements which compose the popu- 
lation in this part of Her Majesty's dominions. One is com- 
posed of Spaniards born in the Peninsula and its adjacent 
islands; the second is made up of Spaniards natives of this 
country; while the third is composed of inhabitants of the 
negro race. It is important although sad to have to recognize 
that although the first are above all interested in the Union 
of this island to the mother country and would be in the day of 
peril the strong support of Her Majesty's Government, it is 
not so with the second class, there being, of course, honorable 
exceptions. The third class, for the most part slaves, enemies 
of both the others, serve as a bridle which restrains greatly the 
advocates of revolution and disturbance. These elements of 
the population whose tendencies and spirit I have just indicated 

1E ly, "Cuba Past and Present"— De Bow's Review. XIV, 105. 

2 The population was : 

1846 1849 

Whi tes 425,749 487,133 

Free Blacks . . . 149,226 164,410 

Slav es 323,759 323,897 



898,752 945,440 

Havana, 1849, 142,002, 1850, 150,561. This does not take into account 
the army nor a large floating population. Diario de la Marina, Jan. 1, 
1852, cited by W. A. Ely. De Bow's Review, XIV, 103, 104/ * 

19 



compose the population of Puerto Principe in a manner much 
less favorable to the preservation of order than the elements 
in this part of the island. . . . That is to say, in the department 
of the center the European Spaniards are 4.61 per cent of the 
white population while in the western section (i.e. Havana) 
they are 15.84 per cent." 

This meant that the Spanish Government could count on a 
much larger support near Havana than elsewhere. There were 
other considerations of the same kind to point to Puerto Prin- 
cipe as a danger point. The number of great plantations near 
Puerto Principe which might be ruined by war was relatively 
small compared with the number near Havana, and naturally 
the slave population was also smaller. In Puerto Principe 
the blacks were outnumbered and therefore less dangerous, 
eighty-four negroes to 100 white men, while in the west the pro- 
portion was reversed being 118 negroes to 100 white men. The 
white Cubans of Puerto Principe were a hardy race of cow- 
boys, always a class to be looked on with fear by a tyrannical 
government, while the wealth of the great planters near Hav- 
ana tended to make them conservative. Concha mentioned still 
another danger: "There is still more: the young men of 
wealthy families receive for the most part their education in 
the United States . . . and they return to their country with 
revolutionary ideas, which they spread among relatives, friends, 
and acquaintances." 3 

Concha's predecessor as Captain General, the Count of Al- 
coy, expressed his views, in 1849, as to the state of public 
opinion in Cuba. The frankness of his statement to the home 
government is remarkable, although his view of Spanish diffi- 
culties, coming from one who wished credit for overcoming 
them, should probably be considered pessimistic. In general, 
however, they were the opinions of the best observers : "The 
secret opinions of the greater part of the natives of this soil, 
and especially of the young men are unfavorable to the do- 
minion of and dependence on the home country." Many of 
these young men had noticed the state of the South American 
republics, and therefore did not hope for a stable independent 
government. Their ideal was rather to have Cuba become a 
state of the American Union. "The distance of Spain, the 

3 Captain General Concha to the Minister of Justice, dated, Havana 
Jan. 9, 1851. Boletin del Archivo Nacional, Ano IV, N. III. 

20 



inf requency of communication as compared with the immediate 
contact with the United States, the lessened respect for our 
maritime power, and external political influences have distinctly 
lessened the spirit of Spanish nationality, so that the young 
men who are accustomed to be educated in large numbers in 
the University or who go frequently to New York, lose in their 
earliest years their love for the home country, acquire habits 
and customs contrary to those they find here established, and 
are a focus of hostile principles which threaten sooner or later 
to overthrow order." 4 

The slave code of Cuba, although not strictly obeyed, was 
considered at the time distinctly humane. Slaves were required 
to be instructed in religion by their masters. They could not 
be worked more than nine or ten hours a day except in the sugar 
harvest, when they could be required to work sixteen hours. 
On Sundays and holidays they could only work the two hours 
needed to perform the necessary work of the plantation. The 
amount of food and the treatment of the women was regulated 
by law. The master could give a slave twenty-five lashes, but 
any severer punishment required a judicial investigation. A 
slave might purchase his liberty at a price set by three arbiters. 
The violation of the slave code by a master was punished by a 
fine of from $20 to $200. 5 

While the fear of slave insurrection was ever present and 
intensely real, there never seems to have been actual danger 
of a slave rising comparable to that in Santo Domingo. Cer- 
tain conditions were different. The negroes in Cuba seem to 
have been particularly docile and there was lack, at least before 
1850, of anything approaching the intense revolutionary fervor 
which caused white men in Santo Domingo to arouse the 
negroes for their own ends. Nor was the proportion of negroes 
in Cuba nearly so overwhelming. 

Nevertheless these circumstances were not coolly weighed. 
For the scenes of rapine and desolation in Santo Domingo 
were burned into the consciousness of every West Indian 
planter, and the dread of servile insurrection was almost an 
article of religion. 6 

4 El Conde de Alcoy al Ministro de Estado. Havana, Sept. 9, 1849— 
Unpublished Mss. Havana Archives. 

5 Ely, Cuba Past and Present, De Bow's Review, XIV, 104. 

* Risings took place at Cardenas on March 28, 1843, and at Matanzas 



It was clearly the policy of the Spanish Government to use 
this fear to discourage revolution. The picture of Santo Do- 
mingo was always kept before Cuban eyes. The Count of 
Alcoy, especially, regarded it as a means to safeguard Cuba to 
Spain. He wrote in 1849: ''Slavery, which is the principal 
foundation of the wealth of a country, makes many realize, in 
spite of their political ideas, the imminent danger which the 
island incurs and which all private fortunes incur at the least 
rumor of disturbance or commotion, and it is for this reason 
that they deplore the eager illusions of those who desire a 
change without counting the cost. They would rather secure 
it gradually, or by cession by Spain." 7 

But while the fear of abolition and slave insurrection made 
for conservatism in method, it also caused many others to fear 
that England might persuade Spain to abolish slavery as she 
had already abolished the slave trade, or that England might 
even make the breaking of her treaties with regard to the slave 
trade an excuse for seizing Cuba. If any such danger were 
imminent immediate annexation to the United States was the 
only remedy. 8 

in the same year (November 5). While these risings in all probabil- 
ity were not at all political, but only due to the cruelty of individual 
masters they were supposed to be a part of a widespread conspiracy to 
assassinate the whites. Cuba was thrown into a panic of fear even after 
the negroes had been easily defeated and put to flight. Some evidence 
was collected tending to show a conspiracy. The negroes, both free 
and slave who were suspected of being connected with the conspiracy 
were severely punis'hed. The slave owners in many cases sought to in- 
timidate their slaves by whipping them cruelly before the others, while 
as a direct result of the uprising, many of the negroes were killed in 
battle, others committed suicide, seventy-eight were condemned to death, 
six hundred to imprisonment for various terms, and four hundred ex- 
pelled from the island. 

For the whole account see Morales, 147-177. Especially — (1) Don 
Jose de la Concha al Ministro de la Gobernacion, Dec. 21, 1850. (Cited 
p. 150.) (2) Correspondence of British Commissioners regarding the 
slave trade, Jan. 1, 1844 (Havana) cited pp. 150-151. Also Boletin 
del Archivo National, A. Ill, N. VI, p. 8. 

7 El Conde de Alcoy al Ministro de Estado. Havana, Sept. 9, 1849, 
Unpublished Mss. Havana Archives. 

8 The use made by the revolutionary propagandists of the fear of 
abolition by England appears clearly in many of their documents, e.g.: 

"Spain has finally granted to England the entire abolition of slavery 
in Cuba. The treaty was signed and sealed in the first days of August, 



In the meantime Spain attempted with more or less sincerity 
to suppress the slave trade, although Spanish governors re- 
garded British zeal as largely a selfish effort to reduce the 
prosperity of Cuba as that of Jamaica had been. Diplomatic 
relations between England and Spain were constantly strained 
on this account, and war was always a distinct possibility. 9 

The views of Cubans opposed to annexation were represent- 
ed by Jose Antonio Saco. Saco was a man of remarkable pa- 
triotism and purity of character. He was well educated, had 
travelled widely and commanded the love and confidence of 
his fellow countrymen. He was forced to leave Cuba in 1834, 
on account of his liberal opinions, spending the rest of his life 
in Spain. Although a liberal he was by no means a radical. 
He desired political liberty for Cuba, but did not believe 'that 
revolution was the true means for attaining it. Any wide- 
spread disturbance seemed to him to mean almost certainly a 
race war between white and negro inhabitants ; and even if 
Cuba won independence it would only be to become the seat 
of a war between England and the United States in which 
Cuba would be devastated and finally absorbed by the stronger. 
He dreaded even the peaceful annexation of Cuba to the United 
States, even though such annexation were possible with the full 
equality of a state. For Cuba would not long remain Cuban, 
but become Anglo Saxon. His writings and ideas are an ex- 
ponent not only of the evils which thoughtful and patriotic 
Cubans very clearly saw, but also of that conservatism which 

and so soon as the affair between Russia and Turkey ends, we shall have 
on our coasts the British squadron of the Dardanelles. . . . What will 
be the first consequences of the publication of the treaty as a law? . . . 
It will begin with the total ruin of agriculture; with this will come 
misery, for when the slaves are freed they will pour out over the coun- 
try in bands . . . and after the wasting and consuming of the food . . . 
will come revolution; but one of those revolutions of the strangest 
kind. The vengeance of three centuries and a half of suffering and 
servitude, held back by the influence of an unexampled despotism, . . . 
will lose its moral check under the sudden change. The 'most horrible 
deeds will be the bloody tracks which will mark its passage." 

"Los Patriotas," Havana, Oct. 3, 1853. Given in Morales, 375. 

9 Sedano : "Cuba, 1850-1873," 26, 27. 

The authority on this subject is Aimes (Hubert) "A History of 
Slavery in Cuba, 1511-1868," Putnam's, N. Y.,1906, III & 298 pp. 

See also Concha, op. cit., 288-294. 

British and Foreign State Papers, e.g. XLI, 421 et passim. 

23 



made them dread insurrection and disturbance, and that deep- 
seated race antipathy born of centuries of misunderstanding 
and conflict which made even liberty seem a slight boon if 
coupled with Anglo Saxon domination. For Cuban antipathy 
was equally great towards England and the United States, 
though her attitude to slavery made England especially danger- 
ous. If Cuba were a colony or even a dependency of England, 
sudden slave emancipation would follow. This, to the planters 
at least, would mean economic ruin, and it might mean all the 
horrors of servile war. 10 

Saco felt that peaceful annexation to the United States would 
be bad enough so long as Cuba should have so small a white 
population ; but annexation by force or any attempt at such 
annexation would make Cuba the seat of a terrible conflict. 
He wrote to his friend Cisneros : "Would not (the govern- 
ment) if it felt itself weak, call to its aid the negroes arming 
them and giving them liberty? . . . Would there not be some 
powerful nation which secretly or openly would sustain Spain 
in the struggle? Would not England give her provisions and 
those black soldiers who would fully sympathize with our own 
negroes ? She could count on the Spaniards because she would 
be defending the interests of their government, and on the 
negroes, for they know that she has given them liberty, while 
the United States holds them in hard captivity. No, Gaspar, 

10 Saco regarded the future of the negro problem with gloom. He 
wrote in 1845: "If the slave trade continues, there will he in Cuba 
neither peace nor security. Slave risings have occurred at all times ; but 
they have always been partial, confined to one or two farms, without 
plan or political result. . . . Very different is the character of the 
risings which at brief intervals have occurred in 1842 and 1843 ; and 
the conspiracy last discovered is the most frightful which has ever been 
planned in Cuba, at once on account of its vast ramifications among 
slaves and free negroes, and on account of its origin and purpose. . . . 
It is not necessary that the negroes should rise at once all over the 
island ; it is not necessary that its fields should blaze in conflagration 
from one end to the other in a single day : partial movements repeated 
here and there are enough to destroy faith and confidence. Then emi- 
gration will begin, capital will flee, agriculture and commerce will rap- 
idly diminish, public revenues will lessen, the poverty of these and the 
fresh demands imposed by a continual state of alarm, will cause taxes 
to rise; and, with expenses on the one hand increased, but with receipts 
diminished, the situation of the island will grow more involved until 
there comes the most terrible catastrophe." (Saco, Papeles, II, 133; 
Perez, 33.) 

24 



no, in the name of heaven ! Let us put away such destructive 
thoughts. Let us not be the wretched plaything of men who 
by our sacrifice wish to obtain our land, not for our happiness, 
but for their advantage. • Let there be neither war nor con- 
spiracies of any kind in Cuba. In our critical situation either 
one means the desolation of the country. Let us bear with 
resignation the yoke of Spain. -But let us bear it so as to leave 
to our children, if not a country of liberty, at least one peaceful 
and hopeful. Let us try with all our energies to put down the 
infamous traffic in slaves; let us diminish without violence or 
injustice the number of these; let us do what we can to in- 
crease the white population ; let us do all which you have always 
done, giving a good example to our fellow countrymen, and 
Cuba, our beloved Cuba, shall some day be Cuba indeed I" 11 

But while Saco stood strongly against any movement to an- 
nex Cuba to the United States, he found many Cubans who 
opposed his anti-annexation views. 12 A proclamation was 
issued April 20, 1848, signed "Unos Cubanos," which had a 
very wide circulation in Cuba. This proclamation stated in 
its strongest terms the case for Cuban annexation to the United 
States. It considered first the objection that any attempt to 
gain separation from Spain would be ruinous. It was said 
that Spain would make use of a servile war to quell insurrection 
and that in a time of disturbance the numerous slaves would 
make a break for liberty. - But the proclamation pointed reas- 
suringly to Jamaica where in 1832 a negro insurrection was 
easily stifled although the proportion was seven and seven- 
eighths negroes to one white inhabitant. In Cuba in 1848 there 
were 418,291 whites and 619,333 negroes. Such a number of 
white inhabitants could easily keep in subjection the unarmed 
and unorganized slaves. Union with the United States would 
not mean becoming a possession of the United States, but rather 
would bring all the political and civil rights of Americans. Am- 
algamation of the races would not extinguish Cuban nationality 
for every child born in Cuba would be at once a Cuban and an 

11 Revista Cubana, VI, 545 seq. (1887). Saco to Gaspar Betancourt 
Cisneros. Paris, March 10, 1848. 

See also Sedano : — Estudios Politicos, 39. 

12 The anti-annexationist ideas of Saco were criticized by Cristobal 
Madan, Ramon de Palma, Diaz Quibus, Pedro Jose Morilla, Lorenzo de 
Alio, Arelino de Ciruhuela and others. (Morales, 658.) 

25 



American. "Cuba united to this strong and respected nation, 
whose Southern interests would be identified with hers, would 
be assured quiet and future success ; her wealth would increase, 
doubling the value of her farms and slaves, trebling that of her 
whole territory ; liberty would be given to individual action and 
the system of hateful and harmful restrictions which paralyzed 
commerce and agriculture would be destroyed." "What is a Cu- 
ban today?", exclaims the author of this tract. 13 "A slave, po- 
litically, morally, physically." Then he appeals to his fellow 
countrymen to aid the scheme of annexation, imploring those 
who hold the destiny of Cuba in their hands to lay aside hatred 
and animosity, to generously and patriotically guide public opin- 
ion on the path which an imperious necessity advises and which 
philanthropy and reason demand to save the country. 

With this conflict of views, even among educated Cubans 
who were critical of the United States, it became increasingly 
evident that the Spanish government was in no mood to lose 
its richest possession either by cession or insurrection. The 
Spanish pride was touched and the hope of any peaceful change 
of government, never very real, became even more shadowy. 
The limits to which a Spanish Governor might go were sug- 
gested by the Count of Alcoy in such a way as to show that 
the fears of men like Saco were not wholly unfounded. He 
wrote to the home government as to the means for preserving 
Cuba : "Among the considerable elements of power with which 
Spain counts in this island, ought to be mentioned slavery. 
Permit me, your excellency, to explain my. belief in this regard. 
The interest in preserving their fortunes and in developing the 
rich crops from which they spring causes all the wealthy in- 
habitants of the country to fear the first whisper of conflict 
which may relax the discipline of the slaves, or threaten eman- 
cipation. From this fact I infer that slavery is the rein which 
through fear and interest, will keep in submission the great 
majority of the white population. But if the event should 
arrive of foreign war and of inner commotions such as to 
threaten the dependence of the island, what should be the 
conduct of the Captain General toward slavery? I, my noble 
lord, state my solemn belief that this terrible weapon which the 
-government holds in its hand might in the last extremity pre- 
vent the loss of the island, and that if the inhabitants are per- 

""Unos Cubanos," Havana, 1848. 

26 



suaded that it will be used they will tremble and renounce every 
fond illusion rather than draw down such an anathema. The 
chance is remote without doubt, but that very fact makes me 
express myself clearly : the liberty of all the slaves in a day of 
gravest peril, proclaimed by Her Majesty's representative in 
these territories, would re-establish superiority and even 
strengthen our power in a very real way, based as it would 
then be on that very class which it seems best today to keep 
submerged. But if that last resort should prove insufficient, or 
if it did not suit Spain afterward to retain her hold, it may 
always be brought about that the conquerors shall acquire 
Hayti instead of the rich and prosperous Cuba and that the 
bastard sons who have brought down that calamity by their 
rebellion shall meet in their complete ruin, punishment and dis- 
illusionment. • A principle of retributive justice or of harmony 
with the maxims of modern civilization, to which it is so cus- 
tomary nowadays to appeal, would also call for general eman- 
cipation at the moment when, for whatever reason, Spain 
should decide to renounce the island. ... So far this trans- At- 
lantic province is still strongly attached to the mother land, 
and thanks to the wisdom and maternal solicitude of Her'Ma- 
jesty, I believe that the bonds of union will be still more 
strengthened; but if the fate of nations brings to this land a 
day pregnant with such circumstances as to threaten its loss, 
then national honor and interest alike would demand that ever}' 
recourse and means be exhausted, without saving anything. 
If, even then, fortune should abandon us, we should at least 
leave it written in history that our departure from America 
corresponded to the heroic story of its acquisition." 14 

Such a document throws a flood of light on the unseen diffi- 
culties against which Lopez contended. It breathes again the 
heroic spirit of Cortes and Pizarro with something, too, of 
their Machiavellian disregard for mercy and kindness. Ameri- 
cans who talked lightly of acquiring Cuba little realized the 
despairing pride which, in spite of insurmountable difficulties, 
kept Cuba for Spain another half century after the days of 
Roncali and Concha. 

14 Unpublished Mss. Archives at Havana. . Federico Roncali (Conde 
de Alcoy) al Ministro de Estado. Havana. September 9, 1849. 



27 



CHAPTER III 

American Attitude Toward Cuba 

The American desire for Cuba was primarily a manifesta- 
tion of that spirit of expansion 1 which characterized the 
pioneer and the colonist ; secondarily it was a genuine expres- 
sion of the desire to give political liberty to an oppressed 
people, a desire which was quickened in 1848 by the news of 
the stirring events of that year in Europe; and thirdly in the 
period from 1848 to 1851 it became increasingly an expression 
of the growing passion to extend the bounds of slavery. Be- 
ginning as an enterprise of more or less adventurous character, 
the change of base from 1849, when efforts were made in New 
York, to New Orleans in 1850 and 185 1, was significant of 
the growing breach between north and south. Lulled as the 
movement was, by the accession of a Whig administration and 
by the Great Compromise, it was to reappear in new form 
under the Democratic administration of Pierce. 

From the point of view of national expansion, the American 
desire for Cuba must be regarded as a direct continuation of 
the early struggle for the commerce of the Mississippi, and 
of the territorial results of that struggle. Louisiana, West 
Florida, and Florida were acquisitions which needed Cuba to 
make them complete from the point of view of commercial in- 
dependence in the West. Thus, as early as 1809, Jefferson 
wrote to Madison, speaking of Napoleon : "But although with 
difficulty he will consent to our receiving Cuba into our Union 
. . . that would be a blessing, and I would immediately erect 
a column on- 1 the Southernmost limit of Cuba, and inscribe on 
it 'ne plus ultra,' as to us in that direction. We should then 

1 The extreme spirit of expansion was thus expressed by one writer: 
"The North Americans will spread out far beyond their present bounds. 
They will encroach again and again upon their neighbors. New terri- 
tories will be planted, declare their independence and be annexed ! We 
have New Mexico and California! We have old Mexico and Cuba! 
The isthmus cannot arrest — nor even the Saint Lawrence ! ! Time has 
all this in her womb." Editorial, De Bow f s Review, July, 1848, VI, 9. 

28 



have only to include the north in our confederacy, which 
would be of course in the first war, and we should have such 
an empire for liberty as she has never surveyed since creation ; 
and I am persuaded no Constitution was ever before so well 
calculated as ours for extensive empire and self-government." 2 
In 1823, when the danger of British or French acquisition 
of Cuba seemed great, John Ouincy Adams, who certainly 
could not be accused of any partiality for slavery, or of any 
desire to see slave territory increased, wrote: "Cuba, almost 
in sight of our shores, from a multitude of considerations has 
become an object of transcendent importance to the commercial 
and political interests of our Union. Its commanding position 
with reference to the Gulf of Mexico and the West Indian 
seas ; the character of its population ; its situation midway be- 
tween our Southern coast and the island of St. Domingo; its 
safe and capacious harbor of Havana fronting a long line of 
our shore destitute of the same advantage; the nature of its 
productions and of its wants, furnishing the supplies and need- 
ing the returns of a commerce immensely profitable and mu- 
tually beneficial, — give it an importance in the sum of our 
national interests with which that of no other foreign country 
can be compared and little inferior to that which binds the 
different members of this Union together. Such indeed are, 
between the interests of that island and of this country, the 
geographical, commercial, moral, and political relations, formed 
by nature, gathering in the process of time, and even now 
verging to maturity, that, in looking forward to the probable 
course of events for the short period of half a century, it is 
scarcely posssible to resist the conviction that the annexation 
of Cuba to our federal republic will be indispensable to the 
continuance and integrity of the Union itself. It is obvious, 

2 Jefferson, Works, 1904 Edition, XIV (VII). Jefferson wrote to 
Monroe in 1823 : "Cuba alone seems at present to hold up a speck of 
war to us. Its possession by Great Britain would indeed be a great 
calamity to us. Could we induce her to join us in guaranteeing its 
independence against all the world, except Spain, it would be nearly 
as valuable to us as if it were our own. But should she take it, I would 
not immediately go to war for it; because the first war on other ac- 
counts will give it to us ; or the island will give itself to us, when able 
to do so." 

Jefferson came later to know that the choice of the Cubans would 
be independence. Jefferson's Works, 1904, XV, 436, 453- 

29 



however, that for this event we are not yet prepared. Numer- 
ous and formidable objections to the extension of our territorial 
dominions beyond the sea present themselves to the first con- 
templation of the subject; obstacles to the system of policy by 
which alone that result can be compassed and maintained are 
to be foreseen and surmounted both at home and abroad ; but 
there are laws of political as well as of physical gravitation, 
and if an apple, severed by the tempest from its native tree, 
cannot choose but fall to the ground, Cuba, forcibly disjoined 
from its own unnatural connection with Spain, and incapable 
of self-support, can gravitate only towards the North Ameri- 
can Union, which by the same law of nature, cannot cast her 
off from its bosom." 3 

In 1848, the administration of Polk was drawing to a close. 
The keynote of the policy of Polk had been expansion — ex- 
pansion for its own sake, although the Wilmot Proviso had 
introduced the question which was already bringing to a close 
the period of expansion and engaging all the interests of the 
nation in the growing question of slavery. 

Trist's hasty conclusion of the treaty of Guadaloupe Hidalgo 
had left the administration dissatisfied with the extent of our 
acquisitions, and yet it was compelled by the rising tide of 
opposition to allow the treaty of peace to be made on the 
terms of Trist and Scott. But an opportunity soon came to 
retrieve this misfortune. Yucatan, an outlying province of 
Mexico, was in the throes of a race struggle between Indians 
and whites. Their own government, of course, could do noth- 
ing to end the state of anarchy and in this predicament the 
whites appealed for outside interference. The appeal seemed 
to Polk eminently opportune and he asked the permission 
of Congress to intervene for the sake of humanity and on 
account of the danger of intervention by either England or 
Spain in case we did not. On May 15, 1848, Calhoun made 
a speech opposing intervention in Yucatan as unnecessary and 
because it could bring no possible advantage to us. Yucatan, 

3 Instructions to Mr. Nelson, newly appointed minister to Spain, April 
28, 1832. House Ex. Doc. 121, 32 Cong. 1 Sess. For the circumstances 
see Chadwick, Chapter X. See also Letter from Trist to Van Buren, 
I 837 (?), regarding Cuba. Van Buren, Mss., Library of Congress. 
He says of the acquisition of Cuba: "It would be a second edition of 
the Louisiana purchase." 

30 



he said, was a barren country and without harbors. It only- 
controlled the passage into the Caribbean Sea, very few vessels 
passing out by that route. It could make no difference to us 
who held Yucatan, for England already controlled the Carib- 
bean by means of Jamaica and Balize. The general principles 
of the Monroe Doctrine should *not be carried to such an ex- 
treme as to endanger our interests, however useful they might 
be to safeguard them. Then he continued significantly: 

"There are cases of interposition where I would resort to the 
hazard of war with all its calamities. Am I asked for one? 
I will answer. I designate the case of Cuba. So long as Cuba 
remains in the hands of Spain — a friendly power — a power 
of which we should have no dread — it should continue to be, 
as it has been the policy of all administrations ever since I 
have been connected with the government, to let Cuba remain 
there; but with the fixed determination, which I hope never 
will be relinquished, that, if Cuba pass from her, it shall not 
be into any other hands but ours : this not from a feeling of 
ambition, not from a desire for the extension of dominion, but 
because that island is indispensable to the safety of the United 
States; or rather, because it is indispensable to the safety of 
the United States that this island should not be in certain 
hands." 4 

The opposition of Calhoun to further acquisitions in Mexico, 
and especially to the acquisition of Yucatan, projects on which 
Polk and Buchanan looked with favor, and his eager desire 
to acquire Cuba are easily explicable. Mexico and Yucatan 
were high lands, for the most part unsuited to those crops 
which depended so largely on slaves for their cultivation. Cuba 
on the other hand contained many slaves. The danger was 
great that Spain, either as a means of self defence or under 
the influence of Great Britain might emancipate these slaves. 
The effect of such an example on the negroes of our own 

4 Calhoun, Works, Vol. IV, pp. 467 seq. The propaganda to secure 
Cuba began in 1845, with the accession of the Democrats to power. In 
1846 Senator Yulee of Florida urged in the Senate negotiations for the 
purchase of Cuba. For the effects of these first movements, carefully 
watched in Cuba, see letters, Unpublished Mss. Havana, Archives : 

1. Del Mtro. de Estado, Oct. 21, 1845- 

2. Al " " " Dec. IS, 1845- 

3. Del " " " Mar. 26, 1846. 

See also Zaragoza, op. cit. I, 585. 

3i 



/ 



Southern States would be incalculable. From the point of 
view of Calhoun, our most cherished institutions depended on 
the continuance at all hazards of slavery in Cuba. This speech, 
therefore, is immensely significant as marking the point where 
the desire for new territory was first expressed frankly in the 
interests of slavery. 5 

From the point of view of Calhoun, the possibility of aboli- 
tion in Cuba was a pressing danger to the United States. The 
number of negroes was increasing, since Spain was either un- 
willing or unable to put a stop to the slave trade. The pres- 
sure for the abolition, not only of the slave trade but also of 
slavery itself, was growing constantly stronger. The demands 
of England were yearly more imperative. There was every 
reason to fear that Spain would free the negroes of Cuba with- 
out regard to the desire of the Creole owners if the danger 
of losing Cuba became too great. At the close of the Mexican 
war the struggle for the maintenance of slavery was already 
beginning to be a losing one. Clearly the great gains from that 
war were, more or less unexpectedly, overwhelmingly in favor 
of the free states. It was this very situation which had led 
the far seeing Calhoun to be at once an author of Texan an- 
nexation and an opponent of the Mexican war. Texas, like 
Cuba, was suited to slavery. Mexico, on her high plateau, 

5 The importance of the island in 1850 was especially great. The 
recent acquisition of California and the discovery of gold there made 
an open route to Panama a vital question. Havana was a natural port 
of call for vessels engaged in the California trade and an unfriendly 
power could do much to hinder traffic, as was clearly proved in the case 
of the Ohio in 1853. This vessel bound from Colon to New York was 
arbitrarily stopped in the harbor at Havana for three days without 
being allowed to communicate with the shore. The vessel at the time 
had on board a large number of passengers and a quantity of gold. 
The captain was not even allowed to send a letter to the consul. At 
the time the vessel had a clean bill of health except for some cases of 
ordinary malarial fever which the Spanish authorities refused to 
investigate. House Exec. Doc. 86, 33 Cong. 1 Sess. 87. (See Chadwick, 
249). 

For a positive economic argument for acquiring Cuba see Thrasher, 
J. S. : "Cuba and the United States" De Bow's Review, N. O. 1854, 
XVII, 43. This argument was based on the fact that a slave worth 
$400 or $500 in Havana would cost $1200 in New Orleans. Cuba could 
now produce sugar more cheaply, but by annexation, and consequent 
equalization of the price of labor, the disadvantage of Louisiana would 
disappear. 

32 



would only add to the strength of the already overwhelming 
superiority of the free territory within the United States. 

The speech of Calhoun in the Yucatan debate seemed to 
quicken the desire of the administration, already committed 
to expansion, to secure the rich possession to the South. On 
June 12, 1848, Buchanan wrote to Romulus M. Saunders, our 
Minister to Spain, instructing him to make every effort to 
secure Cuba from Spain and giving him authority to make a 
treaty in which Spain would receive $100,000,000 if it were 
necessary to offer so much. The letter discussed fully and 
frankly the commercial reasons which had weight with the 
United States in making this offer: 

"The fate of this island must ever be deeply interesting to 
the people of the United States. We are content that it shall 
continue to be a colony of Spain. Whilst in her possession 
we have nothing to apprehend. Besides we are bound to her 
by ties of ancient friendship, and we sincerely desire to render 
these perpetual. 

"But we can never consent that this island shall become a 
colony of any other European power. In the possession of 
Great Britain or any strong naval power, it might prove 
ruinous both to our domestic and foreign commerce, and even 
endanger the Union of the States. The highest and first 
duty of every independent nation is to provide for its own 
safety; and acting upon this principle we should be compelled 
to resist the acquisition of Cuba by any powerful maritime 
state with all the means which Providence has placed at our 
command. 

"Cuba is almost within sight of the coast of Florida. Sit- 
uated between that state and the peninsula of Yucatan and 
possessing the deep, capacious and impregnably fortified har- 
bor of the Havana, if this island were under the dominion of 
Great Britain, she could command both the inlets to the Gulf 
of Mexico. She would thus be enabled in time of war effect- 
ively to blockade the mouth of the Mississippi and to deprive 
all the western states of this Union, as well as those within 
the Gulf, teeming as they are with an industrious and enter- 
prising population, of a foreign market for their immense 
productions. But this is not the worst. She could, also, de- 
stroy the commerce by sea between our ports on the Gulf and 



33 



Atlantic ports, a commerce of nearly as great value as the 
whole of our foreign trade." 

The moment seemed to Buchanan very propitious to strike 
for annexation : 

"We have received information from various sources, both 
official and unofficial, that among the Creoles of Cuba there 
has long existed a deep rooted hostility to Spanish dominion. 
The revolutions which are rapidly succeeding each other 
throughout the world have inspired the Cubans with an ardent 
and irrepressible desire to achieve their independence. Indeed, 
we are informed by the consul of the United States at Havana 
that 'there appears every probability that the island will soon 
be in a state of civil war.' He also states that 'efforts are now 
being made to raise money for that purpose in the United 
States, and there will be attempts to induce a few of the 
volunteer regiments now in Mexico to obtain their discharge 
and join in the Revolution.' . . . The consul in his despatch 
*to me also stated that 'if the revolution is attempted and suc- 
ceeds, immediate application would be made to the United 
States for annexation'; but he did not seem to think that it 
could be successful and probably might not be undertaken with- 
out the aid of American troops. To this portion of the des- 
patch I replied, knowing the ardent desire of the Cubans to be 
annexed to our Union, that I thought it would be 'difficult to 
predict that an unsuccessful rising would delay, if it should not 
defeat, the annexation of the island to the United States,' and 
I assured him that the aid of our volunteer troops could not 
be obtained." 6 

The United States did not care to use unfair means to acquire 
Cuba, and, therefore, it was not willing to fish in the troubled 
waters of a Cuban insurrection. But none the less Buchanan 
made it very clear to our minister that the Polk administration 
regarded the acquisition of Cuba as an all important step. 
The proper price to be paid would depend on the amount of 
the revenues, for Buchanan seems to have regarded Cuba as a 
source of direct revenue as well as of indirect advantages. 
The total revenues under the Spanish regime had in 1844 
amounted to $10,490,252,875, but Buchanan had learned from 
Calderon, the Spanish Minister, that the surplus to the Spanish 
Crown had never in any single year exceeded $2,000,000. From 

* Moore, Buchanan, VIII, 90 et seq. 

34 



the point of view of Spain, then, a fair price would be about 
$50,000,000, and Buchanan thought that Spain might be satis- 
fied with such a price. 7 

To the United States, Cuba might furnish as a state two 
sources of revenue — the public lands and the federal tariff. 
Most of these public lands seemed to have already been as- 
signed by Spain to private individuals so that the revenue from 
them would probably be small. But the value of imports in 
1844 were $25,000,000 and were probably more in 1848. The 
average rate of our existing tariff was twenty-five per cent, 
within a small fraction, and even deducting those imports 
which, coming from other parts of the United States, would en- 
ter free, and which amounted to one-fifth of the whole, the 
United States could still count, according to Buchanan's calcu- 
lation, on an initial revenue of $5,000,000. There might be an 
increase in naval expenses to offset this, but on this basis the 
maximum price to be paid for Cuba could be arrived at. These 
considerations brought Buchanan to the question of the price: 

"Upon the whole, the President would not hesitate to stipu- 
late for the payment of one hundred millions of /dollars, in 
convenient installments, for a cession of the Island of Cuba, 
if it could not be procured for a less sum. 

"The apprehensions which existed, for many years after the 
origin of this government, that the extension of our federal 
system would endanger the Union, seem to have passed away. 
Experience has proved that this system of confederated Re- 
publics, under which the Federal Government has charge of 
the interests common to the whole, whilst local governments 
■^atch over, the concerns of the respective states, is capable of 
almost infinite extension with increasing strength. This, how- 
ever, is always subject to the qualification that the mass of 
the population must be of our own race or must have been 
educated in the school of civil and religious liberty. With this 
qualification,' the more we increase the number of confederated 
states, the greater will be the strength and security of the 
Union ; because the more dependent for their mutual interests 
will the several parts be upon the whole, and the whole upon 
the several parts. 

"It is true that of the 418,291 white inhabitants which Cuba 
contained in 1841, a very large portion is of the Spanish race, 

7 Moore, Buchanan, VIII, 90 et seq. 

35 



still many of our citizens have settled on the island, and some 
of them -are large holders of property. Under our Government 
it would speedily be Americanized, — as Louisiana has been. 
. . . Cuba, justly appreciating the advantages of annexation 
is now ready to rush into our arms. Once admitted she would 
be entirely dependent for her prosperity, and even existence, 
upon her connection with the Union; whilst the rapidly in- 
creasing trade between her and the other States would shed 
its benefits and blessings over the whole. Such a state of 
mutual dependence, resulting from the very nature of things, 
the world has never witnessed. This is what will insure the 
perpetuity of our Union. 

"With all these considerations in view, the President be- 
lieves that the crisis has arrived when an effort should be made 
to purchase the island of Cuba from Spain, and he has deter- 
mined to intrust you with the performance of this most delicate 
and important duty. The attempt should be made first in a 
confidential conversation with the Spanish Minister for For- 
eign Affairs. . . . 

"Should you succeed in accomplishing the object, you will as- 
sociate your name with a most important and beneficial meas- 
ure for the glory and prosperity of your country." s 

The Spanish court was at La Gran j a when Saunders re- 
ceived his instructions in July, 1848. Going there, the Ameri- 
can minister obtained an interview with General Narvaez the 
President of the Council. By him he was received politely 
but coldly, and Saunders became convinced that his task was 
hopeless. He was referred by Narvaez to the newly appointed 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Senor Pidal. Pidal refused to 
give Saunders any hope of immediate cession of the island; 
he said that although the future seemed doubtful, owing to 
the strained relations with England, yet Spain felt sure of the 
safety of the island. There was a hint that the subject might 
later be reopened, and with that hint the American had to 
await as contentedly as he might. 

In the meantime the story of negotiations to sell Cuba had 
leaked out and had produced a storm of angry protest in the 
Spanish press. Thus when Saunders opened the subject again 
in December the situation had distinctly changed. Pidal spoke 
emphatically saying that no minister of the crown of Spain 

8 Buchanan, Works, Edited by J. B. Moore 1909, VIII, 90 et seq. 

36 



would dare to listen to any such proposition, since the unani- 
mous opinion of the country would prefer to see the island 
submerged in the ocean, rather than yielded to any other 
power. 9 

The New York Herald took up the question and published 
the story of the negotiations. Saunders was accused of lazi- 
ness and incapacity and public opinion caused his recall soon 
after the advent of the new administration. 

This ended for a long time the diplomatic efforts to secure 
Cuba, an effort hopeless in its very nature, 10 but important in 
its result. Many now believed that the filibuster must fill the 
place of the diplomat. 11 

9 See Sedano: Estudios Politicos, 23, 24. 

10 For the difficulty of ever persuading Spain to voluntarily sell Cuba 
see letter of the American Consul Campbell to Clayton, dated Havana 
June 13, 1850— Clayton Mss. Library of Congress. Campbell re- 
garded the purchase of the island by the United States as prac- 
tically impossible: "No ministry, whatever false showing they may 
make, would dare to carry it out. The open attempt would not 
only drive the ministry from power, but from the array of interests 
against the alienation, endanger the safety of the throne. These inter- 
ests are as follows. All offices here are filled from Spain. All prom- 
inent officers, lawyers and doctors look to this island as the place to 
obtain station and wealth. Here their agricultural interests find their 
market,— the manufacturing interests of Barcelona practically the same. 
From discriminating duties in favor of Spanish vessels almost all Eu- 
ropean cargoes are imported under the Spanish -flag and the island in 
this way sustains more than three-fourths of the whole merchant 
marine of Spain. Large capitals in Spain in the hands of unprincipled 
men- are invested in the slave trade, causing an annual sale of slaves 
in this island of from three to four millions of dollars. You readily 
discover that such a union of interests and among a people accustomed 
to civil war would be too strong for a ministry, if not fatal to a dynasty. 
That Christina and a ministry could be bought I have no doubt from 
my knowledge of Spanish character, if the thing could be done in se- 
crecy, but the action of the Cortes and the result would make that im- 
probable. Those different interests would be finally united and arrayed 
against any measure the tendency of which would be to their infamy." 

"But Buchanan was still hopeful. In a letter of John M. Clayton 
to Buchanan just after the latter retired from office, dated April 14, 
1849, Clayton banters his predecessor for his failure to secure Cuba: 
"What will you give me to recall Romulus Saunders from Spain? 
Speak out— do not be bashful. Shall I try to buy Cuba after you have 
made such a botch of that business? Do you still wish like Sancho to 
have an island?" 

Buchanan answered in more serious vein. April 12, 1849: "We must 

37 



That the enthusiasm for Cuban independence was not wholly 
selfish is proved by its widespread character. In fact the feel- 
ing was very similar to that in favor of Hungarian and other 
Revolutionists who at this time were received as heroes. It 
is to be remembered that the American of 1850 had almost a 
fanatical belief in the sacredness of republican institutions and 
in their applicability toall political conditions. 12 The condition 
of the island of Cuba and the tyranny of its government had 
long been painted in the blackest colors. A moderate New 
Orleans paper described well two classes- eager to go to Cuba 
at this time : 

"We know that among the volunteers who will fly to the 
help of the island of Cuba, there will be found many adven- 
turers like those who accompanied William the Conqueror in 
his expedition against England; we know that there are some 
natures, unquiet and restless, for whom repose is a punishment, 
and action and danger are necessities. But we know that there 
are also generous and impressionable natures, friends of peace, 
but believing that war is an honorable and sacred mission when 
a sword is bound on and drawn in the interests of a great and 
sacred cause. And why should not Americans do for the 

have Cuba. We can't do without Cuba, and above all we must not 
suffer its transfer to Great Britain. We shall acquire it by a coup d'etat 
at some propitious moment, which from the present state of Europe, 
may not be far distant." 

Buchanan blamed the failure very largely on Saunders : "It must be 
admitted that a more skilful agent might have been selected to conduct 
the negotiations in Spain, as our present minister speaks no language 
but English, and even this he sometimes murders. . . . How delighted 
then am I to feel that you have selected a diplomatist and one fit for 
the work, — one who possessing no vanity himself and knowing when 
to speak and when to be silent, is so well calculated to flutter the pride 
of the Dons, — who by the gentle arts of insinuation and persuasion can 
gradually prepare the queen mother, the ministers and courtiers for 
the great surrender, — and who above all is a perfect master both of 
the language of Louie le Grand and of the knight of the rueful coun- 
tenance. Cuba is already ours. I feel it in my finger's ends." 

(This ideal diplomat is called "Col. I. W. W.") Moore. Buchanan. 
VIII, 360, 361. 

12 Among many examples, Crittenden to Clayton, Frankfort, July 20, 
1849, Clayton Mss. Library of Congress : "The great conflict is now 
going on between popular rights and monarchical or despotic powers. 
That is the issue before mankind." 

38 



island of Cuba what Byron did for Greece and what Lafayette 
did for America?" 13 

The state of American public opinion and especially Ameri- 
can attitude toward Cuba were watched with the greatest 
anxiety in England and France and especially by the successive 
Captains General in Cuba. The London Times made no effort 
to conceal its glee over the growing internal diffculties which 
lessened dangers of further American -aggression. The keen- 
ness with which men like Roncali and Concha analyzed Ameri- 
can problems at a time when American statesmen were trying 
to blind their own eyes to the gravity of the situation is very 
remarkable. Viewing America from near at hand and yet from 
without, and stimulated by fear to the closest observation, the 
governors of Cuba were able to lift the veil of a future which 
men like Webster and Polk and Clay refused to contemplate. 
Roncali thus analyzed the situation to the Minister of State in 
1849 : "With the enlargement of the North American republic, 
there arose long ago the idea of dominating all the Gulf of 
Mexico and therefore the island of Cuba which is wisely re- 
garded as its key. ' Enticed further, by the abundance of its 
fruits and the fame of its fertility, the ambition of the Anglo 
Saxon race could not forget it in the midst of its acquisitions. 
But, since the annexation of Texas, and especially since the 
recent war with Mexico, that project has become so widespread 
that it is without doubt rooted in the public opinion of a great 
part of the states, the writings published for that purpose in 

13 Editorial translated from "L'Abeille de la Nouvelle Orleans," July 

28, 185 1. 

For conservative opposition to any further expansion which became 
the typical Whig view, see <R. Ewing to Crittenden, Feb. 4, 1848. Un- 
published Mss. Library of Congress. 

F. P. Blair wrote to Van Buren, July 15, 1850 describing sarcastically 
the desire of Calhoun to make Cuba a part of a great slave empire. 
Van Buren, Mss. Lib. of Congress. 

But Henry Clay told Captain General Concha frankly, on his visit 
to Havana, that the eventual union of Cuba to the United States was 
inevitable, although he deprecated any unlawful efforts in that direc- 
tion. (Concha al Presidente del Consejo, March 21, 1851. Cited by 
Sedano, "Cuba, 1850-1873," p. 24.) And a writer in De Bow's Review 
said in 185 1 :— "None can doubt, that, at this moment, there is a well 
fixed and almost- universal conviction upon the minds of our people, 
that the possession of Cuba is indispensable to the proper development 
and security of our country"— De Bow's Review, IX, 173. 

39 



Spanish by children of the island having contributed to that 
end. Since the idea of propaganda and expansion has been 
adopted by one of the political parties into which Congress 
is divided, and since the other which is actually in power 
(i.e. the Whigs) has adopted a conservative attitude, it is easy 
to see that with the Cuban question a matter of dispute and 
discussion, Cuban acquisition will serve as a banner to the 
increased parliamentary opposition which the President already 
has, and that on the accession of another administration at the 
end of this term of office, circumstances will grow rapidly more 
serious, and that which today is unable to inspire grave fears 
or to produce more than passing evils, will be changed into a 
grave danger for which preparation should be made. It ought 
also to be kept in mind that even though the acquisition of 
Cuba would in a general way be pleasing to that whole republic, 
the vital dispute which separates the states of the north from 
those of the south makes them look at it from different points 
of view : the Southern States would acquire in the federal gov- 
ernment an importance which they require for the sake of 
slavery, if the acquisition should be made preserving slavery, 
the very consideration which causes those of the north to say 
to the Cubans that the first steps toward the liberty to which 
they aspire should be the emancipation of their slaves. This 
difference of views is therefore very worthy to occupy the 
attention of the government, and as proof of what may some 
day take place it is well to note the course which is each time 
more openly taken in the discussions regarding slavery, a ques- 
tion which in the judgment of very observant men is the cancef 
which is eating away that nation and which will perhaps bring 
destruction of the federation." 14 

Roncali clearly saw the two great dangers of Cuba: one of 
internal discontent, and the other of external aggression. He 
believed that the American passion for expansion would sooner 
or later overcome all opposition and bring on a war between 
the United States and Spain. For this war he was hopeful, 
for Spain had gained in prestige and power since the close of 
the destructive civil war. 

Captain General Concha, who succeeded Roncali in Novem- 
ber, 1850, summed up the situation in much the same fashion, 

14 El Conde de Alcoy al Ministro del Estado. Havana, Sept. 9, 1849. 
Unpublished Mss. Havana Archives. 

40 



although he did not quite so clearly grasp the significance of 
the impending conflict in the United States. He describes the 
ambitions of the Americans, "the Vandals of the New World," 
and the importance of Cuba to them, especially when the At- 
lantic and Pacific should be united by a canal. 

"It would be in my opinion a deplorable mistake to expect 
from the contest which is going on between the slave states and 
the free states of the union a serious obstacle to these ambitious 
views. The first class covet Cuba, because by its acquisition 
they would acquire greater political importance in the Federal 
Government and would gain the greater utility of their three 
million slaves ; the second covet it because with its overflowing 
population, the enterprising mercantile and industrial spirit of 
its inhabitants, and its great fortunes, they might make con- 
siderable financial gains ; finally, both classes covet Cuba, be- 
cause there has taken possession of all the most unbridled 
passion to acquire territory." 15 

"There is in the United States a part of the people which 
eagerly desires the annexation of Cuba. The Southern slave 
states are very much interested in it, because, if they should 
succeed in securing it by their efforts, they would leave slavery 
in existence in Cuba, by means of which they would secure in 
addition to an offset against the preponderance of the Northern 
States, an advantageous field for their capital invested in slaves. 
On the other hand, public opinion has been decidedly unfa- 
vorable to Spanish government in Cuba and all the people of 
the island are supposed to be disposed to rise against the gov- 
ernment at the first opportunity which may present itself, as 
was shown by the very, fact that they supposed a brief expedi- 
tion sufficient ■ for the purpose." It seemed to the Captain 
General that the party in favor of annexation was only waiting 
for the very first incident which might serve as a pretext for 
war against Spain with the ultimate aim of acquiring Cuba. 
The responsibility of the Captain General was very great, real- 
izing as he did that one false step would be sufficient to plunge 
Spain into a war from which she would have nothing to gain 
and everything to lose. 16 

"Captain General Concha, Havana, March 31, 1851. Letter directed 
"Al Excmo. Sr_ Presidente del Consejo de Ministros," Boletin, A. 
IV; N. IV. 

M Concha, op. cit. p. 222. 

41 



With public opinion in such a state in Cuba and the United 
States, with the news of great events in Europe, with the ex- 
ample of easy American victories in Mexico, with even Spanish 
officials looking into the future gloomily, it is scarcely to be 
wondered at that men staked all on the chance of a free Cuba, 
and that Lopez dreamed of great deeds which only needed a 
leader to make them real. 



42 



CHAPTER IV 
Narciso Lopez and the Round Island Expedition 

Narciso Lopez, the central figure of the Cuban movement 
of 1848-51, was 'born in 1798 or 1799 in Venezuela. His father 
owned several large ranches and the son soon became an expert 
horseman on the plains, an accomplishment which later aided 
him to rise as a cavalry leader. 

The civil war under the leadership of Bolivar ruined the 
estates of the elder Lopez, and he was compelled to engage in 
business enterprises in Caracas and Valencia. After a decisive 
battle at La Puerta, near Valencia, in 1814, in which Bolivar 
and the rebels were for a time crushed, the young Lopez man- 
aged to enlist in the Spanish army, and although a mere boy 
who probably took little account of the political issues involved, 
according to all accounts, served for nine years with dis- 
tinction. Under the patronage of General Morales the young 
Venezuelan was not forgotten ; he was strong and utterly fear- 
less and so gained coveted decorations. When the rebel cause 
was finally triumphant in 1823 Lopez had risen to the rank 
of Colonel. 

In that year the Spaniards evacuated Caracas, the army 
withdrawing to Cuba, where the young officer married the 
daughter of a noble family, and became, in his chief interests, 
Cuban. 

Passing to Spain, Colonel Lopez became immediately known 
as a liberal in the reign of absolutism set up by the aid of French 
arms which lasted until the death of the old king, Ferdinand 
the Seventh, in September, 1833. On Ferdinand's death the 
liberal party championed the cause of the Queen Maria Chris- 
tina and her infant daughter Maria Isabel, who by the Salic 
law would have been excluded from the succession, against 
Don Carlos, the old king's brother and the representative of 
Absolutism and Reaction. Christina, .by means of the dead 
king's will, managed to gain power, and the Carlists were 
placed in the position of rebels, their party being especially 
strong north of the Ebro. 

43 



In the coup d'etat by which Christina seized the throne, 
Lopez took an active part and hence became a prominent 
"Christino," as the followers of the queen were called. 

On the appointment of Valdez to the command Lopez 
became an aide de camp to the Spanish general, a relation which 
grew into a deep and life long friendship. 1 Promoted to the 
command of a cavalry brigade of some 3000 men Lopez dis- 
played activity and courage which widely increased his repu- 
tation. At one time during an emergency he took over the 
command at Valencia on the assassination of the real gov- 
ernor, an act for which he was criticised severely. 2 Later 
he was for a short time governor of Madrid. 

1 From the Diary and Letters of a certain English Colonel named 
Gurnwood we get at first hand some interesting glimpses of Lopez and 
his patron Valdez in 1835. These are quoted in Eliot (Edward G.) 
"Papers relating to Lord Eliot's Mission to Spain in the spring of 
1835," London, 187 r. 

Diary of Col. Gurnwood, April 30, 1835, Eliot, 94. "Overtook the 
column at Mendaria and breakfasted with Valdes; afterward accom- 
panied the column, 6000 infantry and four mountain guns, commanded 
by General Aldarna, to Seswa. On arrival there took leave of Valdes 
and went on to Lerin. Met General Lopez who commands the cavalry. 
. . . Quartered in the same house with Lopez; joined him and his 
officers at tea; much exaggeration; most of them for intervention; of 
course, being cavalry of the guard, they perferred Madrid." 

Same May 3rd : "Took leave of Valdes, who in the transactions 
between us, appeared an honest man — I doubt his being a General." 
(Lopez at this time was in command of a column of something more 
than 2000 men). 

Gurnwood to Somerset, May 1, 1835, Eliot, 138. "We were lodged 
last night at the same house at Leren, with General Lopez — an active 
intelligent young man. We passed the evening with him and his offi- 
cers — who, like the officers of cavalry in other services, spoke much, 
but to little purpose, on the campaign. . . . Valdes is a very gentleman- 
like person in his manners — not so in appearance, for he looks like a 
'Marchand de lorgnettes.' He rides at the head of his column 'en 
bourgeois' in a great green coat with sugar loaf buttons, and a plushy 
round hat, something in appearance between the 'marchand de lorg- 
nettes' and an American skipper! I doubt very much his having any 
professional talent." 

There was also a guerilla leader on the Carlist side, Antonio Lopez, 
who after brilliant movements was captured and shot. (Walton, Revo- 
lutions of Spain, II, 468.) This Lopez seems sometimes to be confused 
by magazine writers, with Narciso Lopez. 

2 Lopez answered these criticisms in a pamphlet now very rare. A 
copy may be seen in the New York public library : "Constestacion del 

44 



"On the close of active hostilities Lopez, now a Field Marshal, 
became a Senator in the Cortes from the Liberal city of Seville. 
Upon the appointment of his friend, General Valdez, to the 
supreme command in Cuba, Lopez succeeded in persuading 
Espartero, the head of the liberal government, to give him 
an appointment in that island. By the influence of Valdez, 
Lopez was appointed to a number of prominent positions and 
finally was made Governor of Trinidad, an important point in 
the central part of the island. 3 

Lopez filled with credit the important positions which he 
occupied gaining the good will of the people under his com- 
mand. But at the close of 1843 Valdez was relieved by Gen- 
eral Leopoldo O'Donnell and Lopez lost his lucrative political 
appointment, retaining the rank of a Spanish General but with- 
out duties. He now engaged in several business enterprises in 
which partly through mismanagement and also partly through 
gambling losses he was wholly unsuccessful. His last enter- 
prises were the management of certain mines and plantations 
near Cienfuegos. In these enterprises although supported finan- 
cially by wealthy capitalists he became involved so deeply as 
to be unable to meet his obligations. 

Lopez, who had belonged to the liberal party in Spain and 
who was also somewhat embittered by loss of wealth and 
influence, had long intrigued against the interests of Spain. Al- 
though he himself desired independence for Cuba, he did not 
wish to risk an effort for independence which might bring 
abolition. In these circumstances we find him turning for ad- 
vice to Robert Campbell, American Consul at Havana and an 
eager advocate of the American acquisition of Cuba. Campbell 
did not hesitate to express his sympathy, and to say that he 
had been impressed toy the increase of American feeling in favor 
of acquiring Cuba. But, as an American Consul, he was com- 
pelled to advise Lopez of the reiterated expressions of friend- 

Mariscal de Campo, Don Narciso Lopez, a varios cargos relativos, a 
los sucesos ultimos de Valencia," 30 pp. Madrid, 1839. 

3 We find Lopez already intriguing for separation from Spain as early 
as 1842. He desired to preserve slavery, and so feared especially Eng- 
lish intrigues. See communication from Francis Ross Cocking, former- 
ly British Vice Consul at Havana to Lord Palmerston dated, Caracas, 
Oct. 1, 1846, of which a Spanish translation forwarded from Madrid 
to the Captain General of Cuba, January 24, 1852, is published in El 
Boletin del Archivo Nacional. Havana, A. Ill, N. IV. 

45 



ship and of the treaty obligations existing between Spain and 
the United States. Campbell said that he had even written to 
President Polk for instructions in case slavery were abolished 
in Cuba as a result of the popular movement which was then 
taking place in Europe. Polk, in reply, had pointed to the dis- 
banding of the army against Mexico as a sure sign that he did 
not intend any depredations against neighboring territory, and 
directed Campbell to discourage any talk of war. 4 

From this time on Lopez seemed to have felt very sure that 
in a last extremity the United States would intervene for the 
benefit of a revolutionary party. 

At the time of his conversation with Campbell or soon after 
Lopez was plotting a revolutionary movement which was to 
have had its center at Cienfuegos. 

The date of the rising was set for the 24th of June, 
1848, but the non-arrival of arms expected from the United 
States caused some delay. In the meantime a youth who be- 
longed to the number of conspirators revealed the secret to his 
mother who in turn confided it to her husband. On the advice 
of his lawyer, the father laid this information before the gov- 
ernment. On the sixth of July, Lopez was summoned to appear 
on important business before the Governor at Cienfuegos, but 
hearing of the imprisonment of the young man who had reveal- 
ed the plot, he immediately fled. At Pijuan he caught the train 
for Cardenas and from there sailed to the neighboring port of 
Matanzas. He was fortunate enough to find the ship "Nep- 
tune" just about to sail to Providence, Rhode Island, and he 
was soon safe from pursuit on the ocean. Jose Sanchez Iznaga, 
who had revealed the conspiracy was allowed to escape. Ron- 
cali, Count of Alcoy, the Governor General, acted with unusual 
leniency. No punishments followed the discovery, although 
the absent Lopez was condemned to death (Mar. 3, 1849), an d 
Iznaga to six years imprisonment. 5 

4 See an account of a frank conversation between Campbell and 
Roncali, reported to the Minister of State, July 27, 1849. Boletin, 1906, 
p. 61. 

5 For the movement of 1848 in Cuba see the letters given in appendix 
(Unpublished Mss. Havana Archives) : 

1. Al m'tro de la gobernacion, Mar. 28, 1848- 

2. " " " " " , May 27, 1848- 

3. " " " " " , July 14, 1848. 

This last is a detailed account, which serves as my chief authority. 

46 



The immediate effect of the effort and flight of Lopez was a 
clear statement of the Spanish attitude to foreign aggression, 
given in the official organ, La Gaceta de la Habana, Dec. 27, 
1848. 6 The Gaceta said that "Spain had in the Gulf of Guinea 
two islands of small importance, namely Fernando Po and 
Anobon, almost forgotten, but whose sale the nation opposed ; 
and that being the case, even less readily would the Crown dis- 
pose of an island like Cuba, clung to so devotedly as the most 
important of trans- Atlantic possessions, on account of a gov- 
ernment, of a religion established for more than 300 years, of 
laws and of kinship which were not to be sacrificed to a rash 
and almost unthinkable scheme. 

"No Spaniard," continued the statement, "would be able to 
mention (the scheme) without indignation, and that alone- 
should prove convincing to the authors of such schemes, all the 
more so knowing that Cuba is prosperous and lives happily un- 
der the paternal government of Spain, since its inhabitants 
compare what the America which once was Spanish is now 
with what it used to be; and since they cannot avoid turning 
their eyes toward Europe and the entire world as they thank 
the kind Providence which has preserved them unharmed in 
the midst of universal misfortune." 

In this letter, the Captain General thus characterizes Lopez: "El 
Mariscal de Campo, D. Narciso Lopez, tan conocido por los arrebatos 
temerarios i Imprudentes de su caracter, como por la Veleidad e in- 
constancia de sus sentimientos y opiniones." 

This, of course, is the picture of an enemy. But Lopez seems to 
have impressed his contemporaries by his enthusiasm more than by his 
caution and sanity. Proud with his equals in rank, he was kind to- 
ward inferiors, and possessed much personal magnetism. At this period 
he was of short, stocky build, with bright black eyes and snow white 
hair. 

For the life of Lopez my authorities in addition to those cited, are : 

1. Concha, Memorias. 

2. Torrente, Bosquejo, Economico Politico. I, 32-37. 

3. Vidal Morales, Iniciadores y Martires de la Revolucion, pp. 197, 

233 ff- 

4. Villaverde, "Memoria del General Narciso Lopez" — Unpublished, 

but used and quoted by Morales, pp. 184, 185. 

5. Zaragoza, Las Insurreciones en Cuba, 1872, 2 Tomos. I, 585 

ff ; I, 554-5. 

6. Democratic Review, Feb. 1850, XXVI, 97 ff. 
6 Zaragoza, op. cit., I, 589. 

47 



Lopez arrived at New York in July of 1848 to find an 
already vigorous movement for the forcible annexation of 
Cuba to the United States. This movement had begun early in 
1847 with newspaper articles critical of the Spanish government 
in Cuba. La Verdad was being published regularly in New 
York and La Patria in New Orleans as means of attack on 
all Spanish institutions. The organ of the Spanish government, 
La Cronica, sought to answer these charges. The young 
Cubans exiled or pursuing their studies in New York had 
formed an organized junta as a center of the propaganda, while 
an organization in Havana was collecting and forwarding sums 
of money. The whole movement had gained encouragement 
from the attitude of a large part of the American press, and 
especially from speeches by Senator Yulee of Florida in the 
Senate (May 6, 1847) an d even from one by Vice-President 
Dallas. 7 

In order to gain the largest possible support in the United 
States, it seemed necessary to secure the services of some well 
known chieftain of the Mexican war as leader. General Worth 
seemed likely to win the support of many veterans of the late 
war and the Cubans first turned eagerly to him. The expedi- 
tion was to consist of 5000 men and to cost $3,000,000, and 
preparations were to be made on a scale which would have 
required the open cooperation of the Polk administration. 
Worth seemed to believe the scheme reasonable but died before 
anything definite could be accomplished. 8 

Lopez, now in New York, was evidently the man fitted both 
by rank and experience to win support in Cuba, while his en- 
thusiasm and personal magnetism made him the natural leader 
of the movement. He held an interview with Jefferson Davis 
and offered him the command of the expedition to Cuba. 9 As 

7 Zaragoza, op. cit. I, 559-567. , 

La Aurora was a newspaper published in New York to propagate 
ideas of Cuban annexation. 
The Courier of Charleston, S. C, published similar articles. 

8 Jose Sanchez Iznaga, "A Mis Amigos en Cuba," New Orleans, 
1853. Quoted by Morales, op. cit. 270. 

9 The exact date of the interview is in some doubt. Mrs. Davis 
places it in the summer of 1848, but speaks of Lopez' death as coming 
within two months i.e. 1851. This was probably a mistake, as it is 
unlikely that Davis or Lee would have at all considered the matter 
after the failures in 1849 and 1850. Mrs. Davis describes Lopez as a 

48 



incentives for the use of his name and influence and for his 
leadership, $100,000 were to be deposited before departure 
to Cuba for the use of Mrs. Davis, while success would be 
rewarded by a bonus of $100,000 more or a fine coffee planta- 
tion. Davis refused, but was sufficiently impressed to suggest 
his friend Major Robert E. Lee as one in whose character and 
abilities he had supreme confidence. Lee's attitude to the of- 
fer was described by Davis himself many years later: "He 
came from Mexico crowned with honors, covered by brevets 
and recognized, young as he was, as one of the ablest of his 
country's soldiers, and to prove that he was estimated then as 
such, I may mention that when he was a Captain of engineers, 
stationed in Baltimore, the Cuban Junta in New York selected 
him to be their leader in the revolutionary effort in that island. 
They were anxious to secure his services, and offered him every 
temptation that ambition could desire, and pecuniary emolu- 
ments far beyond any which he could hope otherwise to acquire. 
He thought the matter over, and, I remember, came to Wash- 
ington to consult me as to what he should do. After a brief 
discussion of the complex character of the military problem 
which was presented, he turned from the consideration of that 
view of the question, by stating that the point on which he 
wished particularly to consult me, was as to the propriety of 
entertaining the proposition which had been made to him. He 
had been educated in the service of the United States, and felt 
it wrong to accept place in the army of a foreign power while 
he held a commission." 10 

Not discouraged by these unsuccessful efforts, Lopez deter- 
mined to organize and lead the expedition himself. The Club 
at Havana sent Lopez $30,000 early in 1849, an( ^ contributions 
in this country swelled the amount to $70,ooo. lx Interviews 
with Calhoun, and other prominent men, convinced Lopez that 
all depended on getting at least a semblance of a revolution 
which the American government might use as a pretext for 

dark man remarkable for his glowing eyes and snowy hair. The inter- 
view is described by Mrs. Davis: "Jefferson Davis, A Memoir by his 
wife," I, 412. 

10 See Pamphlet entitled : "Organization of the Lee Monument Asso- 
ciation, Richmond,- Va., Nov. 3 and 4, 1870", 12 pp. Richmond 1871. 
(Library of Congress.) 

"Vidal Morales op. cit. 250-252, 253. (Especially letter of Juan 
Manuel Macias.) 

49 



aggression. Calhoun believed that if with any good reason the 
United States intervened in Cuba, England and France would 
not attempt to interfere. 12 Everywhere people were hopeful of 
the practicability of the enterprise, 13 and recruits were gained in 
half a dozen different cities. Two steamers were bought at New 
York and two sailing vessels at New Orleans. An attempt to 
rendezvous at Cat Island was defeated by the viligance of the 
government, but finally 800 men under Col. White, a soldier 
of fortune who had taken part in the Mexican war, were 
gathered at Round Island near New Orleans. These plans 
were all made so openly that they were followed closely by the 
Captain General of Cuba and by Calderon de la Barca, the 
Spanish minister at Washington, who was supplied with a 
large sum from the Cuban treasury to discover the facts and 
to suppress the movement. The men who enlisted were prom- 
ised the pay and rations of privates in the United States army, 
with a bonus of $1000 each and five acres of land in case of 
success. Thousands of men were setting out for the gold fields 
of California, and the general craze for wealth was used as a 
motive. The officers declared : "The gold is already dug and 
coined for which you will fight." 14 

12 Claiborne, Quitman, II, 55. 

13 An article entitled "Cuba" in the United States Magazine and 
Democratic Review, Sept. 1849. XXV, 193 ff, is typical of American 
optimism : "The practicability of the enterprise is unquestionable. A 
force of 3,000 to 4,000 Americans, landed in Cuba in the winter months, 
would have to contend with perhaps 14,000 Spaniards, divided in small 
garrisons throughout the island, each at the mercy of the people, if 
those people have a sufficient rallying point. Sixty days probably would 
suffice to place a provisional government at the head of affairs, declare 
the independence of the island, organize its revenues, and bid defiance 
to the power of Spain." Like almost every article in the American 
press this regards independence as a step in annexation. Annexation 
would equalize the price of negroes in Cuba and Louisiana and so 
Cuba with its cheaper negroes would no longer be a rival. 

"Under the influence of annexation, the property of the Cubans 
would immediately equalize with that of similar property in the United 
States, and the sugar plantations of Louisana would find, in the hither- 
to untouched soil of Cuba, the means of underselling the world in 
sugar; while the capacity of Cuba to purchase and consume the beef, 
ham, flour, and other supplies of the Western States, would develop 
itself in an almost limitless degree." 

14 M. W. Means to Secretary Clayton, undated, internal evidence 

50 



While White and his men were organizing at Round Island, 
and other recruits were being enlisted in Boston, Baltimore, and 
New Orleans, the case of the abduction of Garcia from New 
Orleans created a good deal of excitement. The newspapers 
which were pushing the movement against Cuba made the most 
of the incident which for a little while seemed to promise a 
serious quarrel with Spain. 

Juan Francisco Garcia y Rey was a jailer at the city prison 
in Havana who, on the night of March 31, 1849, aided Cirillo, 
Villaverde and Vincente Fernandez to escape. Villaverde was 
supposed to be connected with the annexationist movement, 
while the other prisoner was serving a sentence for fraudulent 
bankruptcy. Taking a sailing vessel for the United States, the 
party of refugees landed at Apalachicola, Villaverde proceeding 
to Savannah, and Fernandez and Garcia going to New Orleans. 
By order of the Captain General the ex- jailer of Havana was 
placed under strict surveillance by agents of the Spanish consul. 
The evidence from this point is contradictory and difficult to 
unravel, but it at least seems evident that a system of deliberate 
intimidation was employed to make Garcia, who was seemingly 
rather weak-minded and cowardly, discontented with his pres- 
ent surroundings and willing to go back to Havana. 

Either under promise of complete pardon or perhaps by 
actual violence, Garcia was induced or compelled to go on 
board a sailing vessel (July 5, 1848) and, without any oppor- 
tunity to secure clothing except that which he wore, he was 
carried away to Havana. 

The disappearance of Garcia aroused the anxiety of his 
landlord who published a statement in La Patria that his late 
tenant had been kidnapped and forcibly abducted to Havana. 
The announcement was seized upon by the Delta and given 
a prominent place. Don Carlos de Espafia, the consul of Spain, 
was definitely charged with having violated the sovereignty of 
the United States. The newspaper announcements created the 
greatest excitement and a popular demand was made for the 
arrest and punishment of the Spanish consul and his accom- 
plices. Unfortunately it was discovered that there was no 

points to Sept. 8, 1849 (?). Clayton Mss. Library of Congress. This 
letter communicates plans for an extensive filibustering expedition. 

T. Ewing, Dept. of the Interior to Clayton, Aug. 7, 1849, Mss. Li- 
brary of Congress. ' 

5i 



statute of either the State or the United States providing pun- 
ishment for kidnapping or abducting a white man. The charges 
therefore were "assault and battery" and "false imprisonment," 
both indictable and punishable offences in the State of Louisi- 
ana. The consul objected to a preliminary hearing before a 
justice of the peace maintaining that a consul was not subject to 
the State authorities. 

The hearing was accordingly held before a Justice of the 
Peace and a United States commissioner jointly. Fourteen 
sessions were held and four lawyers employed on each side. 
The voluminous evidence proved conclusively the Spanish sys- 
tem of espionage in an American city and the doubtful persons 
and methods employed by the Spanish consul, but the actual 
use of force in securing the departure of Garcia was not clearly 
established, the testimony proving untrustworthy and contra- 
dictory. The court, however, bound over the defendants for 
trial before the grand jury. 

In the meantime Rey or Garcia had reached Havana and 
was kept on an American vessel closely quarantined. The re- 
ports of the New Orleans papers caused the American Consul, 
Campbell, to visit the ex-jailer; but in the presence of Spanish 
officials Garcia stated that he had come to Havana voluntarily. 

General Campbell was astonished a few days later to receive 
a letter stating that the author, Garcia, had been kidnapped, 
and intimidated into making his previous statement. He de- 
manded the protection of the American flag and his return to 
New Orleans. The American Consul demanded an interview 
alone with Garcia, but the Captain General said that the 
request was insulting and refused to comply with it. 15 

On the expiration of the long period of quarantine Garcia 
was taken and thrown into prison in solitary confinement. On 
two or three occasions the prisoner was brought before Captain 

15 The letter of Garcia to the American consul dated July 27, 1849, 
was as follows : "My name is Juan Garcia Rey ; I was forced hy the 
Spanish consul to leave New Orleans. I demand the protection of the 
American flag and I desire to return to the United States. P. S. I 
came here by force, the Spanish consul having seized me under a 
supposed order of the recorder of the Second Municipality and having 
had me carried by main force on board a ship at nine in the evening. 
P. S. I did not speak frankly to you because the Captain of the port was 
present." Translated from French edition, New Orleans, "Bee," Aug. 
25, 1849. 

52 



General Alcoy who sought to gain information from him re 
garding the conspiracies to revolutionize the island. Garcia 
afterward stated that he gave no important information, but 
the letters of Alcoy show that the prisoner did not hesitate to 
disclose the plans of his late confederates. 

.The government at Washington now took a hand in the 
matter and peremptorily demanded the return of Garcia. 16 On 
the advice of the Spanish minister to Washington the Captain 
General pardoned Garcia who was sent back to New Orleans. 
The ex-jailer arrived there when public opinion had been lashed 
into fever heat by the press, and the case was practically ended. 
The grand jury divided equally on the question of returning an 
indictment, and the United States District Attorney decided to 
drop the prosecution. 17 

"Clayton wrote to President Taylor, Washington, Aug. 18, 1849: 
"I have the honor to inform the President that I have this day received 
despatches from the Consul at Havana which go very strongly to im- 
plicate the Spanish Consul at New Orleans in the abduction of Juan 
Garcia. The evidence of the conduct of the Captain General of Cuba 
tends to inculpate him also. Garcia has been imprisoned and the Cap- 
tain General refuses to permit our Consul to see him. Garcia has 
written two letters to our Consul claiming the protection of our flag. 
■From all the evidence before me I think Garcia was kidnapped and 
that the honor of the country demands the most ample atonement for 
the outrage." 

President Taylor replied from Erie, Pa., Aug. 29, '49: "I- fully 
coincide with you in the opinion that the honor of the country de- 
mands the most ample atonement for the outrage and that the most 
decided measures be taken to demand the release of Garcia and his 
restoration to this country." Clayton Mss., Department of Mss., Library 
of Congress. 

17 My authorities on the case of Garcia, alias Rey, are: 

1. El Conde de Alcoy al Mtro. de Estado. Havana, Aug. 26, 1849. Un- 
published Mss. Havana Archives. 

2. El Conde de Alcoy, al Mtro de Estado, Havana, Sept. 9, 1849. 
Unpublished Mss. Havana Archives. 

3. El Conde de Alcoy, al Mtro. de Estado, Havana, Oct. 9, 1849 
Unpublished Mss. Havana Archives. 

4. Daniel Scully. Abduction of Juan Francisco Rey: A narrative 
of events from his own lips, from the time he left Havana, in company 
with Villaverde and Fernandez, until his return to the United States, 
embracing a relation of what occurred on his first departure from 
Havana; the intrigues and violence by which his abduction was ac- 
complished in iNew Orleans; his voyage back to Havana on the Mary 
Ellen; his imprisonment there, and return to the United States, to- 

53 



While the radical press of the country was advocating the 
broadest possible interpretation of the neutrality law of 1818 
so as to permit the organization of a filibustering expedition 
and while it was especially emphasizing the supposed outrage at 
New Orleans in the case of Garcia, President Taylor was taking 
what measures he could to discourage and suppress any such 
enterprise. His proclamation was issued Aug. 11, 1848. and 
was couched in terms which were satisfactory even to the Cap- 
tain General of Cuba and which, by putting members of such 
expeditions beyond the pale of American protection, later on, 
as we shall see, made any effective interposition in behalf of 
prisoners in Cuba exceedingly embarrassing. 

The proclamation announced that there was reason to believe 
that an armed expedition was about to be fitted out in the 
United States with the intention to invade either the island 
of Cuba or some of the Provinces of Mexico. Persons who 
should so grossly violate the neutrality laws of the United 
States must not expect the interference of the Government in 
any form on their behalf no matter to what extremities they 
might be reduced. Good citizens were urged to discountenance 
any such attempt. 18 

gether with a compilation of the testimony in the preliminary investiga- 
tion before Judge Bright and Commissioner Cohen, and a review of 
the same. New Orleans, 1849. 58 pp. 

5. L'Abeille de la Nouvelle Orleans, Aug. 25, 1849 and the New 
Orleans Bee, Aug. 15, 28, 29, Sept. 11, 1849. 

6. Letter of Villaverde, dated April 19, 1849, given in Dem. Review, 
XXV, 201. 

7. Calderon de la Barca to Clayton, Aug. 23, 1849. Clayton Mss. 
Library of Congress. 

18 Richardson : "Messages and Papers of the Presidents." V. 7, for 
text of proclamation. 

The Captain General (Roncali) wrote Sept. 9, 1849 to the minister 
of state, regarding the men on Round Island (Mss. Havana Archives) : 
"The proclamation of General Taylor, in publicly denouncing this ex- 
pedition and condemning it in so solemn a way, has surprisec' them 
and without any doubt frightened them. In fact, they foresee the new 
obstacles which his (i.e. Taylor's) prudence will place in their way 
and they fear the means of watchfulness and precaution which will be 
adopted here. Nevertheless I am assured that on the twenty-fifth of 
August £he men remained in the same position, and that on the 
twenty-seventh the secret preparation had not ceased in New York and 
other places, although these plans are now notorious and threatened by 
American war ships which are watching if they are going to set sail 

54 



President Taylor's proclamation was highly praised by the 
Whig papers of the Xorth, but the Democratic press criticized 
it, and even the Southern Whig papers regarded it as unduly 
severe. 1 ' The steamship Albany effectively blockaded Round 
Island and cut off all supplies from the men gathered there. 
By September 4, seven war vessels were in the immediate 
neighborhood of Round Island and all hopes of a successful 
expedition from that point were evidently at an end. The men 
were deserting and a murder committed on the island showed 
the difficulty of maintaining effective discipline. 20 On Sept. 7, 
under orders from the State Department, the two vessels which 
had been secured for the purposes of the expedition were 
seized at Xew York. The Sea Gull had on board some fifty 
men, while 120,000 rations were found on the New Orleans. 
Warrants were issued for the arrest of five leaders in the 
enterprise, but on account of the state of public opinion and 
since the movement now seemed wholly discredited, no further 
steps were taken by the government, and the two ships were 
returned to their legal owners. 

The results of the expedition were unfortunate both for the 
Whig administration and for the Cuban Junta. The bitterness 
of many papers against Taylor and his administration were 

since, according to the laws of the country, it seems that the local 
authorities cannot disturb assemblages, travel, nor other preliminary acts 
which they may practice within the country, so long as they do not 
arm, whatever be the purpose of their acts and the method of 
accomplishing them, whether by word of mouth or by the press." 

19 So loyal a Whig paper as the Xew Orleans Bee regarded the inter- 
diction of supplies as uncalled for. It argued that, so long as the men 
were engaged in no hostile acts or did not actually sail for Cuba, they 
should only be kept under surveillance. 

"If the day of Cuba has arrived, if her liberation is noted in the 
book of destiny, she will march to independence by the ways which 
Providence has traced for her and nothing can arrest the accomplish- 
ment of this great deed." 

"What is more natural than that the Creoles of Cuba should call to 
their aid a small phalanx from the United States? These, certainly, 
for the time made themselves outlaws, but after all it is their affair 
and we have no interest in it." L'Abeille, Sept. 1, 1849. 

For the opposite point of view see a pamphlet: "The Round Island 
Expedition — Defence of the Xavy," Mobile, 1849. Reprint of two arti- 
cles signed "Truth," from the Mobile Daily Advertiser, Sept. 18 and 19, 
1849. 

20 L'Abeille de la Nouvelle Orleans, Sept. 4, 1849. 

55 



significant of the state of a large body of public opinion. The 
Cuban Junta had aroused the fears of the Captain Ge.ieral, 
and insured vigilance on his part. They had exhausted their 
means, and although a part of the $53,000 spent was realized 
from the sale of the ships, the Cubans were no longer united. 
One body called "El Conseio del Gobierno Cubano" was estab- 
lished with headquarters in New York, while Lopez and six of 
his friends formed a "Junta to promote Cuban interests.'* Dis- 
couraged by the prospects in New York. Lopez began early in 
1850 to operate chiefly in New Orleans. From this time on the 
movement became more distinctly American and Southern.- 1 

21 See especially Jose Sanchez Iznaga, in Morales, op. cit. 271. 



56 



CHAPTER V 

The Cardenas Expedition 

The failure of the attempt in 1848 made caution in a 
new enterprise very necessary. The neutrality law of the 
United States, first passed in 1794, and given its final form 
in 1818, was aimed at just such efforts. The most important 
clause seemed sufficiently clear and definite: "Every person 
who, within the territory or jurisdiction of the United States, 
begins or sets on foot, or provides, or prepares the means for, 
any military expedition or enterprise to be carried on from 
thence against the territory or domains of any foreign prince 
or state, or of any colony, district, or people, with whom the 
United States are at peace, shall be deemed guilty of a mis- 
demeanor, and shall be fined not exceeding three thousand 
dollars and imprisoned not more than three years." 1 Other 
sections gave to the federal officers the necessary power to 
enforce this legislation. 18 The expression "military expedition 
or enterprise to be carried on from thence" had not received 
the very stringent interpretation which was later adopted by 
the courts during the troublesome times immediately preced- 
ing the Spanish-American War. 2 A large section of the press 
maintained that the law could only reach fully armed and 
disciplined bodies of considerable size which should make their 
attacks directly from some port of the United States. In the 
new expedition every precaution was taken to remain, if possi- 
ble, within the letter of the law. At the same time the govern- 
ment had been stung by foreign criticism, and by the persistence 
of the Spanish minister 3 to make every effort to prevent any 

1 Sections 5286, and 5287-90, Revised Statutes. 

la "The Neutrality Law : what does it mean, what prohibit and what 
permit?" Democratic Review, XXX, 497-512. June, 1852.) 

A more stringent law to permit the seizure of arms had been passed 
in 1838 in view of the difficulties on the Canadian border. But this 
law was to be in force for only two years and applied only to arms 
likely to be shipped across a boundary with a coterminous country. 

3 "In Re Horsa," Decisions given, House Doc. 326, 55 Cong. 2 Session. 

3 The Spanish minister to Washington at this time was Senor Cal- 

57 



further attempts. Caution was thus made very necessary on 
the part of Lopez and his friends. 

In the spring of 1850 Lopez finally gave up the attempt to 
organize an expedition in New York and travelled incognito 
by way of the Ohio and Mississippi, stopping for conferences 
at various points with those who might take an interest in his 
enterprise. 4 At Cincinnati he seems to have had an interview 
with a certain Captain Hardy, a veteran of the Mexican war, 
who immediately began to organize a company, ostensibly to 
go to California. Offers were very munificent. The men were 
to be preferably Kentuckians. They were promised a bounty, 
$4,000 in money, with a further offer of Cuban lands to those 
who served one year. In the meantime they were to receive 
the regular pay of privates in the American army. Officers 
were to have high rank in Cuba and their bounty was set at 
$10,000. A special encouragement was the likelihood of being 
joined by some of the Hungarian refugees, at that time so 
much lionized in the United States. 4 " 

On the fourth of April the expedition embarked on the Mar- 
tha Washington. After taking on 120 Ohio men at Cincinnati, 
the vessel crossed the river to receive the Kentucky contingent 
at Covington, and then started on her adventurous journey. The 
men whiled away a tedious week practising fencing and other 
exercises which might be useful, and at three o'clock on the 

deron de la Barca. He is described as a small man, inclined to be fat, 
with a good head, a dull heavy face, but with the expressive eyes so 
characteristic of the Spanish race. He later became Minister for For- 
eign Affairs, a reward for activity at the time of the Lopez expeditions. 
His dinners and receptions were considered sure avenues to good 
society. His wines and Havana cigars were famous, for this gentle- 
man believed in hospitality as an aid to diplomacy. United States Re- 
view, June, 1855, pp. 450- 1 - 

* Lopez went to Jackson, Mississippi, and had an interview with Gov- 
ernor Quitman. Lopez offered the command to him, but Quitman said 
that the revolutionary movement should start in the island itself. When 
it once had commenced he would accept the command. Claiborne's 
"Quitman," II, 55-58. 

Going to New Orleans Lopez received the help of General Henderson 
and Mr. A de Sigur proprietor of the New Orleans Picayune. Vidal 
Morales 230. 

4a Mss. Report, John H. Goddard, special agent of the government 
to the Hon. Thomas Ewing, Secretary of the Interior, dated Charles- 
ton, June 15, 1850. Dept. of Interior. 

58 



morning of April n, 1850, disembarked at Freeport, some 
three miles above New Orleans. Here they found lodgings 
scarce, and were soon transferred to Lafayette. They were a 
turbulent, good humored band of 250 men, constantly watched 
by Spanish spies, and always in danger of dispersing; but finally 
on the twenty-fifth, two weeks after their arrival they were 
safely on board the Georgiana, all supplied with tickets to Cha- 
gres. Each man was allowed to take his personal belongings in 
a bundle. About nine in the evening a tug came alongside, and 
the Georgiana was soon being towed towards the gulf. A large 
crowd had come to cheer the departing bark, among them 
Lopez, Gonzales and General John Henderson, who stood upon 
the wharf until the Georgiana had disappeared in the darkness. 5 
At the mouth of the Mississippi the Georgiana received its 
guns and ammunition from a fishing smack which had left 
New Orleans the day before in the personal charge of Mr 
Sigur, the editor of the Delta, 5 * 

The Georgiana seemed to be suspected by the United States 
revenue cutter which was cruising in the offing; but the gov- 
ernment vessel contented itself with sailing around the bark 
two or three times, and then went away. The muskets turned 
out to be new regulation army muskets, and in addition the 
Georgiana carried 10,000 rounds of cartridges. 5 " 

The winds were favorable, and, except for the necessity of 
sheering off from vessels of suspicious appearance, the days 
were uneventful. About the fifth day the men made out the 
north coast of Yucatan. Unfortunately the bark was about 
eighty miles west of the island of Mujeres which was the ap- 
pointed rendezvous. The winds which had been so favorable in 
going south were contrary in retracing this distance. It was 

"Lieutenant Hardy, Kentucky .battalion, "An Authentic History of 
the Cuban Expedition," 1-16. 

5a The vessel was under the command of -Captain Benson The chief 
officers were Col. Theodore O'Hara and Lieutenant Colonel Pickett 
O'Hara was a Kentuckian and a veteran of the Mexican war while 
Pickett was a West Point graduate who had already been engaged in 
the unfortunate Round Island Expedition. Hardy, 16-22. 

6b Guns and ammunition seem to have been supplied to the expedition 
from the stores belonging to the States of Mississippi and Louisiana 
See New Orleans Bee, June 7, 1850, and especially report of Wm 
Marvin, Judge U. S. District Court, Key West, May 21, 1850, to the 
President of the U. S. (Mss. Dept. of Interior, Wash., D. C.) 

59 



only possible to make a few miles each day. After four days of 
this tedious work the Georgiana reached the island of Contoy 
about ten miles from Mujeres and almost the same distance 
from the coast of Yucatan. 50 With conditions so unfavorable, 
Captain Benson decided not to try to go any farther, and the 
first vessel of the Cuban expedition came to anchor in a pretty 
little bay, ready to make preparations for disembarkation. 

The little island of Contoy was found to be a sandy key, 
entirely uninhabited. It was scarcely more than half a mile 
in length and very narrow, with a small lake of salt water in 
the center. The small bay where the Georgiana anchored was 
favorably situated on the sheltered western side, but unfortun- 
ately there was on the island no water fit to drink. 6 

The Kentuckians of the Georgiana disembarked on the morn- 
ing of May 7th and immediately built their signal fires to call 
the Creole to the spot. Three fishing smacks were attracted, 
and anchored close beside the Georgiana, much to the anxiety 
of the men on shore, but the Spanish vessels seemed to have no 
suspicions, since Contoy was not an unnatural point at which to 
stop on the way to Panama. 7 

The lack of good water at Contoy made it dangerous to 
attempt to stay there for any length of time. Accordingly a 
pilot was secured from one of the fishing smacks, and for four 
days the attempt was made to get to Mujeres. But the winds 
were either averse, or there was dead calm; the men were 
becoming discontented, and even Captain Benson was sick of 
the whole expedition. The Georgiana was forced to return to 
her old anchorage at Contoy. 

The first night after the return to Contoy discontent was 
growing almost into mutiny, and Captain Benson told some of 
the ringleaders that if a majority signed a petition to that effect 
he would attempt to return to New Orleans. As many as fifty 
or sixty signatures were obtained. 

So far no clear explanation of the plans had been made to 
the men, and that seemed to be one of the chief causes of dis- 
content. Even some of the officers felt it would be useless to 
go on with men so disaffected. On this account Colonel O'Hara 
called the men together and made them a speech, promising 

Bc The island lies about eighty miles from Cuba and is the nearest point 
of Mexican soil. 
"Hardy, 24. 
7 Hardy, 26, 27. 

60 



that, unless Lopez came in eight days, he would return to New 
Orleans. This seemed to restore the spirits of the men, cheers 
were given, three for Lopez, three for Cuba, and three for 
annexation. Other enthusiastic speeches were given by officers 
called out by the men. An oath of obedience to the Articles 
of War of the United States Army and to the Republic of Cuba 
as represented by General Narciso Lopez was signed by almost 
all the men. Those who did not sign were not to be allowed to 
accompany the expedition. A lieutenant was sent with the 
Spanish pilot in a small boat to Mujeres to give the news of 
the whereabouts of the Georgiana to the Steamer Creole when 
it might arrive. The men grew more contented for the Yuca- 
tecans had heard the news of the American ship and began to 
arrive with provisions. Except for an occasional quarrel 
among individuals there were no further signs of the incipient 
mutiny. 

In the meantime, at New Orleans, Colonel Wheat, an officer 
who had served with distinction under Scott in the Mexican 
War, was gathering together a battalion of Louisiana troops. 
This second battalion was composed of a rougher and more ad- 
venturous crowd than either the Kentucky or the Mississippi 
battalions, and consisted of about 160 men. Some, especially 
the officers, were veterans of the Mexican War, but not so large 
a proportion as in the Mississippi regiment. 8 

The Susan Loud, carrying this Louisiana regiment, left her 
moorings at New Orleans at almost the time when her ally, 
the Georgiana, first came in sight of Contoy. She sailed down 
the Mississippi on the night of May 2nd, and then eastward 
on the next day. The Susan Loud had directions to cruise 
to a point 26 N. 87 W. in the general direction of Mujeres 
to wait there until the 7th of May on which day the Creole 
expected to leave New Orleans. The barge should then sail 
on a direct line towards the mouth of the Mississippi until she 
met the steamer. The rendezvous was reached at noon on the 
sixth, and then, for the first time, the lone star flag of Cuba 
was raised over the waters of the gulf amid the cheers of the 
"Liberators." 88 The day which the Susan Loud had to spend 

8 Hardy, 28-31. 

8a The Cuban flag was drawn by Tolon a friend of Lopez in 1849. 
It was displayed on the office of the New York Sun in New York on 
May 11, 1850, an incident which led to protest on the part of Spain. 
See C. Villaverde, quoted in Morales 261-2. 

61 



at the rendezvous was used in organization, for the men had 
not been together before embarking, and almost none except 
the officers had seen their future leader, General Lopez. The 
filibusters were addressed by Colonel Wheat and then proceeded 
to divide themselves into ten squads to serve as the basis of 
future companies. 9 

Whiling away the time in playing poker, with large amounts 
of the bonds of the future Cuban republic as the stakes, the 
newly organized filibusters looked eagerly for the expected 
Creole. About one o'clock on the morning of May 4th her 
smoke was made out ahead, and by sunset even her red signal 
flag was close enough to be made out. The Susan Loud re- 
sponded by running up a white flag in answer. With the Cuban 
flag streaming from each vessel's masthead, the two came 
alongside and General Gonzales came on board the Susan 
Loud from the Creole. Almost the whole of the day fol- 
lowing the meeting of the two vessels was used in transhipping 
the men to the steamer. Captain Pendleton of the Susan Loud 
who was well acquainted with various Cuban harbors was also 
induced to go on board the Creole, while the Susan Loud was 
left to follow the swifter steamer as well as she could. The 
Louisiana men found the Mississippi regiment on the Creole 
disappointingly small. It contained only about 130 men. The 

9 O. D. D. O. "History of the Late Expedition to Cuba, by O. D. D. O., 
one of the participants" — New Orleans, 1850. PP. 1-19. (For critical 
consideration of this source see Bibliography). The various squads 
chose their own officers as follows : 

Company A. Capt. A. C. Steele, Lieutenants, E. Vernon — H. Peabody. 

Company B. Capt. J. C. Davis, Lieutenants, Thixton — H. E. Henning. 

Company C. Capt. T. F. Fisher, Lieutenants, J. H. Dennet — Morris. 

Company D. Capt. T. G. Hunton, Lieutenants, Duncan — Jas. Foley. 

Company E. Capt. J. J. McCormeck, Lieutenants, Bradford — Mitchell. 

Company F. Capt. Thos. Kewen, Lieutenants, E. D. Lane — Woodruff. 

Company G. Capt. N. C. Breckenridge, Lieutenants, J. C. Perkins — 
W. J. Burke. 

Company H. Capt. Thos. March, Lieutenants, Parish — Thos. Lawton. 

Company I. Capt. H. C. Foster, Lieutenants, G. H. Sartin — Hurd. 

Company K. Capt. M. J. Morgan, Lieutenants, E. L. Jones — R. A. 
Harris. 

In addition to Col. Wheat, Theodore P. Byrd was appointed adjutant, 
J. D. R. McHenry, Commissary, L. C. Thomas, Quartermaster, and 
Thomas Wragg, Sergeant Major. There were 134 privates, making a 
total of 170. Lieut. Col. Wm. H. Bell and Major George B. Hayden 
were second and third in command, respectively. 

62 



best of good feeling prevailed between the two sets of men. 10 
On the 12th of May arms were distributed to the men, and 
all those who wished it were introduced to General Lopez. The 
leader of the filibusters is described as a soldierly looking man, 
well set, about five feet eight in height. He had a fine head, 
and sparkling black eyes, from which love of adventure shone. 
In manner he was singularly attractive. The large tall men of 
the Mississippi battalion pleased him especially. His whole 
bearing indicated great activity and power of endurance, quali- 
ties which always inspired confidence in his men. 11 

A tropical storm broke the monotony on the 12th. On the 
same day a carelessly handled fire arm by its discharge killed 
one of the Louisiana regiment, the first tragedy in what had 
so far seemed all comedy. On the afternoon of the 13th 
the coast of Yucatan was sighted, again as in the case of the 
Georgiana too far to the west. In rounding the point of Yuca- 
tan and turning south it would have been natural to pass on 
the seaward side of Contoy. But a sail was seen in that direc- 
tion and for fear it might prove a Spanish war ship, the light 
Creole kept close to shore and thus early on the morning of the 
14th, made out the Georgian® snugly anchored on the west side 
of Contoy, some twenty-five miles north of Mujeres. The 
whole expedition was now united, the filibusters showing their 
delight with deafening cheers. 12 

In a conference between Colonel O'Hara and General Lopez 
it was decided that the Creole should go on to Mujeres for 
water and come back the following day to take on board the 
Kentuckians. A proclamation was distributed in which Lopez 
appealed to the discipline and enthusiasm of his men: "Sol- 
diers of the liberating expedition of Cuba! Our first act on 
arriving shall be the establishment of a provisional constitution, 
founded on American principles, and adapted to the emergen- 
cies of the occasion. This constitution you will unite with your 

19 The officers of the Mississippi battalion were Lieut. Col. W. J. 
Bunch, Major Peter Smith, Captains A. L. Kewen, Keating, Hawkins, 
Hale, Mizelle, O. D. D. O. 25. 

11 O. D. D. O. op. cit., 24-29. 

12 O. D. D. O. 31; Hardy, 32. 

On the island of Mujeres was buried with all due ceremony the body 
of the man who had been accidentally killed. A young theological 
student named McCann from Paris, Kentucky, officiated as chaplain, 
and a salute was fired over the lonely grave. O. D. D. O. 33. 

63 



brethren of Cuba in swearing to support in its principles as 
well as on the field of battle. You have all been chosen by 
your officers as men individually worthy of so honorable an 
undertaking. I rely implicitly on your presenting Cuba to the 
world, a signal example of all the virtues, as well as all the 
valor of the American citizen soldiers ; and I cannot be de- 
ceived in my confidence that by our discipline, good order, 
moderation in victory, and sacred respect for all private rights, 
you will put to shame every insolent calumny of your enemies. 
And when the hour arrives for repose on the laurels which 
await your grasp, you will all, I trust, establish permanent and 
happy homes in the beautiful soil of the island you go to free, 
and there long enjoy the gratitude which Cuba will never fail 
generously to bestow on those to whom she will owe the sacred 
and immeasurable debt of her liberty." 13 

Before the Creole went on to Mujeres, Lopez had a conver- 
sation with the Captain of one of the fishing smacks which 
was going to Havana. Under the appearance of confiding in 
him, he gave the fisherman information which might mislead 
the Spanish authorities regarding his true plans. Mujeres 
turned out to be a pleasant island quite different from Contoy. 
It was about eight miles long and almost two miles wide, lying 
some twelve miles from the mainland. The Adjutant General 
secured some of the inhabitants and soon had them carrying 
water on board the Creole. 1 * 

Some evidences of discontent began to show themselves 
among the Louisiana men at Contoy while the Creole was at 
Mujeres taking water, especially because some of the men fear- 
ed that the little steamer could not carry the increased load 
when the Kentuckians came on board. It was now known 
that the expedition would number 600 men, and the Creole 
was evidently old and out of repair. The men were assembled 
on the beach for drill and again addressed by Colonel Wheat 
in the hope of gaining their full loyalty. 15 

On the morning of the 16th the steamer was finally ready 
to go back to Contoy. When all was ready it was discovered 
that thirteen men had remained behind. One of these men had 

13 Hardy, 34. It is, of course, unlikely that this speech is reported 
verbatim. 
M 0. D. D. O. 34; Col. O'Hara's report in Hardy, op. cit. 65. 
M Q. D. D. O. 39-43. 

64 



boasted that they would capture a fishing smack which lay in the 
bay, and so get back to the United States. On this account the 
Creole took the smack in tow and did not let it go until it was 
safely away from the dangerous island. 16 

When the Georgiana was rejoined at Contoy, the two ships 
were lashed together, and soon the transhipment of men, pro- 
visions and water was going on rapidly. After a council of 
war it was decided that every man should have an opportunity 
if he wished to go back to the United States. Thirty-nine de- 
cided to take advantage of this offer. Of these ten or twelve 
belonged to Colonel O'Hara's regiment and had only come in 
the expectation of disembarking at Chagres, if that had been 
the rendezvous. The deserters were marched around the deck, 
with their hands tied behind them, among the hisses and groans 
of the army, and they were compelled to do the heavy work 
of transferring coal from the Georgiana to the Creole. As 
the Creole was about to sail they were addressed in a bitter 
speech by one of the Kentuckians. 17 

A heavy sea which had risen since the two vessels were 
lashed together made the work of transhipment especially 
difficult 18 ; but soon the troops were on their way, reduced now 
from the original 570 to 521, by desertions at Mujeres and at 
Contoy. The Pizarro and Habanero had left Havana on the 
same day to hunt for the filibusters. On account of the wind 
the Creole had to steam more towards the north than she 
otherwise would and for this reason alone she probably missed 
meeting the Spanish war ships. 19 

19 These deserters are said to have run up a black flag on the beach. 
This would seem almost incredibly foolhardy. O. D. D. O. 44. 

The men on Mujeres seem to have remained several days until a 
Mexican war vessel arriving took them all away to Campeche. Here 
they were received with great curiosity by the people and only lived 
by means of subscriptions raised for them by some kindhearted people. 
Some managed after great hardships to get to Sisal and from there 
to find ships to the United States. Hardy, 92-94. 

"O. D. D. O. 415, Hardy, 35, O'Hara's official Report, Hardy, 65. 

"Hardy, 35; but O. D. D. O., p. 51, says the day was calm and 
favorable. 

"Each man was supplied with sixty rounds of ammunition. Each 
officer carried in addition to a regulation sabre a Jenning's Patent Rifle 
which fired a leaden cartridge 15 times a minute. The Kentuckians 
were supplied with rifles, the Mississippians with yagers, and the men 
from Louisiana with muskets. The men wore red shirts, an interesting 

65 



The men were crowded on the deck and in the hold, and 
only those on deck were able to drill at all. The strictest dis- 
cipline was necessary to prevent bodies of men from passing 
from one part of the ship to the other; for the Creole was very 
heavily loaded and it was not easy to keep her trimmed in the 
heavy seas. One lieutenant was court martialled and reduced 
to the ranks for disrespect to his superior officer, a wholesome 
lesson to the undisciplined volunteers. Lopez paced the deck 
spy glass in hand. Once or twice the Creole changed her 
course to avoid some large steamer. On the evening of the 
first day out from Contoy the exact plan of the invasion was 
made known. The landing was to take place at Cardenas, and 
the railroad to Matanzas was to be seized. This important 
town, thirty miles from Cardenas, should be reached and sur- 
prised within twenty-four hours of the landing. It would be 
the center of recruiting. While ioo picked men proceeded to 
within nine miles of Havana to blow up an important bridge, 
enough recruits to bring the number to five full regiments would 
be armed and mounted. With an army of 5000 men aggressive 
measures would be possible. Lopez expected soon to be 
encamped with an army of 30,000 men before Havana. 20 ' At 
ten o'clock on the evening of May 18th the Creole passed the 
lighthouse fifteen miles from Cardenas, 21 and under a bright 
moon sailed past ships and little islands. Soon the beautiful 

proof of the effect of the movements in -Europe. When steamers were 
passed these unusual shirts were evidently a source of danger. Hardy,. 
35, 36 ; O. D. D. O. 60. 

20 O. D. D. O. 58; O'Hara in Hardy, 66. 

The Adjutant General, later wounded in the battle at Cardenas, was 
a young man named A. J. Gonzales, a Cuban of good family who at the 
age of twenty-six was a professor in the University of Havana. Hav- 
ing travelled widely and with a gift for oratory, on being suspected of 
conspiracy, he had fled to the United States, and became a prominent 
member of the Cuban Junta. It was he who had been deputed to 
secure the services of General Worth before Lopez had arrived in 
the United States. Jose Sanchez Iznaga of Trinidad, J. M. Macias 
and J. M. Hernandez of Matanzas also accompanied Lopez. O. D. D. O. 
59, 60, 61. See Polk Papers which contain letters introducing Gonzales. 

21 Cardenas had a population of 4,000 to 5,000. In the town the 
white and especially the Spanish element engaged in commerce predom- 
inated. Cardenas is about ninety miles from Havana and twenty-five 
from Matanzas, and in 1850 the communications with these two places 
were particularly good both by a highway and a railroad. The greatest 
sugar plantations tended by large numbers of slaves were in the imme- 

66 



little city was in sight. Near the wharf there was some delay 
until a volunteer took the cable to shore. Not until after the 
vessel was made fast was the alarm given by the Spanish 
sentinel. 22 The force which was to seize the railroad station, 
sixty Kentuckians under Lieutenant Colonel Pickett, was the 
first to land. The railway station proved to be one and one-half 
miles from the steamer and well beyond the town, but Pickett's 
company were able to march directly to it and seize it without 
any opposition. 23 A detachment of the Mississippi regiment un- 
der Captain Kewen seized a railroad station within the city, 
making prisoners a guard of twelve armed men and all the 
railway employees. 24 

It was now about five in the morning. The Spanish garrison 
occupied one side of the typical plaza, or public square, with 
the governor's house on the other side, directly across the 
square. Colonel O'Hara with the remaining Kentuckians 
marched quickly up the main street which led along one side 
of the barracks and into the public square. The streets were 
deserted and the town seemed only beginning to realize its 
danger. As soon as the Kentuckians came near, the sentinels 
challenged, and the American troops quickened their pace to 
charge. They were received by heavy firing from behind the 
walls. At the very first fire Colonel O'Hara received a wound 
which disabled him and he was compelled to retire to the 
Creole, Major Hawkins now taking over the command. 25 The 
troops were drawn up before the barracks and Lopez in person 
marched directly up and boldly demanded a surrender. The 

diate neighborhood, a fact which naturally tended to conservatism on 
the part of the whites. A second railroad led towards the interior of 
the island. Concha, p. 29. 

22 O'Hara (Hardy, 66) says there was considerable delay in landing. 
There is a difference at this point between the two chief accounts. 
O. D. D. O., p. 65, says that the vessel grounded, and that Faysoux 
carried the cable to shore. Hardy does not mention the grounding of 
the vessel, and leaves it to be implied that Captain Lewis carried the 
cable (p. 39). 

23 Pickett's Report in Hardy, 68. 

24 O. ID. D. O. 68. 

25 Colonel O'Hara's Report, Hardy, 67. 

Lieutenant Hardy says that Hawkins immediately gave an order 
to try to force an entrance, and that Lopez only arrived in time to 
countermand it, on the ground that it would entail great loss of life. 
But Hardy seems to be strongly prejudiced against Hawkins. 

67 



small Spanish garrison seemed to fear the results of allowing 
the Americans to storm. The doors were thrown open and 
the barracks were occupied by a contingent of American 
troops. 26 

In the meantime the Louisiana and Mississippi divisions had 
advanced by separate streets parallel to the main street, one 
to the east of the plaza and the other to the west. The Mis- 
sissippi men, finding none to oppose them took up a position 
in the rear of the barracks, acting as a reserve. The Louisiana 
men under Colonel Wheat having arrived at a street which led 
into the plaza from the east, turned sharply to the right and 
entered the plaza just in time to find that the Spanish garrison, 
while the doors were being thrown open on the other side of the 
barracks, were making good their retreat unobserved across the 
"plaza" into the governor's house. The two parties had just 
time enough to exchange volleys which did no serious harm 
except that Colonel Wheat, gallantly leading his men, was dis- 
abled by a severe wound. In the meantime the Spaniards 
succeeded in entering the governor's palace in good order. 
Lieutenant Colonel Bell now assumed command of the Louisi- 
ana troops with orders to capture the palace. 27 

The Louisianans strengthened by a company of Kentuckians 
under Robinson, and by Muzelle's Mississippians, charged 
eagerly on the barricaded doors. With a rush they broke in, 
only to find that it would be impossible to reach the second 
floor where the small garrison was stationed. The American 
fire against the walls was simply a waste of ammunition. 
Lieutenant Colonel Bell withdrew his troops out of range to 
give them a breathing spell, and then made a new attack. 28 
The building was now fired and the palace completely sur- 
rounded. Two Spaniards sought to escape, but one was in- 
stantly shot and the other surrendered. The heat of the burning 
building was becoming unbearable to the Spaniards within. 
At eight o'clock a white flag was displayed and after a short 
parley both governor and garrison surrendered unconditionally. 
The garrison which surrendered consisted of about forty men. 
The prisoners were confined in the barracks. 29 

29 Report of Major Hawkins, Hardy, 72. 

27 O. D. D. O. 67. 

29 Report of Lieutenant Colonel Bell, Louisiana Regiment, Hardy, 71. 

29 O. D. D. O. 69, 70. 

68 



As soon as the barracks had surrendered, Hawkins and the 
Kentuckians were posted south of the town to guard against 
any attack from that quarter, but, with the surrender of the 
governor, there being no signs of danger on the south, all the 
men were recalled. The citizens were evidently imbued with 
the idea that these self-called Liberators were real pirates, bent 
on murder and plunder. All those who could were fleeing to 
the ships in the harbor or to the hills back of the town. Some 
offered bribes for the protection of their property. The atti- 
tude of the Americans soon reassured them, but did not win 
positive support. Guards were stationed at the principal stores 
and everything which was taken was paid for scrupulously. 
The training of the Americans in Mexico here showed its good 
effects, for the old soldiers of Taylor and Scott had been ac- 
customed to distinguish conquest from plunder, and habit kept 
them from excess. The only money seized was the safe at the 
custom house, which was found to contain eighty-four doub- 
loons ; in addition guns and ammunition were seized from 
the Spaniards, but private property was respected. Indeed, 
as soon as the governor had surrendered, the Louisiana troops 
seized the fire engines and easily put out the fire which they 
had kindled. 

The filibusters now had nothing to do. All form of organi- 
zation was lost, and the men scattered about the town seeking 
food and rest. The reassured citizens treated them with a half 
frightened courtesy and the men drank large quantities of na- 
tive liquors which had a stupefying effect and made successful 
■fighting during the night doubtful. Lopez made every effort 
to win over some of the citizens, but with little success. They 
were not hostile, but they showed no sign of anything but good 
natured hospitality. Some brought old weapons which they 
had in their possession and which they did not intend to use 
themselves. Indeed they seemed nervously anxious to get rid 
of their unwelcome and dangerous guests ; the rumor was per- 
sistently spread that 3000 men were on the road from Matan- 
zas and would arrive at Cardenas by midnight. A message 
which Lopez received about three in the afternoon seemed to 
confirm this news. A small body of Spanish lancers galloped 
about the outskirts of the town and reconnoitered the situation. 
Evidently the Spaniards would know of every movement and 
it would be hopeless now to surprise Matanzas. If the rumor 

69 



of a large Spanish force between him and Matanzas were true 
it was necessary for Lopez to act quickly. To advance leaving 
a hostile city behind him and to march against a large hostile 
force in front with a disorganized though brave body of men 
was a step which had a chance of success, but certainly only 
a slender one. To remain in Cardenas, to allow the Spanish 
war ships to concentrate outside the harbor and so cut off all 
retreat while the Spanish armies were concentrating in front 
would mean annihilation. There was still one possibility which 
may have lain in Lopez' mind in the beginning. A quick em- 
barkation in the Creole and a flight to the westward, a landing 
on the most western point of the island at Mantua, a point 
easier to reach from New Orleans than Havana, the prestige 
of having already captured an important town, and finally the 
absence of the intimidating Spanish troops which would be 
several days' march away on a fool's errand to Cardenas, these 
seemed the very conditions of success. Lopez was known in 
the west ; he knew the country and the roads, and with the 
added weapons and ammunition captured at Cardenas, if the 
Cubans could be induced to rise, they could be armed, and 
Havana could be attacked on its weakest side. The attack on 
Cardenas should thus serve only as a blind. Of course, every- 
thing depended on the rising of the Cubans. But of the 
eventual likelihood of this Lopez never seemed to have a doubt. 
He knew of discontent among the Creoles and among the 
Spanish troops. He failed to properly estimate the influence 
of long habits of obedience and discipline; and even in the 
later disasters of the Bahia Honda expedition, up to the very 
time when he was captured, he never gave up the hope and 
even the expectation that the peasants would flock to his lone 
star flag and that Spanish soldiers could be won to the cause 
of "Cuba Libre!" 

During the day the quartermaster had been engaged in 
transferring the baggage to the railway station, and all were 
expecting to proceed to Matanzas. The order given at four 
o'clock to reembark on the Creole was received with great sur- 
prise. The scattered men began to reunite and the Louisiana 
and Mississippi men with Colonel Robinson's company of 
Kentuckians were immediately marched towards the steamer. 
Part reembarked while others assisted in loading the arms 
and provisions. An aide de camp was sent to recall Lieutenant 

70 



Colonel Pickett who with his small band had guarded the depot 
all the afternoon. These men now retreated to the foot of 
the main street. 30 

While the reembarkation was going on, Major Hawkins and 
eighty-five or ninety Kentuckians were drawn up in the square 
as a rear guard. The retreat of the American troops and the 
withdrawal of the guard at the depot were not lost on the Span- 
ish forces, which had been on the outskirts of the city. About 
six companies of Spanish infantry and lancers entered the 
city with the evident intention of attacking the retreating 
forces. It. will be remembered that there were three chief streets 
leading back to the shore. The Spanish commander conceived 
the purpose of sending his lancers down the one to the east 
and the infantry down the western road, thus passing Major 
Hawkins' Kentuckians, and separating them from the Creole. 
If this flanking movement had been successful the result would 
have been fatal. Major Hawkins barely had time to throw a 
flanking company into each street to check the Spanish attack, 
while he himself withdrew with his centre to a point on the 
main street nearer the Creole. Baffled on the side street the 
Spanish lancers, some sixty or seventy in number, formed in the 
square and wildly charged upon the retreating Kentuckians in 
the main street. The flanking companies had by this time fallen 
back and formed on the sidewalks of the main street so the 
lancers were caught between three fires. As the lancers charged 
they were met by a raking fire which sent horses and riders in 
wild confusion rolling on the ground. Those who broke 
through only did so to meet the fire of Colonel Pickett's men 
who were drawn as a supporting line at the foot of the street. 
Regardless of the fate of their comrades a second line of thirty 
or forty lancers charged again with the utmost gallantry. 
These were killed almost to a man, those who escaped up a side 
street coming upon the fire of the Louisiana regiment. Lieu- 
tenant Colonel Pickett now took command of the Kentuckians 
and drew them up behind a barricade of sugar hogsheads. 
There they remained about one hour without being attacked 
and then, when all was ready, embarked on the Creole. At 
about nine the steamer got under way, sped on her way by 
scattering Spanish shots from the wharf. 30 " 

30 Lieut. Col. Pickett's Report. Hardy, 68. 

30a There seem to have been twenty-one Spanish soldiers who joined 

71 



The harbor of Cardenas is peculiarly difficult to navigate, 
and it is not strange that in the darkness the Creole without a 
pilot who knew those waters should have grounded. It was 
already midnight and the Spaniards were now thoroughly 
alarmed and would soon have steamers on the watch. Every 
moment's delay made the thought of another landing more and 
more impracticable. It was clearly necessary to lighten ship, 
although such a step would make a second landing impossible. 
The heavier provisions were thrown overboard and then the 

the filibusters. Spanish sources minimize the number in the garrison 
and deny that any joined Lopez voluntarily. The $1452 secured at 
Cardenas from the Spanish treasury was distributed at Key West 
among the wounded and the Spanish deserters. The numbers in the 
garrison are variously given at from seventeen to several hundred. The 
company of lancers who charged the retreating filibusters in the evening 
was probably composed of only thirty men. Hardy seems to be trust- 
worthy in estimating the garrison at one company of infantry. On 
these points the evidence is conflicting. See: Hardy, 73, 41, 63, 50; 
O. D. D. O. Torrente, II, 379, I, 43, 44- 

The Captain General, June 9, 1850, writing to the minister of state 
refers to prisoners landed from the Creole at Key West. This evi- 
dently refers to the twenty-one deserters mentioned by Schlesinger. 
(Unpublished Mss. Havana Archives.) 

The losses at Cardenas were as follows: (1) The Louisianans lost 
some twenty killed and wounded in the morning attack on the gov- 
ernor's house, including Colonel Wheat, who was wounded. None were 
lost in the evening when the retreat was covered by the Kentuckians, 
(Lieut. Col. Bell, Hardy 71). (2) The Kentuckians lost forty killed 
and wounded altogether, largely in the evening engagement. Killed, 
Capt. John A. Logan, Lieut. James J. Garrett, Rev. Louis McCann, Ser- 
geant Henry Cruse and ten privates. Wounded, Col. T. O'Hara, Major 
T. T. Hawkins, Lieuts. Sayre and Hardy, Sergeant Robert Wheeling 
and twenty-one privates, (Report Lieut.-Col. Pickett, Hardy 70). (3) 
The Mississippians probably did not lose more than six or seven, not be- 
ing exposed except in the morning. The total Spanish losses may have 
been almost 100, chiefly in the evening attack. (See Hardy, 43, 44). 

General Gonzales, who had been the very life and soul of the enter- 
prise, exposed himself fearlessly to the fire from the governor's house 
and was wounded early in the day. General Lopez escaped although 
he was in the very thick of the firing. O. D. D. O. 69. 

Among the losses in the evening engagement were those of Chaplain 
McCann who was shot from a house while retreating to join his regi- 
ment, and Chaplain Logan of the Kentuckians and Lieutenant Lexios of 
the Mississippi regiment who were carried aboard the Creole badly 
wounded. They died in the course of the night and were buried at 
sea on the next day. O. D. D. O. 78, 79. 

72 



arms and ammunition, until the piled boxes projected above the 
water. As a last resort more than ioo men were landed on a 
nearby island. This expedient was successful. The vessel 
floated clear, and early in the morning of the 20th passed 
the bar and the light ship. There Lopez landed the captured 
governor and the commander of the garrison. 

^ As soon as the Creole was clear of the harbor great opposi- 
tion arose to Lopez' desire to land at Mantua. A conference 
of the officers was called and it was found that while Colonel 
Wheat and four others wished to follow Lopez once more, the 
majority felt that another landing would be sheer folly.' It 
was decided to leave the whole matter to the men, for with 
discontented men it was evident that very little could be done. 
But the men were almost unanimously against landing, only 
fifteen voting with Lopez. The old general begged to be put 
on shore with whatever men would follow him. Whether this 
was done to try to shame all to follow, or from a real belief 
that the Cuban insurrectionists only needed a leader, the daring 
request was refused, and by almost common consent the Creole 
turned her prow toward Key West. Nor would any other 
course have been possible, even granting the widespread and 
effective discontent which Lopez so strongly counted on. Gen- 
eral Gonzales who acted as interpreter was wounded ; the Span- 
iards would be on the lookout and the danger of being captured 
on the way to Mantua was increased by the necessity of passing 
Havana; it would now be almost impossible to make an ef- 
fective surprise; the ammunition needed to arm the Cubans 
had been thrown overboard; and there was only just enough 
fuel to take the ship either to Mantua or to Key West. At 
best only a landing could be effected and there would be no 
hope of retreating in case of failure. Such considerations as 
these were decisive. 31 

The Creole, by taking a course too much to the east luckily 
avoided the Pisarro which visited Key West in search of her 
on the next' morning. In the evening it was found that the 
Creole was in the shallows some forty miles to the east of Key 
West. A pilot was taken on board, and it was decided to an- 
chor and proceed by daylight. The twenty-first dawned clear, 
the last day of the expedition. The Creole had proceeded about 

31 Report of Major Hawkins, Hardy, 73, 74. Report of Lieutenant- 
Colonel Pickett, Hardy, 69. 

73 



fourteen miles when in the southwest was seen the smoke of 
the Pizarro. The Spanish vessel had visited Key West in 
search of them and was now cruising off that port in expecta- 
tion of encountering the filibusters. It was now a matter of a 
race. The Pizarro had the advantage of speed, while the light 
draught of the Creole allowed her to take a more direct route 
nearer the reef. Every bit of coal was piled on the fires ; boxes, 
barrels of resin, everything available was used, and the old 
Creole steamed as she had never done before. The flag of 
Spain was visible from the Pizarro, and the crowded adventur- 
ers could be in no doubt of their most imminent danger. For- 
tunately for them the heavy Spaniard had to stop and take on 
a pilot, and this made it possible for the Creole to enter Key 
West twenty-five minutes the winner in the race. Anchoring 
under the guns of the Petrel, an American war vessel, the 
Pizarro dared do nothing but protest against the disembarka- 
tion of the filibusters. 

At Key West the filibusters were welcomed by the citizens. 
Lopez took passage to Savannah, while the others broke up 
into small groups and dispersed to their homes as best they 
might. In this they were aided by citizens of Key West, al- 
though a meeting called in their behalf caused a disturbance 
between their friends and opponents. No attempt was made to 
arrest any of the filibusters at Key West, but the Creole was 
seized by the United States authorities including all the arms 
and ammunition on board. The rapidity with which the men 
disembarked furnished the United States authorities some ex- 
cuse for not making arrests. Ten minutes after the Creole 
touched the pier, the wounded had been carried off and she 
was absolutely deserted by soldiers and crew. 32 

33 O. D. D. O. 79-82. Hardy, 46-54, 58, 63, Pickett's (Report, Hardy, 70, 
The Spanish Naval Commander in the Antilles, Francisco Avenero, to 
the Spanish Consul at Key West, House Ex. Doc. 83, 32 Cong. 1 Sess. 

P- 45'. 

The ships in the Cardenas expedition were supplied with coal and 
provisions for thirty days. Iznaga, a close friend of Lopez, gave the 
total cost $37,500, entirely secured from American sources. Morales, 
271. 

In the report for May 21, 1850, from W. C. Maloney, U. S. Mar- 
shall at Key West, to the Secretary of Interior, this official states that 
the number of armed men thrown into the town of Key West exceeded 
that of "effective male inhabitants." Seven negro slaves who had fled 

74 



The expedition and the attempts of the government to pre- 
vent it had been already a prolific source of embarrassment to 
the administration. On May 20th the papers had an- 
nounced the action taken by the President in sending vessels of 
the American navy to try to prevent the expedition from land- 
ing, or at least to cut off supplies and reenforcements from the 
United States. This action was made the ground for a bitter 
attack by Senator Yulee of Florida. He said he was doubtful 
whether any such expedition were contemplated. If it were, 
he did not believe it to be clearly illegal under the neutrality 
act of 1818. He said that the administration showed a desire 
to usurp powers which the constitution never gave it. It in- 
tended to deprive persons of life, liberty and property without 
due process of law. In attempting to keep provisions from 
reaching the island the President was himself breaking our 
laws of neutrality by taking the part in a foreign territory of 
one belligerent against the other. The President had gone so 
far as to make war without the authority of Congress. The 
government seemed to him, as to a very large number of 
Americans to be taking the side of despotism against liberal 
progress. 328 This remarkable speech called forth a masterly 
reply from Webster. The Senator from Massachusetts review- 
ed our promises to Spain repeated through the executive again 

on the Creole from Cardenas were restored to the Pizarro on appli- 
cation of the Spanish consul. (Mss. Dept. of Interior, Washington, 
D. C.) In the meantime on receiving the news of invasion Roncali 
issued a proclamation declaring the blockade of the island, placing it 
under military government, and condemning to instant death all who 
took part in any way in revolution or in inciting the slaves to rise. 
He called upon the citizens to show their loyalty. (Zaragoza, I, 597.) 

The governor of Matanzas reached Cardenas with a small body of 
troops about 2 a. m. only to find that the filibusters were gone. About 
3500 troops including 1000 militia under the Count of Mirasol left Ha- 
vana by rail soon after they received the news, and crossing the bay 
of Cardenas in boats marched beyond Cardenas to the east, where the 
expedition was expected to attempt a new landing. Zaragoza, op cit. 
600-602; Concha, 30. 

32a The Senator from Florida defended the filibusters saying that they 
were acting under "their personal civil right of emigration and ex- 
patriation." This view would have justified President Taylor's unfor- 
tunate threat in his proclamation in 1849 to refuse protection to 
filibusters as American citizens and these views tied the hands of the 
government when Crittenden and his men were captured in 1851, and 
later proved embarrassing in the famous case of the Virginius. 

75 



and again since Jackson's time. We were not only bound by 
treaties of peace, amity and goodwill, but we had repeatedly 
promised that if Spain would abstain from surrendering Cuba to 
any other European power, she might be assured of the good 
offices of the United States to maintain her in possession of 
the island. He held it to be an unquestionable law that Ameri- 
can jurisdiction followed the flag, whether that flag floated on 
the sea or even in a foreign port. This jurisdiction imposed 
the duty of protection, not only for the benefit of the United 
States, but, in true justice, for the benefit of a foreign country 
whose peace was threatened. Further, the act of 1818 imposed 
it as a solemn duty on the President to preserve the peace of 
the country by suppressing every unauthorized expedition set 
on foot in the United States against any portion of a country 
with which we were at peace. Mr. Webster could not regard 
the clause of the Constitution which safeguarded life, liberty 
and property as applying to armed insurrection. He expressed 
the highest confidence in the President of the United States. 33 

When the news of the Cardenas expedition reached Madrid 
the Spanish government urged very strongly upon the gov- 
ernment at Washington the severe punishment of the filibusters. 
Such punishment was required by the dignity of the American 
nation: "But if contrary to our expectations the authors of 
this last expedition should go unpunished as those did who last 
year planned the Round Island expedition, the government of 
Her Majesty will find itself obliged to appeal to the sentiments 
of morality and good faith of the nations of Europe to oppose 
the entrance of a system of politics and of doctrines which 
would put an end to the foundations on which rests the peace of 
the civilized world. If Europe should sanction by her silence 
and acquiescence the scandalous state of affairs by which the 
citizens of the United States (or those of any power whatever) 
might freely make war from their territory against Spain, when 
the latter is at perfect peace officially with the Union; if it 
should be tolerated or looked on with indifference that the 
solemn stipulations which bind the two states should be with 
impunity made hollow by mobs and that the law of nations 
and public morality should be violated without other motive 
than the selfishness of the aggressors, and with no other reli- 
ance than force; then civilized nations ought to renounce that 

33 Cong. Globe, May 21, 1850— XXI, 1030-1035. 

76 



peace which is based on the laws of nations and the terms of 
treaties, and make ready for a new era in which might will be 
right and in which popular passions of the worst kind will be 
substituted for the reason of states." 34 

The London Times, in an editorial for June 8, 1850, voiced 
much European opinion which severely criticized the govern- 
ment : "The civilized nations of the world are beginning to ask 
themselves the meaning of this extraordinary state system which 
unites many provinces for defence of one, if attacked, but 
leaves that one perfectly free to attack any friendly power in 
defiance of the wishes of the other members of the corporate 
government. Had Spanish ships blockaded the port of New 
Orleans, Spain would have been at war with the United 
States collectively. An armament is fitted out at New Orleans 
to invade Spanish territory and the government which repre- 
sents the United States is powerless to prevent its progress or 
( departure." 

In the south, the trend of public opinion was wholly favora- 
- ble to the filibusters, and made their conviction almost impossi- 
ble. A prominent Whig paper stated the situation clearly: 
"Our administration will disown all participation in it as an 
infraction of right, justice and good faith, but the design ap- 
peals with almost irresistible power to the great heart of the 
nation, and enlists the interests of the masses." 35 

In spite of much opposition the administration showed gen- 
uine good faith in its earnest endeavors to bring the filibusters 
to punishment. The Creole was confiscated, and Ewing, Secre- 
tary of the Interior, wrote to the District Attorney at New 
Orleans: "It is the earnest desire of the President that all 
leaders engaged in organizing and setting on foot the late ex- 
pedition against Cuba shall be brought to trial and punishment. 
It is a matter in which the good faith of the nation is impli- 
cated and it will not do to confine the retribution of justice to 
an obscure and worthless foreigner and suffer our own citizens 
who know the law which they have violated to escape 
unpunished. 

"These men have worked great mischief. They have done 

^Copia de un despacho dirigido al ministro Espanol en Washington 
y Circulado a los representantes de Espana en los Cortes de Europa, 
Madrid, June 23, 1850. Boletin del Archivo National, 19x16, p. 63. 

35 New Orleans Bee, May 14, 1850. 

77 



whatsoever they could to bring the laws into disrepute. They 
have disturbed our relations with a foreign power, with whom 
we desire peace and commerce, and they have sacrificed the 
lives of many of their ignorant and unreflecting fellow citizens 
who confided in them and followed their fortunes. Theirs, in 
its consequence, at least, is no common crime — and more than 
ordinary care should be taken to punish it and to prevent its 
recurrence in the future." 36 

In spite of the evident good faith of the administration, 
public opinion proved too strong to allow any convictions. 
Lopez was arrested at Savannah and released for lack of evi- 
dence. Everywhere he was received as a hero. His achieve- 
ment in capturing Cardenas was considered only a foretaste 
of greater successes. He arrived at New Orleans on June 7, 
1850, ready for a new enterprise. 37 At the preliminary hearing 
before the commissioner, the investigation was much hampered 
by the refusal of practically all the witnesses to answer im- 
portant questions on the ground that they would incriminate 
themselves. To some direct questions they answered that their 
sense of honor forbade injuring those who had confided in 
them. When pressed they denied all knowledge. 38 In spite of 
these difficulties the Grand Jury at New Orleans found true 
bills against sixteen of the leaders. 39 Ex-Senator Henderson 

^Ewing, Secretary of Interior, to Logan Hunton, June 10, 1850, 
Confidential, original Mss., Dept. of Interior. 

87 New Orleans Bee, June 8, 1850. Lopez is thus described: "Gen. 
Lopez has an exceedingly prepossessing appearance. He is apparently 
about fifty years of age. His figure is compact and well set. His 
face which is dark olive, and of the Spanish cast, is strikingly handsome, 
expressive of both intelligence and energy. His full dark eyes, firm, 
well-formed mouth, and erect head, crowned with iron grey hair, fix 
the attention and convince you that he is no ordinary man. Unless 
we are greatly mistaken in the impression we have formed of him, he 
will again be heard of in some new attempt to revolutionize Cuba. He 
certainly does not look like a man easily disheartened." Mobile Tribune; 
quoted N. O.. Bee, June 3, 1850. 

38 N. O. Bee, June 3-June 18, 1850. "The Cuba State Trials"— Dent. 
Review, 1852. 

39 Copy of Report of Logan Hunton to Secretary of State Webster 
regarding state of prosecutions, New Orleans, Oct. 2, 1850. Mss. Dept. 
of Interior. 

The following had been indicted : Narciso Lopez, Theodore O'Hara, 
John F. Pickett, R. Hayden, Chatham R. Wheat, Thomas T. Hawkins, 
W. H. Bell, N. J. Bunce, Peter Smith, and A. J. Gonzales (these nine 



was selected for trial on the ground that he had helped to 
organize the expedition. Although the charge of the judge was 
uniformly favorable to the prosecution, three successive juries 
were divided and failed to convict. The prosecution of the 
other fifteen was then dropped. Similar efforts to secure 
conviction of those connected with the expedition failed in 
New York and Ohio. The juries seemed to interpret the law 
as well as to estimate the facts which were clearly against 
the prisoners. The action of these juries furnished the Captain 
General of Cuba a text to compare jury trials with those before 
military tribunals to the disadvantage of the former, and many 
Americans regarded these trials with misgivings as a sign of a 
widespread lawlessness, while others were pleased at the evi- 
dences of what they regarded as a love of liberty. 40 

The administration of President Taylor, which was to close 
so soon with the unexpected death of the old hero on July 9, 
had to deal with one delicate and important problem growing 
out of the Cardenas expedition. It will be remembered that 
the Susan Laud had proceeded towards Contoy after trans- 
shipping the men, and that the Georgiana had been left at the 
island in Mexican waters to carry back the thirty-nine men who 
refused to accompany the Creole. On May 18th the two sail- 
ing vessels were seized by the Pizarro and Habanero, and the 
fifty-two men on board were taken to Havana for trial, the 
vessels following with prize crews 40a The American consul 

last being either colonels or majors in the expedition), L. J. Sigur, editor 
of. the Delta, Donahen Augusten, militia general and commander of a 
military company or regiment called the 'Legion,' John A. Quitman, 
Cotesworth Pinckney Smith, Judge of the Supreme Court of Missis- 
sippi, John Henderson, former U. S. Senator, and J. L. O'Sullivan, 
formerly editor of the Democratic Review. 

40 The Cuban State Trials, Democratic Review. 1852. 

The indictment and arrest of Governor Quitman of Mississippi cre- 
ated the greatest excitement. Governor Quitman at first threatened to 
use the militia to defend the threatened sovereignty of the State of 
Mississippi, but finally resigned and allowed himself to be arrested. 
He was released on bail, Feb. 7, 1851, and when the third trial of General 
Henderson failed through the inability of the jury to reach a decision, 
all the cases were dismissed. Claiborne's "Quitman," II, 75, 6. 

40a The accounts by Hardy and O. D. D. O. do not mention the arrival 
of the Susan Loud at Contoy before the departure of the Creole. But 
the Captain General reported that both vessels were captured at Contoy 
forty-eight hours after the departure of the Creole. El Conde de 

79 



and the captain of the sloop of war, Albany, demanded the 
release of the prisoners, on the ground that they were captured 
in neutral waters. On the refusal of this demand, a special 
commissioner was sent by the state department to emphasize 
the previous demand, and to state that the President would 
regard the punishment of the prisoners as an outrage. 41 

With regard to the prisoners, Secretary of State Clayton 
argued that even an intention to commit a crime did not con- 
stitute a crime and directed the American commissioner at 
Havana to "warn" the Captain General "in the most friendly 
manner and in the true spirit of ancient treaties, that if he 
unjustly shed one drop of American blood at that exciting 
period it might cost the two countries a sanguinary war." 42 
Clayton was anxious that the prisoners should be remitted by 
the Captain General to the United States "to encounter a pun- 
ishment, which, if they are honorable men, will be worse than 
any he could inflict, in the indignant frowns and denunciations 
of good men in their own country." 

The American minister at Madrid was also instructed to 

Alcoy al Mtro. de Estado, Habana, May 27 de 1850. Unpublished 
Mss. Havana Archives. 

41 House Ex. Doc. 83, 32 Cong. ; 1 Sess. p. 45. 

The London ^Times commented on the Contoy Prisoners: "They 
incurred the guilt and liabilities of piracy at the moment they put to 
sea on their errand of pillage; and they were amenable to justice ac-. 
cording to the laws of nations at any period of their expedition, subject 
to no other condition than the legal proof of their guilty intent." It is 
needless to say that so extreme a view would find little to sustain it in 
International Law. Times, July 19, 1850. 

42 J. J. Crittenden wrote Clayton, June 22, 1850, Clayton Mss. Library 
of Congress: "You have had an arduous time, indeed, in the number 
and importance of the foreign difficulties and questions that have been 
thrown upon you. But you have no cause to regret these labours. You 
have performed them with a signal success and ability, that cannot fail 
to be rewarded with the public applause. The attitude you have taken 
on the Cuban affair is exactly the right one — popular, proud and na- 
tional — brandishing the laws of the land over the heads of Lopez 
and his lawless followers, and at the same time giving Spain to be 
warned that she is to shed no drop of American blood unjustly or in 
revenge." 

In a letter dated July 9, 1850, the Captain General complained bitterly 
to his home government of what he deemed the deliberate effort of 
Secretary Clayton to bring on a war between the United States and 
Spain. (Unpublished Mss. Havana.) 

80 



carry the protest of the American government directly to the 
Spanish ministry. The claim of the American minister that 
the Contoy prisoners were chiefly bona fide passengers to 
California seems very much open to question, 43 but he stood on 
firmer ground when he protested against the right of Spain to 
arrest violators of an American law on neutral territory any 
more than on American territory. Sefior Pidal, the Spanish 
Minister of State, did not attempt to quote any precedents for 
his position, but argued that the moment any such band of men 
left American territory, they became pirates, without any na- 
tionality. If Spain had to wait until such a force actually 
landed in Cuba her difficulties would be largely increased, and 
she would suffer great losses unnecessarily. It was impossible 
for her to yield to the demand of the United States. 44 

While the negotiations were in progress, the Contoy prison- 
ers were tried by the maritime court, after some dispute with 
Captain General Alcoy with regard to jurisdiction. The mari- 
time court was certainly more lenient than the Captain General 
would have been, and all but three were found not guilty on 
the ground that they were deceived as to the true object of 
the expedition. The master of the Georgiana and the mates 
of the two vessels were sentenced to long terms of penal servi- 
tude in the African prison at Ceuta, but owing to the American 
demands were pardoned and sent back to the United States 
from Cadiz, November 16, 1850, a notable diplomatic victory 
for Secretary Clayton. 

It seemed to be the policy of Webster, who now became Sec- 
retary of State, to try to conciliate Spain, and the two sailing 
vessels were accordingly confiscated by a Spanish prize court, 
although it was in time of peace, without any serious protest 
from the state department. 45 

43 Chadwick, 233, 234, adopts the view that those found "not guilty" 
were bona fide passengers to Charges. With this view the Captain 
General agreed. (Letter to minister of State, June 9, 1850, Unpublished 
Mss. Havana). Hardy and O. D. D. O. give the impression that they 
had intended to go to Cuba, and had lost their courage. 

44 Mr. Barringer, minister at Madrid to Mr. Clayton, Secretary of 
State, Aug. 7, 1850, House Ex. Doc. 83, 32 Cong. 1 Sess. 

45 House Ex. Doc. 83, 32 Cong. 1 Sess. The American position was 
later stated clearly (Senate Resolution, June 16, 1858, quoted by Chad- 
wick, page 236) : "American vessels on the high seas, in time of peace, 
bearing the American flag, remain under the jurisdiction of the country 

81 



In Cuba the immediate result of the expedition was the ap- 
pointment of a Captain General of great energy and ability, 
Don Jose de la Concha, to succeed Roncali. Concha had been 
commander of the Spanish cavalry. He received his appoint- 
ment in September and thus had two months to plan his policies 
before arriving in the island November 10. The new Captain 
General frankly expressed at the beginning his ideal : "A gov- 
ernment of force" to make certain peace and security, and at 
the same time "a government of justice which would permit, 
>no abuse." It was to be a benevolent despotism. Instead of 
indefinite fees, he demanded fixed incomes for government 
officials, that he might be able to eradicate corruption. But all 
reforms, as in the days of the Roman proconsuls, must be from 
above. 

In addition to his appointment of Concha, the Duke of Val- 
encia, as Prime Minister, took immediate steps to increase the 
defensive power of the island. At great expense and without 
any delay troops were organized and sent to Cuba. These were 
made up of four new battalions of infantry, four squadrons of 
cavalry, a battery of light artillery for use in the mountains, 
and a company of working men to act as sappers. In addition 
to this he opened a line of four vessels between Cadiz and Ha- 
vana to keep Spain in constant communication with the 
island. 46 

to which they belong, and therefore, any visitation, molestation, or 
detention of such vessel by force, or by the exhibition of force, on 
the part of a foreign power, is in derogation of the sovereignty of the 
United States." 

Torrente believes (I, 49) that war with Spain would have resulted 
if Clayton had remained Secretary of State. 

48 Concha, op. cit. 134-136; 174, 201. 

These measures were due to the recommendations of Roncali to the 
Minister of ' State, June 9, 1850, Unpublished Mss. Havana. 



82 



CHAPTER VI 

The Cleopatra and the Pampero 

Those who knew him had been entirely correct in character- 
izing Lopez as a man not easily disheartened. The failure of 
his attempt in the summer only spurred him on, and in Novem- 
ber, 1850, we find Lopez actively and hopefully engaged at 
New Orleans in preparations for a new expedition. All the 
friends of the Cuban adventurer took special pride in carrying 
on their plans at the very time that they were under indictment 
for the previous offence. The new expedition was to sail from 
the coast of Georgia where the supplies were being collected, 
though the steamer was to be secured at New Orleans. One 
could be had for $25,000, but only half the money had at that 
time been collected. The promoters of the new scheme argued 
that the expedition to Cardenas had served to arouse the ex- 
pectations of the Cubans and to make the new landing almost 
sure of success. Lack of money was the great difficulty. Gen- 
eral Henderson wrote to Claiborne : "I need not tell you how 
much I desire to see him move again, and it is more useless to 
tell you also how wholly unable I am to assist him to make 
this move. With my limited means, I am under the extremest 
burdens from my endeavors on the former occasion. Indeed 
I find my cash advances for the first experiment was over half 
of all the cash advanced to the enterprise, and all my present 
means and energies are exhausted in bringing up the arrearages. 
Yet I still believe in the importance, the morality and the proba- 
bility of the enterprise; and I believe it is one the South should 
steadfastly cherish and promote. I feel it more especially in- 
cumbent on us who have once failed to retrieve ourselves from 
so much of the opprobrium and reproach as the defeat has cast 
upon us. For we all know that, could we succeed, we should 
win all those triumphs which success in such enterprises never 
fails to command. And would not such triumph be glorious? 
... I believe you yield equal consideration to the importance 
of this subject as I do; and, as a Southern question, I do 

83 



not think, when properly viewed, its magnitude can be 
overestimated." 1 

Preparations during the fall and winter centered around 
Savannah, where many recruits were gathered. The plans were 
constantly modified, and as constantly revealed to the Spanish 
Minister through a spy named Burtnett, who also called him- 
self Burnham and Duncan Smith. 

Burnham gained the entire confidence of the filibusters, and 
they revealed their plans. They were to assemble at a point on 
the coast of Florida and give out rumors of an attack on the 
south coast of Cuba. While the Spaniards were expecting 
them in that direction, eight or ten small expeditions would 
sally out against various points on the north coast. Thus Cuba 
would rise at once and the conflagration would be so wide- 
spread that the Spaniards would not know where to turn. Al- 
ready the plotters thought they could depend on 14,000 Cubans. 
They considered the opportunity greatest in the West. The 
invasions were to take place at points where the leader of each 
party was known and had friends. The Spanish troops were 
regarded as highly dissatisfied. Burnham learned that many 
leading southern gentlemen had supplied money. Some of 
the bonds of the Revolutionary government had sold at forty 
cents on the dollar. Thousands of rifles had already been pur- 
chased and placed at convenient places to be removed at a 

1 Claiborne's "Quitman" II, 69. 

The whole movement had come to be considered Southern, as was 
clearly shown when the prosecutions against those indicted in 1850 were 
dropped. 

The New Orleans newspapers published the following telegram from 
Natchez, dated March 8, 185 1 : "So great was the joyful excitement 
in Natchez last night on the termination of the Cuban humbug in your 
city, that the night was made voiceful with the roar of cannon. Fifteen 
guns were fired for Quitman and fifteen for (the) Southern States. 
Many persons pulled off their stockings (sic) for cartridges, and fired 
several for mankind in general." 

In March, 1851, Henry Clay visited Havana and was entertained by 
Captain General Concha. Clay told the Captain General that he regard- 
ed filibustering expeditions as foodhardy but not always avoidable. He 
frankly acknowledged the great strategic importance of Cuba to the 
United States, and prophesied that by peaceful means it would some 
day be acquired from Spain. This interesting conversation was re- 
ported in detail to his home government by Concha, March 31, 185 1. 
(Unpublished Mss. Havana.) 



moment's notice. Estates in the South had been mortgaged 
that the owners might share in the future wealth of broad plan- 
tations well stocked with negroes. Having discovered these 
plans, Doctor Burnham promptly disclosed them to his em- 
ployers, "knowing," as he piously said, "that no matter what 
might be the result, so far as I was personally concerned, I had 
justice and right on my side." 

The first consignment of arms for the new expedition was 
to sail from New York in the steamer Cleopatra, and all the 
plans were arranged in detail with every chance of success, for 
experience had taught Lopez and his lieutenants the value of 
secrecy and caution. On a certain Wednesday evening in April 
1 85 1, the chartered sloop William Roe was to leave South 
Amboy, while the steamer Nahantee was to start from the foot 
of Eighteenth Street, New York. The Cleopatra was to wait 
just outside quarantine, to be distinguished by three lights hung 
one above the other on her stern pole. The William Roe was 
to await off Sandy Hook burning as a signal a blue light every 
five minutes until she saw a similar signal in answer. The 
Cleopatra, awaiting off quarantine, was to make the excuse 
that her captain had been called on shore on business at the 
last moment. All these plans were virtuously recounted to the 
Spanish Consul and to the government officials. 

Burnham would have preferred a dramatic close to the 
whole incident, but the Federal government was satisfied to 
detain the schooner at South Amboy on a technical flaw in her 
papers. The crew of the Cleopatra unfortunately got drunk, 
and, not getting away in time, she too was detained on a writ 
of attachment for $3,000 due to her previous owner for repairs. 
Provisions on board the steamer were mortgaged to pay the 
debt, but on the evening of the twenty-sixth all the principal 
parties implicated were arrested. 2 On the testimony of Burn- 
ham, John L. O'Sullivan, Captain Lewis and Louis Schlessin- 
ger were indicted by the Grand Jury, but all efforts at conviction 
failed owing to mistrial, and the matter was dropped. 3 

2 The Boletin del Archivo National, 1906, contained the Spanish 
version as written by Burtnett, while what seems to be an English 
translation is edited by L. M. Perez in the Reports of the Southern 
Historical Association, X, 346 et seq. 

3 Late Cuba State Trials, Democratic Review, April, 1852. 

The Cleopatra and provisions were not confiscated, but being returned 

85 



On April 25 President Fillmore issued a proclamation 
which was even more severe than President Taylor's of the 
previous year. It stated that there was reason to believe that 
an expedition was preparing, that the leaders were foreigners 
abusing the hospitality of the United States, and that such ex- 
peditions could only be regarded as "adventures for condemna- 
tion of the civilized world." Those who violated our neutrality 
laws would therefore not only make themselves subject to the 
penalties of our own law but would "forfeit their claim to the 
protection of this government, or any interference on their 
behalf no matter to what extremeties they may be reduced in 
consequence of their illegal conduct." 4 

Although the Cleopatra expedition had ended in complete 
failure, the attempt was followed by interesting events in the 
island of Cuba. The new Captain General was convinced that 
a landing was sure to be effected sooner or later and made 
preparations accordingly, distributing his forces with the great- 
est care. 5 His determination was expressed in the following 
proclamation to the Governors and Lieutenant Governors : 
"It has come to the knowledge of the Government that a new 
incursion of pirates is preparing, similar to the one which took 
place at Cardenas during the last year. It is proposed, without 
doubt, as it was then, to sack defenceless towns and to disturb 
the order which reigns in this beautiful part of the Spanish 
monarchy. But the loyalty of its inhabitants, the valor and 
discipline of the troops and the measures taken by the govern- 
ment, are the surest guaranty that its destruction will follow 
immediately the news of its disembarkation. You must, then, 
above all see to it that the news of this invasion produces no 
alarm in the district which you command. 

"To exterminate the pirates, whatever may be their number, 
it is not necessary to have recourse to extraordinary means; 
the ordinary means on which the government can count are 
enough and even more than enough. Any act, on the other 
hand, which is unusual would produce anxiety and uneasiness 
among the peaceful inhabitants; it might cause, perhaps, an 

by the government officials, were resold and became the basis of a new 
expedition. (Iznaga, quoted by Morales, 272.) 

4 Moore, Digest of International law. Ill, 788, Richardson's Mes- 
sages, V, in. 

6 Concha, 143. 

86 



interruption of business, and would thus occasion a real and 
important loss for public and private interests. It is necessary, 
therefore to avoid any measures which may remove from the 
towns of that district the confidence and sense of security 
which the government inspires. The actual situation, however, 
imposes on the authorities the double duty to cause order to 
reign, and not to appear to obtain it by unaccustomed means 
which are only expedient when circumstances are really dan- 
gerous. And this double object will be achieved if that vigil- 
ance, activity and prudence are in evidence on which I should 
be able to count from you. -But you must not forget that in 
these circumstances one of th^e most important duties of the 
authorities is to quiet minds, and hush suspicions, to take care, 
finally, that not for a single instant there should be disturbed 
that harmony which now more than ever ought to reign among 
the inhabitants of the island. Working to this end, I have the 
most entire confidence that this event will end fortunately, 
making certain the peace which the island needs to continue on 
the path of prosperity which it has so far followed." 6 

The chief anxiety of the Governor General concerned the 
prosperous city of Puerto Principe. Young men in the city 
were in communication with Lopez, and public opinion was 
bitter on account of the suppression of the ancient Audiencia 
or Parliament of the city. Even the women were selling their 
jewels to aid the rebellion. 

When things were in this state at Puerto Principe, the Cap- 
tain General received a petition from the city council asking 
that their Audiencia be not taken away. This petition was 
dated one month previous to the date on which it was sent to 
the Captain General. Evidently, as it seemed to him, they had 
dared to send the petition to Spain without asking his consent 
and had even waited a month before sending it to him so as 
to make sure of getting their side of the case in first. What 
astonished Concha most was that the commanding general who 
was supposed to represent military discipline in the district 
expressed great satisfaction in joining his petition to theirs. 
Such a show of independent spirit was peculiarly pleasing to 
Concha. • It was a welcome opportunity, as he tells us himself, 
to show his power. He immediately met the petition, which 
seems to have been entirely respectful, by suspending the city 

"Concha, 210. 

87 



council and dismissing the commanding general. In this course 
he felt particularly justified since he had reason to believe that 
many members of the council were thoroughly disaffected. 

The new commanding general, Don Jose Lemery, was a 
man after Concha's own heart. Active and shrewd he had 
none of that pride in local institutions or local government 
which had wrecked the career of his predecessor. 

"I charge you most earnestly," said Concha to his new lieu- 
tenant, "along with active zeal and decided energy, to also use 
that judgment, that caution, that politeness and prudent courage 
which are the only means by which an absolute authority can 
master circumstances, without giving occasion for unnecessary 
quarrels or complaints founded in an excess of that very 
energy which when prudently joined (to these qualities) and 
cautiously directed, produces the result which ought to be its 
object, namely to frustrate the realization of the criminal pur- 
poses of Her Majesty's enemies and thus to avoid the neces- 
sity of exemplary punishments, always lamentable, but in the 
last resort inevitable." 7 

For a little while the active measures of Concha in suppress- 
ing all evidences of discontent thoroughly frightened the secret 
insurgents. But in spite of Lemery's care inflammatory broad- 
sides soon began again to appear. Lemery now thought it 
time to display that "prudent energy" which had been enjoined 
upon him. One night he ordered the arrest of sixteen promin- 
ent citizens under suspicion of disloyalty. The majority of 
these were members of the old Ayuntamiento. Joaquin Aguero 
and one other succeeded in making their escape outside of the 
city, where Aguero became the leader of the first active Cuban 
movement. He encamped and entrenched himself on a high 
hill where he was joined by other fugitives to the number of 

7 (i) Concha, op. cit. 205, 6, 7, 8. 
(2) Concha, Havana, April 1, 1851. Letter directed "Al Sr. Presi- 
dente del Consejo de Ministros" — B olefin, IV, 4, (66). 
(3) Concha, Havana, July 21, 1851. "Al Excmo. Senor Presidente 
del Consejo de Ministros," Boletin, IV, 81. 
(4) Concha, Havana, Aug. 1, 1851. "Al Excmo. Sr. Ministro de la 
Gobernacion del Reino," Boletin, IV, 83. 
Very clear evidence that Lopez had much to justify his hopes appears 
in the letter of Concha, dated July 21. In this he says : "The desire 
of the inhabitants for annexation or independence already amounts to 
fanaticism." 



fifty. With this body, on July 7, Aguero proceeded to attack 
Las Tunas. The Spanish forces showed great activity. Lem- 
ery was able to disperse without bloodshed a party of insurgents 
which was gathering in the suburbs of Santa Cruz. On the 
other side General Manzana, from the town of Cuba, made a 
remarkable forced march of forty hours through a pouring 
rain and, reaching Las Tunas, saved it from any further danger. 
Aguero was captured and his remaining followers were driven 
to hide themselves where they could. 

The plot of Aguero spread to other parts of the island but, 
being so quickly put down, it was only in Trinidad that a few 
young men under leadership of Armenteros appeared in open 
rebellion. Passing from farm to farm they gathered about 
fifty horses. Immediately the Governor of Trinidad, and the 
Lieutenant Governors of Villa Clara and Cienfuegos marched 
out against them. Surrounded on all sides they had no other 
alternative than to hide themselves in a thickly wooded moun- 
tain, where they had to abandon their horses. Without even a 
show of resistance, the majority were captured, while some 
few managed to make good their escape to their houses. The 
military court to try the prisoners was placed under Carlos 
Vargas. Concha says that from this time on the inhabitants 
of the central region remained "blindly loyal to the 
Government." 8 

Late in July, in spite of careful censorship, news began to 
arrive in New Orleans of successful risings in Cuba. All stories 
of failure were credited to Spanish sources, and the press which 
had tended to become somewhat critical of Lopez became again 
optimistic. Great public meetings were held. Proclamations 
of Cuban liberty were read. $50,000 were raised to show the 
sincerity of this movement, and men thronged to enlist. These 
men were evidently of a higher average class and actuated by 
more worthy motives than in any of the previous expeditions. 
Cuban liberty was now the cry,— for the Americans of 1850 
were easily aroused by any effort sincerely made to throw off 

8 My sources for this movement are: 

(1) Concha, op. cit. 209. 

(2) Torrente, op. cit. I, 53, 54. 

(3) Zaragoza, op. cit. I, 620 ff. 

(4) New Orleans Bee, July 23, 185 1. 

(5) Vidal Morales, op. cit. 275 ff. especially, 300, 1. 



what they regarded as the shackles of despotism. Of course, 
the old desire to save Cuba to the cause of slavery was curious- 
ly mixed with a sincere enthusiasm for political liberty. It is 
even said that Garibaldi, then in the United States, was ap- 
proached and urged to act as leader. Lopez and Sigur were 
the centers of attraction in New Orleans. 9 It is no wonder that 
the officer of the custom house did not feel himself called on to 
make extraordinary exertions, and the steamer Pampero of 
about 500 tons burthen was bought and equipped and made 
ready to carry the first contingent of the new expedition with- 
out serious opposition. To Lopez and his chief lieutenants all 
difficulties seemed now overcome and success within reach. 10 

9 As to Sigur one witness says : "Sigur era entonces el hombre mas 
importante de N. Orleans. En materia de vida o muerte, no se podian 
obtener cinco minutos de conversation con el, tan precioso era su tiempo. 
No podia andar por las calles sin ser acometido en cada esquina por 
media docena de personas que le ofrecian levantar companias o regi- 
mentos para la causa Cubana." (Boletin — 1904, pp. 19.) 

10 My chief authorities are : 

(1) New Orleans' Papers, July 24, 1851-Aug. 2, 1851. 

Especially Bee, July 24. 

(2) Colonel Haynes Memorial, Cong. Globe, XXIV, 217. 

(3) Iznaga, in Morales, op. cit. 273. 

(4) Correspondence of Freret, collector of customs, with the Sec- 

retary of the Treasury. (Pamphlet, New York Public 
Library.) 

Freret was severely blamed and finally dismissed for incompetence 
on account of the Pampero affair. 

The answer of the Department to the excuses of Freret was dated 
Aug. 14: "The Department considers that under its previous instruc- 
tions you had full authority to act in a case like that of the "Pampero," 
where the object of the parties was so obvious and notorious as being 
connected with an illegal attempt against the territories of a friendly 
power. It is of course impracticable for the Department to give special 
instructions to meet every case of the kind which may occur, but you 
must exercise a sound discretion in detaining vessels which you may 
think are engaged in any unlawful expedition, and about departing from 
your district. . . . The Department considers that there can be no real 
difficulty in discriminating between parties embarking as bona fide pas- 
sengers for the Pacific Via the Isthmus, and those who assume to be 
such and go in transient and frequently unsuitable vessels, but who are 
really destined to act as an armed expedition against the citizens or 
territories of a friendly power. 

You are again requested and instructed to keep a vigilant lookout for 
any such unlawful expedition, and to use all the means in your power 
to check and break them up." 

00 



CHAPTER VII 
The Last Attempt 

On the morning of Sunday August 3 ia at daybreak, the 
steamer Pampero sailed from the foot of Lafayette Street, 
New Orleans. An enthusiastic crowd was there to speed the 
parting adventurers and the air rang with joyful shouts from 
shore and from the ship. The Pampero was towed down the 
river to Balize where the difficulties of the filibusters began. It 
was found that the ship was too crowded to put to sea. In 
fact Captain Lewis refused to go farther until some of the 
eager adventurers were left behind. One hundred men were to 
be denied the boon of accompanying the expedition. The com- 
panies were assembled and each captain selected the men who 
seemed least fitted for so arduous an enterprise. A very few 
chose voluntarily to be left behind. That night they were 
placed on shore, but in the morning it was discovered that 
many had come back on board and the situation was almost 
as bad as ever. Colonel Downman urged and entreated, but 
they said they had started for Cuba and intended to get there. 
In the meantime a tug had arrived with the arms and am- 
munition and all were busy transshipping these to the Pam- 
pero. This work sufficiently discouraged some, so that a few 
were persuaded to return, and Captain Jackson's whole com- 
pany, by dint of force and persuasion, went back to New 
Orleans, promising to come in the next expedition; for the 
Pampero was to be only a forerunner of a large invasion. One 
day was given to drill and organization. At sunset on the 
fifth the Pampero was towed over the bar and started on her 
journey of adventure. Of these sons of Anglo Saxon rovers 
who sailed light heartedly out upon the blue waters of the 
Gulf, the majority were to suffer incredible hardships under a 
tropical sun and to leave their bones in a land whose history, 

la Schlesinger, Dent. Rev. XXI, IX, gives Aug. 2. Aug. 3 is given 
by the account in Boletin, Havana, 1904, and President Fillmore, Mes- 
sage, Dec. 2, 1851. 

9i 



since the days of the Great Genoese, had been one endless 
repetition of just such bloody tragedies. 

Their numbers were little more than 400. x The Com- 
mander-in chief was of course General Lopez, while in his 
staff were foreign officers of distinction who had fought and 
lost in the battles for freedom of the old world. The chief of 
staff was the Hungarian General, Pragay, who was accom- 
panied by Colonel Blumenthal, Major Louis Schlesinger and 
other Hungarian officers. The engineers were Cubans and 
Hungarians, while a few Germans accompanied the expedition 
without any special leader. The staff included two surgeons 
who were to do good service to Spanish as well as to American 
wounded. 

The Cuban company, under the command of Ildefonso 
Oberto, numbered 44 men. The Americans were divided into 
two battalions, of 232 and 122 men each. The first battalion 
was commanded by Colonel Downman, a veteran of the Mexi- 
can war and a good disciplinarian. Respected by his men and 
an active and skilled officer, his death in the first engagement 
was an irreparable loss. The Lieutenant-Colonel of the battal- 
ion was William Scott Haynes of Tennessee. Robert Ellis 
commanded the so-called guards of Sigur; this company of 51 
men had, as its lieutenants, Breckenridge, Labrizan and Mc- 
Donald. The four other companies of this battalion were 
under the command of Captains John Johnson, Brigham, 
Gotay, and William H. Stewart. 

The second battalion was designed to serve the artillery 
which was to be embarked at St. John's on the coast of Cuba. 
Its commander, Colonel William L. Crittenden, a nephew of 
the Attorney General of the United States, had been educated 
at West Point and had served in the Mexican War with distinc- 
tion. At the time of the expedition he was an officer of the 
Custom House at New Orleans. 2 His battalion was divided 
into three companies under Captains Kelly, James Sanders, and 
Victor Kerr, which companies contained 40, 49, and 18 men 
respectively. 

1 The account in the Boletin, Havana, 1904, gives the number as 434. 
Schlesinger in Dem. Review, XXXI, No. IX, 216, gives the number at 
"a trifle over 400." 

2 Schlesinger states, Dem. Review, XXI, 213, that Crittenden gave 
information to Lopez as to the movements of the Custom House of- 
ficials which materially aided in the escape of the Pampero. 

92 



The first two days were entirely uneventful. There being 
only one small stove, it was difficult to cook the rations which 
were given out, but Colonel Downman arranged the hours so 
that there should be as little conflict as possible. Lopez and his 
staff took only one cooked meal a day. On the seventh there 
appeared the smoke of a vessel which seemed to be pursuing 
the Pampero. The filibusters changed their course, but in the 
morning the vessel was still in sight. Cartridges were given 
out and all stood ready to repel an attack.,, Fortunately, about 
nine in the morning the strange steamer seemed to be satisfied 
that it had mistaken the character of the Pampero, In any 
case, it changed its course and was soon lost to view. On the 
tenth a pilot was picked up and the expedition reached Key 
West. The filibusters had been dreading to find war vessels 
stationed at Key West, so the precaution was taken of hiding 
all the men below. Great was the rejoicing to find port and 
barracks both empty. It seemed an omen of success. The 
soldiers poured out on deck to enjoy what for many was to be 
their last day as Americans and within the jurisdiction of their 
native land. But gloomy thoughts were absent. The hos- 
pitable inhabitants came on board in crowds bringing cham- 
pagne and other luxuries. Healths were drunk and good cheer 
reigned supreme. Rumor had it that three towns were in in- 
surrection and that Cuba was ready for the attack which would 
make her free. The original intention had been to proceed to 
the St. John's river and there take the artillery which had 
been stored away. But the news from Cuba changed all. If 
the island was in insurrection, rapidity was urgent; before 
Spain could quell the disturbances she should in another quar- 
ter have a more formidable enemy to meet. Very probably 
other considerations had weight too. The St. John's River 
was very far away, and the Pampero might be intercepted at 
any moment. Even if she entered the river, it was not easy 
to guarantee that she would have a chance to sail out. Then, 
too, in Cuba rapidity of movement would be essential. The 
troops must reach the mountains and must do it without the 
delay which artillery would occasion. The roads were ex- 
ecrable, and so small a force could not hope to lay siege to a 
town. On the other hand, the American soldiers were won- 
derful rifle shots. In that weapon must lie the chief depen- 
dence of the filibusters. In any case, the Pampero was only 

93 



a preliminary advance guard and, if they could hold their own, 
the men at New Orleans who were already eager to start would 
soon come with artillery and other equipment. Furthermore, 
not only did Spain and the United States have vessels watching 
for the Pampero, but France and England were soon likely to 
issue like orders. 

For these reasons it was decided to go directly by the. short- 
est route to Cuba. On the evening of the tenth the little force 
bade farewell to their friends at Key West. Captain Lewis 
raised anchor and the Pampero, amid loud huzzahs, directed 
her prow towards the Cuban coast. At daybreak land was 
clearly visible, and by nine o'clock it was found that they were 
within ten miles of the Morro at Havana; two vessels had 
started in pursuit; but, changing her course, the light speedy 
Pampero had soon left these behind. Once again the Pampero 
turned toward the island and taking two men from a schooner 
to act as pilots, arrived off Bahia Honda at eight o'clock in the 
evening, (Aug. n, 1851). The mate of the Pampero was sent 
to reconnoitre, but soon came back to say that his boat had 
been fired upon and that the fort seemed too well manned to 
make a landing at that place practicable. Lopez now decided 
to make the landing at Morillo, a short distance to the west of 
Bahia Honda. When about a mile from the shore, the Pampero 
grounded, and it became necessary to disembark in small boats. 
The first boatload contained Colonel Downman and a detach- 
ment under Captain Gotay. The Spanish patrol on the shore 
fired but did no damage, though a bullet passed through the cap 
of a lieutenant. The first troops to land succeeded in getting 
possession of two large fiat boats, and with these all the troops 
were landed at daybreak. The men were permitted to lie down 
for two hours, but sleep was impossible on account of the 
swarms of mosquitoes. 

In the meantime information of these movements had not 
failed to reach the alert Concha at Havana. The recent dis- 
turbances in the Central Department, even aside from the 
stream of proclamations and the open announcements in the 
American papers, would have been sufficient to warn the gov- 
ernor of Cuba of his danger. He was not surprised on the 
night of August 11 to receive word from the Captain of the 
Port that two American vessels of suspicious character had 
appeared off the mouth of the harbor. One had seemed to be 

94 



an American war vessel. The second and more suspicious of 
the two stopped and seemed to hesitate, finally steaming away 
to the northwest. Nothing more concerning the strange ves- 
sels was heard by the Captain General until half past two in 
the morning when a messenger arrived from Mariel, a fort to 
the west of Havana. The Spanish frigate Esperanza had, put 
in to Mariel to report having seen a steamer loaded with men. 
The steamer had carefully avoided the Esperanza, so that the 
Captain had been unable to ascertain her exact character. 
Concha had now no doubts as to the true character of the 
strange steamer. Word was sent out immediately to make 
the Pizarro ready to carry troops, and at seven-thirty General 
Don Manuel Ena with 750 men was already embarked and 
ready to sail. The steamer had in tow a schooner which had 
been made ready previously to carry thirty horses. 

Concha had been led from intercepted letters and other in- 
formation in his possession to expect the hostile force to land 
at Mantua on the extreme western point of the island. It 
seemed to him particularly suited to the filibusters' purpose 
since its nearness to New Orleans would make it an ideal point 
on which to await reenforcements. Roads and means of com- 
munication to Mantua were so bad as to make it almost unap- 
proachable from the land side. The wealth of the district 
farther east had made it necessary to station all the troops of 
Colonel Elizalde at Pinar del Rio, leaving Mantua without any 
garrison at all. 

Fearing for Mantua, the Captain General was on the point 
of sending the Pizarro to the extreme west, when the Captain 
of the schooner which Lopez had detained arrived with news 
of the true direction which the filibusters had taken. The 
situation particularly pleased the Captain General. It was 
probable that Lopez would march by way of the mountains in 
the general direction of the Capital. Colonel Morales was there- 
fore sent by rail to Gunajay where 400 men were soon collected 
to meet the enemy from in front. General Ena was to land at 
Bahia Honda and from there cooperate with Colonel Elizalde, 
who advancing from Pinar del Rio in the southwest would crush 
the enemy whose escape to the sea would be effectually barred 
by Ena. The command of the coast at Bahia Honda would 
also effectually cut off the large reenforcements which were 
now the chief danger. The 400 men at Gunajay would hold 



95 



the passes in front of the enemy. Thus Lopez and his men 
were virtually surrounded almost as soon as they landed. 3 

Ignorant of these dangers, the filibusters continued their 
work of disembarkation. By nine o'clock all the arms and 
provisions were safely landed, and Lopez was ready to take 
his march to Las Pozas, a village ten miles away. 4 There 
were no carts at the landing place, and it seemed necessary to 
leave the provisions and to send back for them as soon as carts 
could be procured. Lopez was anxious to march on with the 
whole force, but General Pragay persuaded him to detach 
Crittenden's 120 men to guard and bring up the provisions and 
arms. By half after nine the larger column was on its way, 
and by a fairly rapid march reached Las Pozas at twelve-thirty. 
The march in the heat of the day, made by men who had not 
slept or eaten since the day before, was a fitting introduction to 
the hardships of a filibuster's career. Guards were stationed at 
various points in the village and carts were sent back to Crit- 
tenden to bring the arms and ammunition. The carts, under 
the escort of five members of the Cuban company, had gone 
about half way to the landing place when they were attacked by 
a crowd of peasants. These cut loose the oxen and dispersed 
the escort; but Lieutenant James of Crittenden's force came 
up at this time and the negro drivers found other oxen, so that 
all were able to join Crittenden. Thus, on the morning of the 
13th, Crittenden started slowly to join Lopez. The two carts 
drawn by a single yoke of oxen each were heavily overloaded 
and the journey was necessarily slow and painful. 

In the meantime interesting events were taking place at 
Las Pozas where was Lopez with his 325 men. Having ar- 
rived about noon on the 12th, the tired soldiers had an op- 
portunity to eat and drink. Strict orders were given against 
any one taking property without paying for it. Guards were 
stationed at the instance of General Pragay to guard the stores 
and to prevent drunkenness. The very best order prevailed. 
On the night of the 12th, while Crittenden was awaiting the 
ox carts at Morrillo, Lopez and his men slept on their arms 

8 Concha, Memorias, 210, 2iu. 

4 The Pampero having landed her force at El Morro returned by 
way of Key West, intending to go to Jacksonville and there embark 
new forces under General Gonzales. (L'Abeille de la Nouvelle Orleans, 
Aug. 30, 185 1.) 

96 



ready for the attack which was soon sure to come. In the 
morning, while some of the men were cooking their rations 
and others were bathing in a small creek, the alarm was given. 
The enemy had attacked and routed the outposts and were al- 
ready within 200 yards of the village. The companies were 
quickly formed, and the company of Johnson on the left with- 
stood the first Spanish attack until he was reinforced by Cap- 
tain Stewart and the Cubans under Oberto. A division of the 
enemy were seen to be stealing around the right to make a 
flank attack from the cornfields. Captain Ellis occupied a hill 
on that side from which he could guard against this attack 
with ease. The center was formed by Captains Brigham and 
Gotay. The firing was now brisk along the whole line, and the 
Spaniards gradually fell back while the American line ad- 
vanced. Reinforced, the Spaniards charged ag'ain on the 
advantageous American position, but were hurled back with 
severe loss. One body only, occupying the road to Las Pozas, 
maintained their position. On these Colonel Downman charged 
with fifty men, enough to cover the road. The Spanish line 
held until the filibusters' bayonets were within a few feet, and 
then fled. But Colonel Downman allowed the pursuit to go too 
far. His small number of men were in turn charged and de- 
feated, he and Captain Oberto being killed. 5 On the whole 
the Spanish firing was too high to be effective while the Amer- 
icans kept up the reputation of their revolutionary forefathers 
for a deadly aim. The company of Ellis which was not needed 
longer to cover the right, since the enemy had given up their 
flanking movement, was now called to the front to make sure 
of the road where Colonel Downman had charged and fallen. 
But the enemy did not press their late advantage, the whole 
force retiring from the field in good order and leaving the 
filibusters in control of Las Pozas. 

The whole battle had lasted two hours under a boiling sun, 

5 Schlesinger, Bern. Review, XXXI, 357, gives the forces which were 
opposed at Las Pozas at 800 Spaniards and 275 Americans ; Concha, 
Memorias, 213, gives the Spanish 'forces at 400, and the Americans at 
350. Probably 400 Spaniards and 325 Americans actually engaged is 
approximately correct. Schlesinger very severely criticizes the Ameri- 
cans for their unwillingness to charge, at the same time complimenting 
their remarkable marksmanship. He also blames many of the evils of 
the expedition on the lack of discipline and insubordination of the 
Americans. 

97 



being desperately contested every moment. The losses to the 
325 Americans were twenty killed and twenty-five wounded, 
while among the 400 Spaniards the losses were undoubtedly 
very much greater. But the filibusters were to miss the ex- 
perienced wisdom of Colonel Downman while four other offi- 
cers were killed and seven were wounded, including General 
Pragay, the Hungarian chief of staff. 

It was perfectly evident by this time that the Spaniards 
would soon reach so accessible a spot in overwhelming num- 
bers, and, therefore, an immediate junction with Crittenden 
was imperative. If Crittenden were joined and the stores 
were saved, the enterprise, which was certainly serious, as the 
men must now have seen, might yet succeed. For with plen- 
tiful ammunition and full forces a retreat might be made to a 
town farther inland and more defensible. There the filibusters 
could organize insurrection and await the large American re- 
enforcements which they expected, or possibly even the hoped 
for war between the United States and Spain. But without 
their supplies even a Cuban uprising could do little good. For, 
with what could they arm any Cubans who might join them, 
having barely enough themselves to maintain a short campaign ? 

About two or three of the afternoon, just after the battle, 
Lopez sent the company of Ellis, now under Lieutenant Mc- 
Donald, the body which had felt the battle least severely, to- 
gether with the company of Stuart, about ninety men in all, 
to watch the movements of the enemy and if possible to make 
sure a union with Crittenden. They advanced three miles 
along the road by which the forces had come to Las Pozas, 
and found the Spaniards on both sides of them in large num- 
bers. Receiving an order from General Lopez, the main body 
turned back, while eight volunteers pressed on with a message 
to Crittenden. The Spaniards were soon so numerous in the 
direction in which they were going that any communication 
with Crittenden was clearly hopeless, and the messsengers hid 
in the thick underbush until they could get back to Las Pozas. 

The anxiety regarding Crittenden was now very great. It 
was certainly important to press on rapidly towards the moun- 
tains, and yet, so long as there was any hope, Crittenden could 
not be left behind. About midnight (13th) there arrived 
Captain Kelly with thirty-three men of Crittenden's party. 
Crittenden had moved along very slowly during the morning, 

98 



changing the leisurely oxen at every opportunity. At a dis- 
tance of four miles from Morillo the little force had made 
camp and were engaged in eating when they were attacked. 

The men rushed to arms, Crittenden himself came up with 
the rear guard, and the enemy were repulsed, allowing the 
Americans to finish their meal. Unfortunately the Spanish 
main forces were now arriving and it was quite evident that 
Crittenden's forces were hopelessly outnumbered. The Span- 
iards attacked once more only to be again repulsed; but to 
remain on the defensive while the numbers of the Spaniards 
were constantly growing was hopeless. Crittenden decided to 
divide his forces, and leaving Kelly with his forty men to guard 
the provisions, he and the remaining eighty charged against 
the Spanish troops. Almost immediately the Spanish forces 
attacked Kelly and he was separated from Crittenden. In a 
tangled country which neither leader knew, the little forces 
could not hope to reunite. Crittenden had made, on a smaller 
scale, the same fatal mistake of dividing an already small force 
which Lopez had made the day before. Situated as the forces 
were, the event showed that, however important the arms and 
ammunition might be, it was madness to separate troops which 
could not hope to successfully defend them even if united. 
The policy of maintaining a base of supplies and a rearguard, 
undoubtedly good and necessary tactics for a large army, was 
opposed to the lightning rapidity of movement which alone 
could bring success to a small band of guerillas. At the same 
time the dilemma was almost hopeless. For to abandon the 
additional arms would make it impossible to arm any Cuban in- 
surrection which might take place, or to replace the ammunition 
which might be used. As for food, the country could supply 
quite easily the needs of so small a body. 

Kelly and his handful of men were forced back on the pro- 
visions. There, seeing that a defence of them was entirely 
hopeless and his scouts getting no trace of Crittenden, he de- 
cided to attempt directly to reach Las Pozas. But by this time 
the road was well covered by Spanish troops so that Kelly and 
his men were compelled to advance through the thickets. 

After wandering about all day, in the evening Kelly found a 
negro who guided his men to the edge of a forest within 
sight of Las Pozas. He could not be sure which side occupied 
the town, so, sending on the negro with a scout, he himself halt- 



99 



ed with his men until they should bring word. The scouts 
returned with the report that the town was full of men in blue 
shirts. Kelly accordingly advanced to be reunited with Lopez. 

After the battle, Lopez sent out a party to bring in the 
wounded. The party found twelve Spaniards still living. They 
were placed in huts and their wounds bandaged. From the 
battlefield, also, were collected necessary clothing and 11,000 
cartridges, which were later to prove especially useful. 

After midnight all hope of seeing Crittenden again was 
given up, and the diminished band of 300 men started towards 
the mountains. To carry the wounded was impossible ; and it 
was necessary to leave these wretched men behind. The next 
day they were shot by the advance guard of the Spaniards. 
Two or three of the more slightly wounded and especially 
Captain Ellis were able to find horses and accompany the main 
body. Each soldier carried his gun and 120 cartridges. During 
the early morning of the fourteenth these troops who, on the 
day before, had fought a battle, marched twelve miles over a 
steep rough road. At nine o'clock they halted for the day, 
killing a cow and roasting the flesh on the bayonets. In this 
way many bayonets were soon rendered useless. The meat was 
eaten without bread or salt. At five in the evening they con- 
tinued their march in the tropical twilight until eight, and then 
slept on their arms until about midnight when the moon came 
out to light their weary march. The next morning the troops 
reached a large and well wooded plantation. Here the tired 
men hoped for a good rest. Two cows had been killed and 
green corn was gathered for a feast, when Lopez called a coun- 
cil and announced that the little band had missed its way 
during the previous night. Instead of going southwest toward 
San Cristobal as they should, they had swerved north and were 
within three miles of their landing place at Bahia Honda, where 
there were known to be 1300 Spanish soldiers. The only 
chance of safety was a forced march. The food had to be left 
behind and the troops, who had already on the day before left 
behind ten stragglers, marched five miles over a wretched road. 
On this forced march many good 1 men were again left behind, 
and of these only one managed to catch up with the main body. 
Halt was made long enough to kill a cow and gather corn, and 
the starving men were strengthened and cheered by a good 
meal. In the afternoon the march was continued, and the 



soldiers were encouraged by the accession of two Cubans who 
were heartily welcomed. These were the first and only re- 
cruits to join the expedition. The battalion halted at eight in 
the evening, but there were so many stragglers that it was mid- 
night before they were reunited. The rough ground and 
thickets had destroyed the men's shoes. All were practically 
barefoot. 

In the meantime, Crittenden had been separated from Kelly 
on the thirteenth, as we have seen, while the battle of Las 
Pozas was still going on. Repulsed in his charge, he had 
sought to join Lopez by another road, but had met General 
Ena and his troops, who had just withdrawn from the battle. 
Compelled to take to the thick woods, the men had passed 
two nights in great wretchedness without anything to eat. The 
force was too small to reach Lopez and could do nothing more 
on the island. The fifty survivors went back to the coast, and, 
taking four boats, put out to sea in the vague hope of reaching 
Key West. On the second day they were captured and taken 
to Havana. 

It was three o'clock on the morning of the fifteenth when 
Concha learned that the naval forces had captured Crittenden 
and his fifty men. The order refusing quarter to the prisoners 
was recent and plain, and Concha was determined that it should 
be respected. Having been captured by the naval forces within 
the keys to the north of the island, Concha feared that there 
would be some conflict with regard to his jurisdiction in the 
matter. He would have preferred if the prisoners had been 
shot immediately as soon as they were captured thus avoiding 
all formalities and all the excitement which an execution in 
Havana must produce. He did not care to have them tried at 
all and especially by a naval court. He feared that a naval 
court, jealous of his power, might not recognize his order which 
refused all quarter. The Contoy prisoners had come before 
such a naval court, and what had been the result? After a 
long statement by the judge to the effect that the prisoners 
were genuine pirates they had been freed. It was only later, 
and after a wearisome trial that the two captains and a pilot 
of the Susan Loud and the Georgiana were condemned to 
prison. Such weakness may have been necessary for reasons 
of public policy then, but Concha did not intend weakness or 
doubt of his authority to be displayed in this case. 

IOI 



He immediately summoned the officer of the day and the 
chief of police, and, in the presence of his rival, the admiral, 
gave the order in no uncertain terms that at seven o'clock in 
the morning the troops of the garrison should be drawn up in 
readiness beside the castle of Atares. Before seven-thirty 
Concha ordered that every pirate should be dead. 

The Captain General had hoped by these measures not only 
to avoid conflict of authority but also to prevent the news of 
the capture spreading in the city until the men were actually 
executed. The previous order called for the execution without 
trial of any enemies caught upon the soil of Cuba. After 
giving the order for the early execution it seemed to Concha 
that he should make assurance doubly sure. Embarrassing 
questions of international law might arise which would give 
the United States a pretext for declaring war. There was not 
the least doubt as to the character of the prisoners, and yet, 
they had not been captured on the land but trying to escape 
by sea. To secure at least a form of trial, two attorneys with 
interpreters were sent on board the Esperanza, the vessel to 
which the prisoners had been transferred, with orders to re- 
ceive the confessions of the prisoners as quickly as possible. 
Unfortunately, at least from the Captain General's point of 
view, these declarations were made slowly, since questions and 
answers had to be translated by the interpreters. At half-past 
seven, the time set for the execution, only ten prisoners had 
made their statements. More attorneys were secured and sent 
on board with instructions to hasten proceedings as much as 
possible ; but even with their aid the examinations went on 
until half-past ten. The sentence was immediately signed by 
the impatient Captain General and carried out at eleven. 6 Two 
steamers carried the news to New Orleans on the very day of 
the execution. 7 

8 Fillmore, Message, Dec. 2, 1851. Concha, Memorias, 223, 224. The 
American newspapers published accounts of terrible atrocities perpe- 
trated on the bodies of Crittenden and his men. 

7 A letter from Mr. William May, from U. S. Frigate Saranac, Sep! 
16, 185 1, to his brother Dr. Frederick May of Washington is among 
the Crittenden Mss., Library of Congress. 

May states that "the prisoners who were shot at Havana were after- 
wards mutilated, dragged by the heels, outraged in a manner our 
Indian savage would revolt at; ears, fingers, pieces of scull (sic), 
brought away for exhibition, and nailed or hung up in public places. 

102 



While the tragedy was taking place at Havana, Lopez and his 
men were pushing on as rapidly as they could in their hopeless 
march towards San Cristobal. Many of the men were shoe- 
less. The little band on the sixteenth was still near the sea 
coast, probably to the east of Bahia Honda. Early in the 
morning they came upon a number of Spanish soldiers who 

"Crittenden and the fifty prisoners taken with him were brought to 
Havana in the Spanish frigate Esperansa. The next morning at ten 
o'clock on the day they were shot they were conveyed to the shore 
in a boat. Crittenden, one of the last to leave the boat and stiff 
and slow in moving, was told to be quick and brutally struck in the 
face, some say with a sword (others and an eyewitness told me that 
it was a hand blow), seized and bound but not subdued, he grit (sic) 
his teeth and spat in the face of the cowardly dog of a Spaniard. 

"They were led out in tens and shot and when the work was not 
completed, club'd (sic) with the bute (sic) of muskets. One poor 
fellow, only slightly wounded, got up and took another position out 
from the slain, when he too was despatched. To a man they walked 
boldly up and with unflinching eye met their doom. Jeered, spit 
upon, struck by the inhuman crowd, they scornfully stood up with 
head erect and disappointed the crowd in their hope for show of fear. 
Crittenden was about the twentieth shot, and alone was brought out — 
he did kneel, was forced to kneel, but as he gave the signal, a privilege 
granted him, he attempted to face round, as a true soldier would die. 
The crown of his head was literally blown off. 

"Ten of bodies (sic) only were coffined, the rest, what was left 
of thim (sic), thrown into a pit. And thus these brave men died 
before each other's eyes, without one friendly voice to sooth their last 
moments, to say a kind word or to receive their last message." 

The New Orleans Crescent published a report from an American 
correspondent describing the execution and stating that Kerr and 
Crittenden refused to kneel with their backs to the firing squad. It 
is this report which contains Crittenden's supposed words : "An Amer- 
ican kneels only to his God, and always faces his enemy." Other ac- 
counts say nothing about this dramatic incident which is in all 
probability a New Orleans embellishment. (New Orleans Crescent, 
given in Jones, 'Cuba in 1851," 65.) 

Concha "Al Ministro de Estado," Havana, Dated, Aug. 31, 1851. 
Bole tin IV, 80. 

In this letter Concha praised very highly the conduct of Consul A. F. 
Owen and Mr. C. F. Piatt, Commander of the American gunboat Al- 
bany. When on the night of the 15th Crittenden's party had arrived 
at Havana and when it was generally known that on the next day they 
were to be shot, a number of Americans plead with the American 
Consul to interpose in their behalf with the Spanish government: 
"With the greatest dignity he refused such a proposal, answering that, 
according to the solemn declaration of the President of the United 

103 



fled to a fortified house near the shore, leaving behind six 
splendid cavalry horses and some wine and provisions which 
were especially appreciated. The road now turned sharply to 
the right and, leaving the shore, Lopez and his men reached 
the crest of a range of hills and then went down into a pleasant 
valley where the ripe fruit satisfied both hunger and thirst. 

States, they had lost their nationality at the moment of embarking on 
a piratical expedition, and he expressed this very view to me personally 
when, after the severe punishment had been accomplished in the pres- 
ence of all Havana, a punishment which the citizens received as a just 
expiation of the horrible crime committed by those wretched men, he 
came to me on the night of that very day, the 16th, to give me news 
of another expedition which had just been sent to him, in order that 
by my authority I might use those precautions which would bring 
safety. So much for Mr. Owen. Commander Piatt showed himself 
equally energetic and worthy of the consideration of this government, 
on the morning of the 16th." The city had been very much excited 
and the American captains of vessels in the harbor had come to wait 
on Commander Piatt to take measures for their safety. He had told 
them dryly to go back and attend to their own ships and not to meddle 
with anything which took place. 

The Spanish authorities issued a semi-official account of the execu- 
tion, published in various newspapers : "The troops formed a square. 
They had on their war uniform — the blusa and straw hat. On the 
arrival of the troops (the cavalry and the civic guard), the multitude, 
on foot and on horseback, took places on the heights, on the plain on the 
sea, and (at) a great distance upon the edifices of Jesus del Monte 
and el Ceno, incessantly cheering the Queen and Spain — eternal idols 
of that army and this people so much calumniated by the United States. 

"El Sehor Mayor de la Plaza read the usual edict, and the criminals 
appeared ten at a time, and after being shot were taken away from the 
place of execution to make room for their companions. The first chief 
was shot alone, the two second chiefs were shot together — all in the 
midst of incessant cries in favor of the Queen and Spain. 

"Justice being done, the Lieutenant Rey, in a speech to the soldiers 
and the people, expressed himself in strong and worthy terms, saying 
that the punishment inflicted was merited by these men, who, without 
a God, without a law, without a flag, come in order to attack our na- 
tionality, our religion, our Queen, and all other objects dear to our 
hearts. 

"The vivats to the Queen, and to the Country were repeated with 
more energy; the troops defiled, and the people went to the place of 
execution, where they looked for what the criminals had left. 

"Ten funeral cars were waiting to convey to the cemetery the mortal 
remains of the fifty pirates. Those cars had been furnished by the fu- 
neral agencies, and were ornamented according to the circumstances of 
the tragedy. 

"The justice of man is complete. God has pardoned the young 

104 



A wealthy planter welcomed the filibusters and placed the re- 
sources of his plantation at their command. At five in the 
afternoon the march recommenced and this time in the gen- 
eral direction of the sea. It seemed to be the main purpose of 
Lopez for a day or two to stay in the general neighborhood 

culprits, who have lost their lives by trusting their faith to the infamous 
falsehoods of the New Orleans papers." (London Times, Sept. 5, 1851.) 
Of letters from various prisoners that of Crittenden himself is most 
f u ll : "Ship of war, Esperanza, 

August 16, 1851. 
Dear Lucien : 

In half an hour I, with fifty others, am to be shot. We were taken 
prisoners. We were in small boats. General Lopez separated the bal- 
ance of the command from me. I had with me about one hundred — was 
attacked by two battalions of infantry and one company of horse. The 
odds were too great, and strange to tell I was not furnished with a sin- 
gle musket cartridge. Lopez did not get any artillery. I have not the 
heart to write to any of my family. If the truth ever comes out you will 
find that I did my duty, and have the perfect confidence of every man 
with me. We had retired from the field and were going to sea, and were 
overtaken by the Spanish steamer Habanero, and captured. Tell General 
Huston that his nephew got separated from me on the 13th day of the 
fight and I have not seen him since. He may have straggled off and join- 
ed Lopez, who advanced rapidly to the interior. My people, however, 
were entirely surrounded on every side. We saw that we have been 
deceived grossly, and were making for the United States, when taken. 
During my short sojourn on this island I have not met a single patriot. 
We landed some forty or fifty miles to the westward of this, and I am 
sure that in that part of the island Lopez has no friends. When I 
was attacked Lopez was only three miles off. If he had not been 
deceiving us as to the state of things, he would have fallen back with 
his force and made fight, instead of which he marched on immediately 
to the interior. I am requested to get you to tell Mr. Green of the 
Creston House that his brother shares my fate. Victor Kerr is also 
with me, also Stanford. I recollect no others of your acquaintance at 
present. I will die like a man. My heart has not failed yet, nor do 
I believe it will. Communicate with my family. 

This is an incoherent letter, but the circumstances must excuse it. 
My hands are swollen to double their thickness, resulting from having 
been too tightly corded for the last eighteen hours. Write to John 
and let him write to my mother. I am afraid the news will break her 
heart. My heart beats warmly towards her now. 

Farewell. My love to all my friends. I am sorry that I die owing 
a cent but it is inevitable. 

Yours, strong in heart, 
To Dr. Lucien Hensley." W. H. Chittenden. 

(New Orleans Bee, Sept. 3, 1851.) 

105 



of the shore, puzzling the Spanish troops by winding marches. 
Here it would be possible to join any new forces from New 
Orleans which might land and with them make a decisive attack 
on some important point. To halt for any length of time at any 
one place was impossible since provisions would fail and time 
would be given to the Spaniards to concentrate in overwhelming 
numbers. This movement along the coast, with the putting to 
sea of Crittenden and his men, was interpreted by the Spaniards 
as an attempt to attack some fortified post on the sea coast 
from both land and sea. If Lopez could have captured such a 
position, he might have established a base to which other fili- 
busters might come, or, at any rate, made sure his own escape 
in case of failure. For this purpose, however, the artillery 
left behind at the St. John's River would have been invaluable. 
All the while, Lopez labored under the delusion that the Spanish 
troops were almost ready to come over bodily, and on each 
encounter gave the signal to fire only with extreme hesitation, 
fearing that he might have friends before him. If he had 
known that no reinforcements could arrive, he should certainly 
have pushed on rapidly for the mountains. It is to be remem- 
bered also that even on the sixteenth the fate of Crittenden's 
men was entirely unknown to him, and it was important to 
allow a junction to be made if possible. Halting for a few 
hours in a strong position on the night of the sixteenth, evi- 
dences of the presence of a large number of the enemy in the 
immediate neighborhood were apparent. In fact the next morn- 
ing the advance guard composed of the Cuban Company came 
in contact with Spanish troops, firing on them without effect. 
At noon was reached the great coffee plantation of Frias, prop- 
erty of the wife of General Lopez. At this place Lopez hoped 
to be able to remain for several days while the enemy followed 
false scents in other directions. But scarcely were the troops 
ready to eat the plentiful food, when a sentinel fired his gun 
as a signal, and came in to announce that a large body of 
lancers were advancing by the same road which the Americans 
had recently followed. This was the beginning of the second 
important engagement of the expedition. (Las Frias, Aug. 17, 

1851). 

The American position was admirable to receive a cavalry 
attack. A thick fringe of mango trees, with their large stems 
and dense foliage, made a natural parapet, difficult for horses 

106 



to pass, and useful for American sharpshooters. The Spanish 
commander halted at the main house of the plantation and took 
a deliberate view of the position. Lopez was deceived by this 
delay into the belief that the Spaniards were intending to join 
him, and gave the word not to fire. The commander of the 
cavalry suddenly ordered the charge, a hopeless measure against 
such a position. The Spaniards were driven back, although 
many of the best shots among the filibusters did not fire, obey- 
ing Lopez' previous command. 

Two of the Spanish lancers taken prisoners said that General 
Ena was in hot pursuit with iooo Spanish infantry. The 
Americans, having lost many on the march, now numbered 
only 250 effective men, and the danger of being surrounded 
and destroyed was very great. A Spanish force, evidently the 
main body, was passing to the rear with the intention of cutting 
off the retreat of the filibusters. There was just time to retreat 
to a high hill, where the Americans could not easily be sur- 
rounded. A great cheer arose for General Lopez and for the 
cause of a free Cuba, a cause in which the filibusters still believ- 
ed. The Spaniards by their hasty firing had missed the oppor- 
tunity to seriously injure the Americans in their retreat to the 
hill. It was now too late. The firing went on for half an hour. 
General Ena in leading a flank attack fell mortally wounded 
and his second in command decided to withdraw his troops. 
The Americans charged the retreating Spaniards without effect, 
when, finding that the Spaniards were unlikely to return to the 
attack, the filibusters turned again towards the mountains. This 
remarkable contest bore some resemblance to the battle of New 
Orleans, of course on a small scale. The Americans lost two 
killed and three or four wounded, while the Spaniards lost their 
commander, second in rank only to Captain General Concha, 
and a considerable number of men. From this time Concha 
himself commanded the Spanish troops in person. 78 

The night which followed the battle was spent at an old 
Spanish fortification where 100 men might have held their 
own against a very much larger number of troops. The rain 
fell in torrents, and it was impossible to keep up the fires suffi- 
ciently to cook the meat which had been secured. The majority 
of the men marched on the next day without food. One of the 
stragglers left behind near Bahia Honda came up with the news 

7a Concha, op. cit. 215. 

107 



that they had been in the very outskirts of the town on the 
night of the fourteenth. He had hidden in the bushes and 
then gone to a plantation where he was kindly treated and 
given food and clothing. That evening halt was made near a 
saw mill, where the ammunition could be kept dry in spite of 
the torrents of rain. Two oxen were killed and with the abund- 
ant growing corn the men were able to enjoy a good meal again. 
Instead of halting to regain lost energy, Lopez considered it 
necessary to press on. The road was now almost impassable. 
Men walked in mud to their knees. With the sultry heat, the 
weight of guns and ammunition became intolerable, and when 
the slippery foothills were reached, the soldiers began to throw 
away the extra weights. Many guns and much ammunition 
had been rendered useless by the rain. When the plain near 
San Cristobal was reached, the party of filibusters was stretched 
out over five miles of road, while some had fallen dead from 
the effects of the sun and fatigue. The cartridge belts were 
old and not well suited to protect the ammunition. As a result 
much was useless. 

Here, for the first time, open discontent showed itself. A 
committee was appointed in true American style to wait on 
Lopez and find out exactly what he intended to do. He an- 
swered that by mistake the troops had come too near to the 
city of San Cristobal. It was said that the alarm had already 
been given there and the only safety lay in beating an immediate 
and hasty retreat. The troops absolutely refused to move an- 
other step without rest, preferring to risk an attack than to 
die of fatigue. Up to this time the men had been hopeful and 
trusted General Lopez to get them out of their difficulties. 
Daily he had told them that they would soon reach a strong 
body of Cuban insurgents with whom they could attack a 
strongly fortified place. The Spanish troops would join them 
if there seemed to be any chance of ultimate success. There 
is no reason to doubt that Lopez was sincere in these protesta- 
tions. He took a larger risk in appearing in Cuba than any 
of his men. He was an outlaw long since condemned to death, 
and in case of failure could hope for no mercy. His whole atti- 
tude toward the Spanish troops shows that he expected them 
to come over to his side, while his delay near the coast was 
evidence that he expected reenforcements. . The attitude of 
many Cubans was undoubtedly favorable to his cause. Success 

108 



would have secured friends, just as failure made the loyalists 
seem to include all the people of the island. It is to be remem- 
bered that much the same thing happened in the American 
Revolution when in many cases the number of loyalists seemed 
to vary inversely to the American successes. The failure to 
reunite with Crittenden, the stern example made of his men 
following the failures of Puerto Principe, took the courage out 
of the party of revolution and sane Cubans sought now to gain 
the good will of the government by pushing down a lost cause. 8 
These were the immediate causes of failure while deeper still 
lay the great issues of annexation or independence, and of 
slavery or abolition, which divided the Cuban people. The 
greater issue in America between extension of slave territory 
and conservatism lessened chances of whole hearted American 
support which five years earlier might have been hoped for 
with some confidence. 9 

Reluctantly, on the evening of the nineteenth of August, 
Lopez allowed his men to barricade themselves with trunks of 
trees on a spot near San Cristobal where they could only with 
great difficulty be attacked. The rain, so fatal to all their hopes, 
kept falling, and for the first time deep discouragement settled 
upon the party. It was evident that even Lopez, who had al- 
ways been buoyant in his hopes, was fearful that no assistance 
could now be looked for. In fact he told the men that their 
only chance lay in reaching the high mountains where the enemy 
could not pursue them. Evidently the situation was desperate. 

8 One of the reasons for the failure of Lopez to arouse the Cubans 
lay in the very fact that his followers were foreigners. The assist- 
ance of political insurrection in a foreign land is acknowledged to be 
peculiarly difficult. In the words of Captain Mahan : "The natives of 
the soil, among whom such a force appears, either view it with sus- 
picion or expect it to do all the work; not unfrequently are both 
jealous and inactive. It is well, then, to give malcontents all the as- 
sistance they require in materials of war, to keep alive as a diversion 
every such focus of trouble, ... but it is not safe to reckon on the 

- hatred of the insurgents for their own countrymen outweighing their 
dislike for the foreigners. It is not good policy to send a force that 
is incapable of successful independent action, relying on the support 
of the natives in a civil war." 

Used as these words were, of a very different episode they a^ply 
with peculiar force to the Lopez expeditions. (Mahan : "Influence of 
Sea Power on the French Revolution." I, 97). 

9 Smith, Parties and Slavery, p. 9. 

109 



The retreat was commenced on the next morning. The 
American troops, commanded since the death of Downman, 
by the inexperienced Haynes, now observed few of the forms 
of discipline. Men marched where they pleased without regard 
to company formation, though some still kept their guns as 
their only hope of safety. Halt was made in the afternoon 
at a plantation called Aguacate, where a terrible storm occurred, 
the usual rain being accompanied by great wind. If anything 
had been dry before it was now thoroughly wet. At eight on 
the morning of August 21, the pickets were called in and Lopez 
gave orders to march. But the men demanded breakfast first 
and no new pickets were sent out. While the men were at 
breakfast, 400 Spanish troops stole up through the cornfields 
and were within twenty yards before they were discovered. 
Three or four Americans were killed at the first discharge. 
The Cuban Company was dispersed in all directions, but the 
American battalion under Colonel Haynes managed to seize 
their guns and form on a hill where a defence might be made 
with bayonets and the few guns which were still serviceable. 
Lopez and his staff retired from the field and Haynes gave 
the word to follow. Captain Johnson failed to hear the order 
and held his ground until his twenty men were compelled to 
scatter to avoid being captured. They were not seen again by 
their companions until they all gathered in prison at Havana. 

The rain, which still fell in torrents, for once did a good turn 
to the cause of the filibusters by covering their flight. Splashing 
through a swollen creek where the Spaniards seemed loathe to 
follow, cutting their way through the bushes with swords, 
travelling without path or knowledge of direction, the main 
Jbody still kept together and managed to make good their escape. 
Of the 220 men at Aguacate only fifty or sixty had guns fit to 
use, but only four Americans were killed in the attack. Six 
prisoners were taken by the Spaniards and immediately shot. 
In the evening 140 men alone managed to collect around the 
smouldering fires, while the tropical rain continued. On the 
22nd the now hopeless band managed to advance two or three 
miles into a wild and uninhabited country. Lopez' horse was 
killed for food, the only food the men had had for two days. 
On the twenty-third the same story was repeated, the men 
wading up a creek in lieu of a path and eating the roots of the 
palmetto. The only possibility seemed to be to wander about 
the mountains until death brought relief. 

no 



At last on the morning of the twenty-fourth the rain ceased. 
In the bright sunshine the men regained their spirits and climb- 
ed trees to get a view of some hut or house, but the tree covered 
mountains seemed piled up in endless chains with no cabins or 
smoke to give evidence of human habitation. The column 
marched on until midday when Captain Stewart climbed a tree, 
taking with him a compass. In the distance he could make out 
a cultivated level. Following the direction given, a march of 
three or four miles brought the company to a path which led 
into a familiar road. It was the same which they had covered 
already on the nineteenth and twentieth when traveling to- 
wards San Cristobal. The men were halted and an inventory 
taken. There were about 140 men with sixty-nine guns, most 
of these quite useless, many even lacking bayonets. Only about 
a dozen men had shoes, while many had their feet terribly 
lacerated by thorns and stones. To move at any but the 
slowest pace was impossible. 

A council of war was held and plans of safety were dis- 
cussed. Some thought that the party should then and there 
break up into small groups to try to reach the sea, others that 
their only hope lay in remaining united. As was natural in so 
desperate a situation, Lopez had to listen to many complaints 
from the men, who had seen no signs whatever of the promised 
revolution. The real nobility of Lopez' character showed itself 
in his begging the men to purchase life for themselves by giving 
him over to the Spaniards. All, now thoroughly ashamed, 
refused, and only a few would have consented to abandon him. 
It was decided to stake all on the issue of one desperate chance, 
and, armed with knives, bayonets, and a few guns, to boldly 
attack San Cristobal, which was defended by 500 well equipped 
Spanish troops. This plan, four days before, might have had 
a chance of success. On the twenty-fourth it was only a coun- 
sel of despair. The march had commenced when suddenly 
Spanish cavalry came up behind ; a few still believed in the 
legend of a successful insurrection and raised the joyful cry: 
"Patriots, Patriots," but the charge of the cavalry dissipated 
this last fond hope and scattered the men in small groups in 
every direction. So ended as an organized military expedition 
the last Lopez attempt against Cuba. 

The men who were captured on the twenty-fifth were shot 
on the spot, but on the twenty-sixth orders reached San Cristo-. 



bal from the Captain General to give quarter to all who might 
surrender. Fifty were captured near San Cristobal and a large 
number also near Bahia Honda. The prisoners were all treated 
well by the Spanish authorities, though many strayed in the 
mountains fifteen or twenty days more before they were cap- 
tured, living on roots and wild plants. 10 

The Captain General regarded the capture and execution of 
Lopez as vital to the safety of the island. Lopez had lived 
long in Cuba, and knew conditions well. His worst enemies 
acknowledged his singular charm of manner and his capacity 
for arousing confidence and admiration. The arrival of the 
captive Lopez at Havana on August 31st was thus the signal 
for great rejoicing among the Spanish sympathizing people of 
the Cuban capital. They felt that his death would put an end 
for the present to all such expeditions. While the old Spanish 
general, whose life had been a romance, lay in prison awaiting 
shameful death, the city wore the appearance of a holidey. 
Twenty thousand citizens had gathered to watch the execu- 
tion. Briefly the Captain General addressed them, his words 
passing from mouth to mouth being instinctively obeyed: "I 
wish," he shouted, "the deepest quiet to accompany the ful- 
filment of the law." Twenty thousand men stood quiet until 
the grey head of the man in the chair fell forward under the 
garrote. 11 

Of the prisoners taken after the execution of Crittenden, 
some were freed at the request of their friends, while others, 
about 160 in number, were sent as prisoners to Spain. The 
administration at Washington was in a quandary with regard 
to them. The feeling in the United States was very strong 
in their favor, being increased by sympathy for their families 
and friends. At the same time the administration could not 
help but feel the danger of encouraging such movements by 

10 My chief authorities for this narrative are : 

1. Concha, Memorias, pp. 210 ff. 

2. "Personal Narrative of Louis Schlesinger of Adventures in 

Cuba and Ceuta," Dem. Rev. XXXI. 

3. Expedicion del General Narciso Lopez, Agosto — Septiembre de 
18511. Relacion de un expedicionario. Documentos ineditos para la 
Historia de Cuba pertenecientes al Archivo Nacional. Boletin, Havana, 
III, 1904. 

These sources agree on the important points, but disagree in details, 
and have been followed with caution. 
"Concha, 220, 221. 

112 



leniency. Previous proclamations made it impossible to do 
more than to request the release of the prisoners. It could 
not be demanded as a right. 12 Fortunately the prisoners were 
finally pardoned by the queen, thus relieving the situation 
which had begun to grow tense. 13 



! Fillmore, Message, Dec. 2, 1851. 
Cong. Globe, XXIV, 217. 



113 



CHAPTER VIII 
Results 

The news of the execution of Crittenden's men reached 
New Orleans by the Crescent City, August 21, 1851. From 
the point of view of the Captain General the policy of severity 
seemed justified, for the city was full of men eager to go to 
Cuba on the first news of success. Steamers were in read- 
iness, and arms abundant. 1 The news of the execution was 
received with rage by the Americans, and with corresponding 
glee by Spaniards. The Union, the Spanish organ, published 
an account of the execution with approving comments. Pla- 
cards were immediately put up threatening destruction to the 
office of the paper. In the afternoon a mob was organized, 
and proceeded to carry out the threat against the Union, and 
also similar measures against Spanish coffee houses. The of- 
fice of the Spanish consul was attacked early in the evening, 
but the mob was persuaded to desist. Later the mob returned, 
broke open the doors, defaced the portraits of the Queen of 
Spain and of the Captain General of Cuba. The Spanish 
Consul Laborde, either in fear for his life, or for effect, took 
refuge at first in the house of a friend and later fled to Ha- 
vana. Similar destruction of Spanish property took place on 
a smaller scale at Key West where the people were especially 
favorable to the filibusters. 2 Excitement was increased by the 
news that the Falcon, an American steamer on her way from 
Chagres, had been fired upon by the Spanish authorities. 3 
When the news arrived at Mobile an incident occurred which 
might have brought disgrace upon the American name and 
which could easily have led to the war which the radicals de- 
sired. By an unlucky chance a Spanish brigantine named 
the Fernando VII had been shipwrecked on its passage from 

1 Freret, Correspondence with Treasury Department, Pamphlet, New 
York City Library. 

2 The authorities for these incidents are given by Moore : "Digest 
of International Law," VI, 815. 

3 New Orleans Bee, Aug. 22, 1851. 

114 



San Juan to Havana. The crew and the passengers, number- 
ing fifty-seven, managed to escape with their lives, and had just 
arrived at Mobile, hungry and exhausted. Among them, unfor- 
tunately enough, were a number of Spanish soldiers, including a 
lieutenant of the Spanish army. The fact of their arrival 
soon became known and a crowd of several hundred enraged 
men surrounded the Spanish consulate, threatening to beat 
and lynch the Spaniards. Fortunately, five or six of the most 
influential citizens of Mobile were able to quiet the rabble, 
while the Spanish officer was spirited away; and the Spanish 
consul managed to get the men safely on shipboard for 
Havana. 4 

Public meetings took place at towns so far apart as Louis- 
ville, Cincinnati, and Pittsburgh. At Baltimore a procession 
was formed parading the streets with the American Consul at 
Havana burning in effigy. Even in places like Philadelphia, 
where opposition to the expedition had been great, the news of 
the execution of Crittenden's men produced a complete re- 
versal of feeling. At Philadelphia the meeting was presided 
over by an ex-mayer of the city, and a long list of resolutions 
were adopted. It was demanded that the United States should 
propose to Spain immediate autonomy for Cuba. In case war 
should result from this ultimatum, the United States should 
continue to fight until Cuba was independent. The following 
resolutions are typical of the feeling both north and south: 

"Resolved, That the President of the United States ought to 
be authorized by Congress to send, with such naval escort as 
he may deem proper, a special envoy to Spain, to offer the gov- 
ernment of that a country a choice of the alternatives of with- 
drawing from Cuba the military force which has been sent 
from Europe to the unhappy island, or of allowing to the island 
a free local legislature, chosen by universal suffrage, with an 
unlimited toleration of differences in religious belief and the 
privilege of an unrestricted intercourse with the rest of man- 
kind. ....... 

"Resolved, That Congress ought promptly to repeal all laws 
of the United States which may be construed to prohibit an 
armed intervention by citizens of the United States for the 
relief of those who suffer under the tyranny of the present 

4 Sedano, op. cit. 58-62, especially certificate of the Spanish Consul. 
Sedano was present in Mobile and witnessed the scene. 

115 



despotic military government of the Spanish colonial dependen- 
cies of America 

''Resolved, That the President and Congress ought to in- 
sist, in their respective departments, upon a national atone- 
ment by Spain for the late atrocious act of assassination, with- 
out a trial, of citizens of the United States, who in a cause as 
noble as that of LaFayette and his associates, voluntered their 
services in the aid of liberty in Cuba, and when made prisoners 
of war were publicly butchered without a trial; or upon a na- 
tional disavowal of the atrocity and punishment of its per- 
petrators by Spain." 5 

The outcome of the whole affair was political capital which 
the Democratic press was not slow to use aganist the Whigs. 

While public meetings were denouncing Spain, the inde- 
fatigable Calderon de la Barca was not slow to demand redress 
for the outrages at New Orleans and Key West. The losses 
sustained by Spaniards became the subject of correspondence 
between the Spanish minister and the department of State. 
Crittenden explained that the punishment of the perpetrators 
of mob violence was under our system a matter of the state 
government. The position taken by Webster was that the 
Federal government was under obligations to make good the 
losses of the Spanish consul; but that it could only be asked 
to indemnify those private citizens who had recourse to the 
same courts with Americans as an act of comity and not as 
a duty. 6 The pardon of the prisoners of the Pampero expedi- 
tion, led to the introduction of a bill in Congress to provide for 
imdemnification of all losses to Spaniards by mob violence. 

On August 25, 1852, this bill was the subject of an animated 
debate in the Senate. Clemens of Alabama could see no rea- 
son why the federal government should be called upon to in- 
demnify citizens of another country for losses. They had the 
same remedy as citizens of the United States would have un- 
der the same circumstances. They had been attacked not as 
Spaniards but as undesirable citizens who were supposed to 
be unduly elated over the recent murder of Americans in 
Havana. The Senator concluded : "These men saw proper to 
excite a popular mob, and they felt the results of it. The laws 

5 N. O. Bee, Sept. 4, 1851. 

"Crittenden to Calderon de la Barca Oct. 14, 1851. (Crittenden Mss. 
Library of Congress). 
For Webster's views see Moore, Digest, III, 812. 

116 



are open to them; let them seek redress where an American 
citizen would have to seek it." 

Underwood of Kentucky thought that our duty as hosts to 
citizens of another nation put us under peculiar obligations. If 
there had been a specific article in a treaty on the subject, the 
matter would certainly not have been doubtful. Even without 
a treaty such a precedent would be useful to us in cases where 
our own citizens suffered losses of the same kind in foreign 
countries. 

Senator Mason, the chairman of the Committee on Foreign 
Relations, pointed out a distinction in our responsibility for 
the losses sustained by the consul and those by private Spanish 
citizens. The consul was directly under the protection of the 
government, while the citizens of Spain in New Orleans were 
living voluntarily for business reasons under the local state 
and municipal laws and authority. It was an act of wise mag- 
nanimity, however, to pay for all losses, especially in view of 
the fact that Spain had already pardoned the prisoners of the 
expedition in deference to our wishes. 

The bill, as finally passed, placed $25000 at the command of 
the President to compensate Spanish citizens for such losses 
as after due investigation he found that they had incurred. 7 

If we turn from the immediate results in the United States 
to foreign countries, we find that the second landing of a 
filibustering expedition aroused the anxious hostility of Great 
Britain and France. The London Times expressed these fears 
editorially Sept. 9, 1851 : "In a naval point of view the pos- 
session of the port of Havana by the Americans would be an 
occurrence of first rate importance. It would be to the Gulf 
of Mexico what Gibraltar is to the Mediterranean. It would 
place under their guns the vast line of traffic which more and 
more connects the eastern and the western oceans ; it would 
leave almost at their mercy the islands and colonies of Eu- 
ropean States, which would speedily become fresh objects of 
their ambition. . . . The French government has long per- 
ceived the extreme importance of the subject, both as regards 
the resources of Spain and the navigation of the western seas ; 
accordingly, the French squadron in the West Indies has been 
reinforced, and instructions have been forwarded to the of- 
ficers in command to assist the Spanish authorities by all the 

7 Congressional Globe, XXIV, 2340, 2341. 

117 



means in their power to repel the attack of any party of 
American or other adventurers. ... If the Southern States 
are allowed to incorporate Cuba, and to strengthen the slave- 
holding interest in the Union by that enormous acquisition, the 
North will turn in self defence upon the nearest territory which 
it may seize to restore the balance of power, and that territory 
is our own. One act of rapine and violence will follow an- 
other, until the cry will be for the expulsion of European auth- 
ority from the North American continent and the West India 
Islands." 

France and England issued orders to their naval com- 
manders to prevent by force, if necessary, the landing of ad- 
venturers from any nation on the island of Cuba with hostile 
intent. This action led to a solemn warning in the Presiden- 
tial message of 1851. President Fillmore said in this connec- 
tion: "The maritime rights of the United States are founded 
on a firm, secure, and well defined basis ; they stand upon the 
ground of national independence and public law, and will be 
maintained in all their full and just extent. . . . No American 
ship can be allowed to be visited or searched for the purpose of 
ascertaining the character of individuals on board, nor can 
there be allowed any watch by the vessels of any foreign nation 
over American vessels on the coasts of the United States or the 
seas adjacent thereto." 8 

England and France now proposed a tripartite convention 
with the United States to guarantee the possession of Cuba 
to Spain after the fashion in which the nations of Europe were 
later to guarantee the integrity of the Turkish empire. The 
essential articles of this convention were as follows : "The 
high contracting parties hereby, severally and collectively, dis- 
claim, now and for hereafter, all intention to obtain possession 
of the island of Cuba, and they respectively bind themselves 
to discountenance all attempts to that effect on the part of any 
power or individuals whatever. 

"The high contracting parties declare, severally and col- 
lectively, that they will not obtain or maintain for themselves, 
or for any one of themselves, any exclusive control over the 
said island, nor assume nor exercise any dominion over the 
same." 

8 Curtis, Webster, II, 551. Crittenden to Sartiges, Oct. 22, 1851. 
Senate Docs. 32 Cong. 1 Sess. I, 76. Fillmore, Message, Dec. 2, 1851. 

118 



This proposal, so contrary to the historic policy of the 
United States, was discussed and rejected in an able reply 
by Secretary Everett. The Secretary of State restated the 
feeling of the administration that the United States could not 
view with indifference the possession of Cuba by any European 
power other than Spain. Any compact with England and 
France to guarantee the present status of Cuba seemed to Ever- 
ett unequal and unjust : "France and England, by entering into 
it, v/ould disable themselves from obtaining possession of an is- 
land remote from their seat of government, belonging to another 
European power, whose natural right to possess it must always 
be as good as their own — a distant island in another hemi- 
sphere, and one which by no ordinary or peaceful course of 
things could ever belong to either of them. If the present 
balance of power in Europe should be broken up, if Spain 
should become unable to maintain the island in her possession, 
and France and England should be engaged in a death struggle 
with each other Cuba might then be the prize of the victor. 
Till these events all take place, the President does not see how 
Cuba can belong to any European power but Spain. 

"The United States, on the other hand, would, by the pro- 
posed convention, disable themselves from making an ac- 
quisition which might take place without any disturbance of 
existing foreign relations, and in the natural order of things. 
The island of Cuba lies at our doors. It commands the ap- 
proach to the Gulf of Mexico, which washes the shores of five 
of our States. It bars the entrance of that great river which 
drains half of the North American Continent, and with its 
tributaries forms the largest system of internal water-com- 
munication in the world. It keeps watch at the doorway of 
our intercourse with California by the isthmus route. If an 
island like Cuba, belonging to the Spanish crown, guarded the 
entrance to the Thames and the Seine, and the United States 
should propose a convention like this to France and England, 
those powers would assuredly feel that the disability assumed 
•by ourselves was far less serious than that which we asked 
them to assume." 

In concluding his despatch Everett pointed out the direct 
connection between the Lopez expedition and the proposed 
convention: "I will intimate a final objection to the proposed 
convention. M. De Turgot and Lord Malmesbury put for- 



119 



ward, as the reason for entering into such a compact, 'the at- 
tacks which have lately been made upon the island of Cuba 
by lawless bands of adventurers from the United States, with 
the avowed design of taking possession of the island.' 
The President is convinced that the conclusion of such a treaty, 
instead of putting a stop to these lawless proceedings, would 
give a new and powerful impulse to them. It would strike a 
death blow to the conservative policy hitherto pursued in this 
country toward Cuba. No administration of this government, 
however strong in the public confidence in other respects, 
could stand a day under the odium of having stipulated with 
the great powers of Europe, that in no future time, under no 
change of circumstances, by no amicable arrangement with 
Spain, by no act of lawful war (should that calamity unfor- 
tunately occur), by no consent of the inhabitants of the island, 
should they, like the possessions of Spain on the American 
Continent, succeed in rendering themselves independent ; in 
fine by no overruling necessity of self-preservation should the 
United States ever make the acquisition of Cuba." 9 

Aside from the immediate results of the expeditions for 
the United States, the deeper result was a revelation to the 
Americans themselves of the inherent weakness of the Com- 
promise of 1850 and of the close connection of any question 
of expansion withlthe question of slavery. This fact makes 
of the succeeding events, and especially of the Ostend Mani- 
festo, a new chapter in American history. 

A brief view of the direct results of the expedition in Cuba 
itself brings this account to a natural conclusion. Lopez had 
made use of the American desire for annexation, but he had 
felt that the question was one which must be left to the free 
choice of the people of Cuba. 10 Among them the old desire to 

9 Mr. Everett, Secretary of State, to the Count Sartiges, Dec. 1, 
1852, S. Ex. Doc. 13, 32 Cong, a Sess. 15. 

Moore, Digest, VI, 457-471. 

10 Macias afterwards testified that Lopez used the idea of annexation 
to some extent to gain the good will of the Havana Junta and so to 
unify the policy of the Cuban revolutionists. He did this reluctantly 
and with a genuine desire to see Cuba independent. Annexation would 
solve the problem of the abolition movement by putting slave property 
under the protection of southern sentiment. The dread of slave up- 
risings was, as we have seen, a real obstacle to the party of Independ- 
ence. Macias, who of course as a member of the Junta and a close 
friend of Lopez was in a position to testify, wrote in 1875 : "General 



throw off the Spanish government was not dead, although 
it had not been sufficiently organized or aroused to bring im- 
mediate help to the old Spanish general. But the trend from 
now on became clearly away from the idea of annexation to 
one of complete independence. The future disturbances in 
Cuba were, after 1851, far more distinctively Cuban, while 
the movement of 1848-51 was essentially American. 

Concha used the events of August 1851 to urge strong 
measures for defence and suppression of insurrection. The 
building of great roads, a strong army and navy, and a com- 
pletely centralized and military administration were his ideals 
and recommendations. 11 The recommendations of Concha 
were substantially adopted, and by an order of September 30, 
185 1 the system of control of Cuba from Spain was changed. 
It was stated to be the purpose of the government to centralize 
power more fully in the hands of the Captain General. Instead 
of a special ministry for the Provinces, Cuban affairs of a gen- 
eral character were placed directly in the hands of the prime 
minister with the aid of a special advisory council. While this 
step certainly shows the growing importance of the Cuban 
problem, it is not easy to see that any very great centralization 
was accomplished, since affairs of the army, navy, and treas- 
ury in Cuba were to be in charge of three separate depart- 
ments at Madrid. Nevertheless the direct control of the prime 
minister was supposed to be a means making for rapidity and 
harmony. 12 

From now on the powers of the Captain General were exer- 
cised more despotically than ever. 

On account of his activity in aiding the prisoners, Mr. J. S. 
Thrasher, an American merchant resident in Havana and the 
editor of El Faro Industrial, fell under the suspicion of 

Lopez (I remember the fact well) always maintained in the circle 
of his friends that the people of Cuba had alone the right to decide 
in so important a matter, and that the duty of the liberating army 
was ■ to submit it to its consideration." Letter of Macias to Luna. 
Quoted in Morales, 253, La Independencia, N. Y., Mar. 4, 1875. 

"Concha "Al E. S. Presidente del Consejo de Ministros," Havana, 
Nov. 7, 1851, Boletin, IV, 105. 

12 (1) In the opinion of Sedano the extremely centralized power 
urged by Concha was a mistake from which many of the worst evils 
of Cuba were to flow. Sedano "Cuba, 1850-1873," pp. 34.) 

(2) Reales Decretos, Sept. 30, 1851, Torrente, I, 107. (Cuba, 1850- 
1873, P- 34-) 

121 



the Captain General. The newspaper was suppressed and 
Thrasher himself was arrested, his correspondence being 
seized. In spite of the protests of the American consul, 
Thrasher was brought before a military court and, without 
delay, found guilty as an accomplice of the filibusters and con- 
demned to eight years imprisonment in Ceuta. This sentence 
was approved by the Captain General without hesitation. Al- 
though Thrasher had been condemned according to Spanish 
law, he was soon pardoned — an act which seemed to invite 
breaches of hospitality by foreigners in Cuba. 13 

Many Cubans were banished for belonging to the revolu- 
tionary Juntas. A conspiracy commenced by former friends 
of Lopez, and known as that of Vnelta Abajo, was easily sup- 
pressed by the government, and when Concha gave up the 
command in April 1852 the island was indeed outwardly quiet. 
— but seed had been sown which was to bear much bitter fruit 
in days to come. 

"Concha, op. cit. 226, 227. Concha Al Presidente del Consejo, Dec. 
3, 185 1. Unpublished ,Mss. Havana. 

This document gives fully the details of the trial of Thrasher. It is 
a good example of high-handed judicial measures. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Note: No attempt has been made to include titles other 
than those actually consulted in preparing this monograph. 

CHAPTER I 

Sources 

A. Unpublished Spanish Manuscripts. 

(a) Correspondence of the Captains-General in the 
Archives at Havana. 
1845, October 21. Subject: Purchase of Cuba by the United 

States. Al mtro. de estado. 

1845, December 15. Same subject. Al mtro. de estado. 

1846, March 26. Same subject. Del mtro. de estado. 
1848, March 28. Subject: Political regime of Cuba. Al 

mtro. de la gobernacion. 
1848, May 27. Conditions in the island. Al mtro. de la 
gobernacion. ' 

1848, July 14. Subject: Narciso Lopez. Al mtro. de la 
• . gobernacion. 

1849, August 26. Subject: Lopez expedition. Al mtro. de 
estado. 

1849, September 9. Same subject. Al mtro. de estado. 
1849, September 9. Same subject. Al mtro. de gobernacion. 
1849, September 9. Same subject. Al mtro. de estado. 

(Important on Cuban conditions and relations to United 

States.) 
1849, September 2 6- Same subject. Al mtro. de estado. 
1849, October 9. Same subject. Al mtro. de estado. 

1849, October 9. Subject: Spanish consul at New Orleans. 
Al mtro. de estado. 

1850, February 9. Subject: Lopez expedition. Al mtro. de 
estado. 

1850, April 9. Same subject. Al mtro. de estado. 
1850, May 27. Same subject. Al mtro. de estado. 
1850, June 9. Same subject. Al mtro. de estado. 
1850, June 21. Same subject. Del mtro. de estado. 
1850, July 9. Same subject. Al mtro. de estado. 
1850, July 9. Same subject. Al mtro. de estado. 

1850, October 7. Same subject. Al mtro. de la gobernacion. 

1 85 1, March 31. Subject: Henry Clay. Al mtro. de estado. 
1851, July 2. Subject: Public opinion in Cuba. Al mtro. de 

la gobernacion. 

123 



1851, August 31. Subject: French and Danish co-operation 

with Spain. 
1851, December 3. Subject: John S. Thrasher. Al. Senor 

Presidente del Consejo. 

(b) Unpublished Manuscripts (miscellaneous) in the 

Archives General at Havana. 
1849-1850: Subject: Imprisonment of Wm. H. Bush and re- 
moval of the U. S. consul, Robert Campbell. Expediente 
relativo al consul de los Estados Unidos, Mr. Robert 
Campbell, sobre su separacion solicitada. 

1850. Subject: Information offered to the Captain-General re- 
garding the Lopez expedition. Expediente: incidente 
sobre un individuo llamado Mr. Marshall. 

1851. Subject: Arrest of John S. Thrasher. 

1851-1852. Subject: Trial and imprisonment of John S. 
Thrasher. 

(c) Unpublished Manuscript, Van Bur en Collection, 

Library of Congress. 
1837, February 21. Subject: Protesta de los Diputados Elec- 
tos por la Isla de Cuba a los Cortes Generales de la 
Nacion. Madrid. Signed, Juan Montalvoy Castillo, 
Francisco Armas, Jose Antonio Saco. (This protest dis- 
cusses Cuba's historical rights to be regarded as a part of 
the Spanish nation.) 

B. Spanish Manuscripts in the Boletin del Archivo 
Nacional, 1902-1908. 

(a) Correspondence of the Captains-General. 

1844, November 28. Subject: Revolutionary society in Lon- 
don. Al mtro. de estado ; reservada. Boletin V., no. 2. 

1844, November 28. Subject: Revoluntionary society in Lon- 
don. Al mtro. de estado; reservada. Boletin V., no. 2. 

1849, J lirv 2 7- Subject: Annexation of Cuba. Al mtro. de 
estado; reservada. Boletin V., no. 4. 

1850, June 2^. Subject: Lopez expedition. Del mtro. de es- 
tado. Boletin V., nos. 4 and 5. 

1851, January 9 — November 7. Subject: Eleven dispatches of 
the Captain-General, D. Jose Gutierres de la Concha, and 
bearing directly on Lopez expedition. Boletin IV., nos. 
3-6- 

(b) Miscellnaeous Manuscripts. 

1841-1842. Subject: Projects for the emancipation of slaves 
in Cuba. Activities of British agents. Boletin III., nos. 
5 and 6. 

1851. Subject: Lopez expeditions: account by one of the 
members. Expedicion del general Narciso Lopez. Ag- 
osto-septiembre, 1851. Relacion de un expedicionario. 

124 



No date or signature. Boletin III., nos. 1-3. (While 
this account is given only as that of a member of the ex- 
pedition and directed to the Captain-General, it bears 
every appearance of care and accuracy. It was written 
or translated by one who used Spanish readily. See 
Perez, "Guide to Cuban Archives.") 
1851, September. Subject: Lopez expeditions. The Cle- 
opatra. A narrative of events connected with the late 
intended invasion of Cuba, by Duncan Smith. Boletin 
V., nos. 1 and 2. 

C. Unpublished English Manuscripts. 

1848, December 6. N. P. Trist to Hon. Isaac E. Holmes, 
Rep. S. C, introducing Ambrosio Jose Gonzales. Polk 
Correspondence, Library of Congress. 

1849, January 4. Same subject. J. M. Storms ( ?) to Sena- 
tor Dickinson, N. Y. Polk Correspondence, Library of 

. Congress. 

1849, J un e 8. Fallon to Clayton, describing status of foreign- 
ers in Cuba. Clayton Mss. Library of Congress. 

1849, J une 22 - Campbell to Clayton, introducing Don Cris- 
tobal Madan. Clayton Mss. Library of Congress. 

1849, July 7. Ben C. Green to Clayton on Cuban conditions. 
Clayton Mss. Library of Congress. 

1849, August — . Undated note of Calderon de la Barca to 
Clayton. Round Island expedition. Clayton Mss. 

1849, August 7. T. Erving to Clayton. Same subject. Clay- 
ton Mss. 

1849, August 26. District Attorney of Boston to Clayton. 
Same subject. Clayton Mss. 

1849, August 28. "Hampden" to Clayton. Same subject. 
Clayton Mss. 

1849, September 6. New York District Attorney to Clayton 
(telegram.) Same subject. Clayton Mss. 

1849, September 7. New York District Attorney to Clayton 
(telegram). Same subject. Clayton Mss. 

1849, September 8. (?) Letter signed "M. W. Means" to 
Clayton. Undated. (Internal evidence points to Sept. 
8.) Same subject. Clayton Mss. 

1849, O ct - 2 °- New York District Attorney to Clayton. 
• Same subject. Clayton Mss. 

1850, Feb. 23. Calderon de la Barca to Clayton. Marked 
"Private." Cardenas expedition. Clayton Mss. 

1850, May 21. F. A. Brown to Wm Marvin, Judge U. S. Dis- 
trict Court, Key West. Same subject. Mss. Department 
of the Interior. 

1850, May 21. Wm. Marvin to the President of the United 
States. Same subject. Mss. Department of the Interior. 

1850, May 21. W. C. Maloney, U. S. Marshall, Key West, to 

125 



the Secretary of the Interior. Same subject. Mss. De- 
partment of the Interior. 

1850, June 18. Logan Hunton to Secretary Erving. Same 
subject. Mss. Department of the Interior. 

1850, May 22. W. C. Maloney to Secretary of Interior. Same 
subject. Mss. Department of the Interior. 

1850, May 12. W. F. Marvin to F. A. Brown, Spanish Vice 
Consul at Key West. Same subject. Mss. Department 
of the Interior. 

1850, May 29. Logan Hunton to Clayton. Same subject. 
Mss. Department of the Interior. 

1850, June 6. District Attorney, Southern District of Flor- 
ida, to President Taylor. Same subject. Mss. Depart- 
ment of Interior. 

1850, June 9. Clayton to President Taylor. Same subject. 
Clayton Mss. 

1850, June 10. Secretary Erving to Logan Hunton. Same sub- 
ject. Mss. Department of the Interior. 

1850, June 13. Robert B. Campbell. Marked "private and 
confidential." Same subject. Clayton Mss. 

1850, June 15. J. H. Goddard, special agent of the govern- 
ment, to Secretary Erving. Same subject. Mss. Depart- 
of the Interior. 

1850, June 26. D. C. Goddard, Secretary Interior ad interim, to 
Logan Hunton. Same subject. Mss. Department of 
J the Interior. 

1850, June 17. Secretary Erving to Logan Hunton. Same sub- 
ject. Mss. Department of the Interior. 

1850, June 17. J. H. Goddard to Secretary Erving. Same sub- 
ject. Mss. Department of the Interior. 

1850, July 8. J. H. Goddard to Secretary Erving. Same sub- 
ject. Mss. Department of the Interior. 

1850, July 17. Clayton to Bulwer. Same subject. Clayton 
Mss. 

1850, July 26. Logan Hunton to Hon. S. J. Gholson, U. S. 
District Judge, New Orleans. Same subject. Mss. Depart- 
ment of the Interior. 

1850, July 2y. D. C. Goddard to Logan Hunton. Same sub- 
ject. Mss. Department of the Interior. 

1850, Aug. 8. Logan Hunton to Clayton. Same subject. 
Clayton Mss. 

1850, Oct. 4. T. Sedgwick to Webster. Same subject. Crit- 
tenden Mss., Library of Congress. 

1850, Oct. 4. Sedgwick to Webster. (Enclosure.) Same 
subject. Crittenden Mss. 

1850, Oct. 31. Hunton to Stuart, Secretary of the Interior. 
Same subject. Mss. Department of the Interior. 

1850, Oct. 31. Hunton to Webster. Same subject. Mss. 
Department of the Interior. 

126 



1850, Nov. 10. Horatio J. Harris, U. S. District Attorney at 
Vicksburg, Miss., to the President of the United States. 
Same subject. Mss. Department of the Interior. 

1850, Sept. 1. Copy of letter from John H. Friech, one of 
the Contoy prisoners to Logan Hunton. Same subject. 
Mss. Department of the Interior. 

1850, Nov. 22. Hunton to Stuart. Same subject. Mss. De- 
partment of the Interior. 

1850, Nov. 28. J. H. Goddard to Secretary of the Interior, 
same subject. Mss. Department of the Interior. 

1850, Dec. 12. J. H. Goddard to Secretary of the Interior. 
Same subject. Mss. Department of the Interior. 

1851, Sept. 15. Opinion of Elisha Whittlesey on bill present- 
ed by Logan Hunton for services rendered. Same sub- 
ject. Crittenden Mss. 

185 1, Dec. 8. U. S. Minister to Spain to Secretary of Interior 
Stuart. Same subject. Mss Department of the In- 
terior. 

Bibliographies 

1. List of Books Relating to Cuba (including references to 
collected works and periodicals), with Bibliography of Maps. 
Senate Doc. No. 11, 55th Cong. 2d Sess. Reprinted Washing- 
ton 1898. 

2. Perez, Luis Marino. "Guide to the Materials for 
American History in Cuban Archives." Washington, 1907. 

This work is especially useful. 

D. Official Documents. 

British and Foreign State Papers. London, 1812-97. 90 
vols. Vols. 39-42 cover the years 1849-1853. 

This is an invaluable source for conditions in Cuba as shown 
by reports of British consuls and Commissioners, and for 
British diplomacy with regard to Cuba. 

British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. 42. Palmerston to 
British Ambassador at Madrid, May 185 1. 

This letter shows that in advocating abolition England was 
establishing a powerful means of resistance to "any scheme 
for annexing Cuba to the United States, where slavery 
exists." 

Accounts and Papers contained in the Sessional Papers 
printed by the House of Lords, or presented by Royal Com- 
mand. London, 1844-1873. 19 vols. 

This is an important source for the study of slavery in Cuba. 

Everett, Edward. Correspondence on the proposed tri- 
partite convention relative to Cuba. Boston, 1853. 

127 



House Ex. Doc. 5, 31st Cong. 1 Sess. pp. 1.7. 
President Taylor's Proclamation of Aug. 11, 1849. 

House Ex. Doc. 83. 32 Cong. 1 Sess- p. 45. 
Details of the escape of the Creole to Key West, and diplo- 
matic correspondence relative to the Contoy prisoners. 

House Ex. Doc. 121, ^2 Cong. 1 Sess. p. 42. 
The attempt to purchase Cuba. 

Senate Doc, 32 Cong. 1 Sess. Vol. 1. 

Commodore Parker to Secretary of State. Flagship Sar- 
anac, Havana, Sept. 12, 1851. 

Senate Doc. 32 Cong. 1 Sess., Vol. 1. pp. 44. 
Account of the riot at New Orleans. 
Senate Doc. 13, 32 Cong. 2 Sess. 
Document relating to tri-partite agreement. 

House Ex. Doc. 86, 33 Cong., 1 Sess. 7, 87. 
The Crescent City Case and the Ohio case. 

House Ex. Doc. 86, 33 Cong., 1 Sess. 129. 

The Case of the Falcon which was fired on Aug. 16, 185 1. 

House Ex. Docs. 83, 32 Cong. 1 Sess. 

Official Report of Commander Charles T. Piatt, command- 
ing United States Sloop-of-War Albany, dated Sept. 1, 185 1. 
This is an account of an interview with the prisoners on 
Sept. 1. On that date there were 130 in Havana. 

House Ex. Doc. 121, 32 Cong. 1 Sess. 

John Quincy Adams on the inevitable acquisition of Cuba 
by the United States. 

Instructions to Mr. Nelson, newly appointed Minister to 
Spain, Apr. 23, 1823. 

Informe Fiscal sobre Fomento de la Poblacion Blanca en la 
isla de Cuba y emancipacion progresiva de la esclava, con una 
breve resena de los reformas y modificaciones que para con- 
seguirlo convendria establecer en la legislacion y constitucion 
coloniales : Presentado a la superintendencia general delegada 
de real hacienda en diciembre de 1844, por el Fiscal de la 
misma. 

Madrid, 1845, 3 2 ^ PP- (i°4 PP- of text, with appendix of 
documents. This work is in reality a description of the gov- 
ernment and economic condition of Cuba in 1844. 

Moore, J. B. Digest of International Law. 
An invaluable source for documents bearing on the ques- 
tions of International Law involved. 

128 



Coleccion de los Fallos de pronunciados por una seccion de 
la comision militar establecida en la ciudad de Matanzas para 
conocer de la causa de conspiration de la gente de color. Mat- 
anzas, 1844. 

This is the official report of the investigating Committee, 
and throws light on the question of slavery in Cuba. 

Ultramar, Ministerio de Cuba desde 1850 a 1873. Coleccion 
de informes, memorias, proyectos, y antecedentes sobre el 
Gobierno de la Isla de Cuba. 301 pages. Madrid, 1873. 

These are a collection of official documents edited by Don 
Carlos de Sedano, and published by the Spanish Government. 
Many reports of Concha and his successors are included. 

E. Contemporary Books and Documents 

Concha, Jose de la. Memorias sohe et estado politico, gob- 
ierno y administration de la Isla de Cuba por el Teniente 
Genral Don Jose de la Concha. Madrid, 1853. Pp. 362 and 
appendix. 

These memoirs of his first administration published by 
Concha immediately after his return, are the most important 
single source for a study of Cuba in this period. Many docu- 
ments are copied in full. 

• Morales, Vidal. "Iniciadores y Primeros Martires de la 
Revolution Cubana." Havana, 1901. 

This work is a large volume containing a great variety of 
poorly arranged documents. Many of these are otherwise 
inaccessible. As a source for information on the whole sub- 
ject this work by Morales is important. Morales was for 
several years in charge of the Archives at Havana, and had 
unusual opportunties for securing information. Morales 
contains a very complete bibliography of material bearing on 
Cuban history. 

Publications of Southern Historical Association, 1906, pp. 

345- 

"Betrayal of the Cleopatra," or "Narrative of Events Con- 
nected with the Late Intended Invasion of Cuba," by Duncan 
Smith, i.e. Dr. Henry Burtnet. (July, 1851). Edited by 
L. M. Perez. 

Iznaga, Jose Sanchez. Constitucion de la orden de la Es- 
trella Solitaria. New York, 1852. 

Contains information as to the cost of the various expedi- 
tions, and as to the betrayal of the Cleopatra expedition in 
April, 1 85 1. Iznaga was a close friend of Lopez. 



129 



Webster, Daniel. Complete Works, Boston, 1903. 
Vols. 12 and 14 contain the material bearing on Cuba and 
the Lopez expedition. 

Calhoun, John C. Works, IV, 449-469. Speech in Senate, 
May 15, 1848, relating to Cuba. 

Saco, Jose Antonio. Folletos Escritos por Don Jose Antonio 
Saco contra la anexion de Cuba a los Estados Untados de 
America. New York, 1856. 

Saco, Jose Antonio. Obras de Don Jose Antonio Saco, Com- 
piladas por primera vez y publicadas en dos tomos, por un 
paisano del autor. New York, 1853. 

Saco, Jose Antonio. Obras, New York, 1853, tres tomos. 
Coleccion de papeles cientificos, historicos, politicos y de otros 
ramos sobre la Isla de Cuba. Paris, 1858-9. Tres tomos. 

A valuable source for a study of Cuban government. 

Cuevas, Laureano F. de. La administracion. Comprende 
este tomo las dispociciones oficiales desde fines de 1849 en <l ue 
ceso la obra del Senor Zamora, hasta principio de 1855. 
Habana, i860. 

d'Harponville, Hespel. La Reine des Antilles. Paris, 1850. 
(Descriptive.) 

Sotomayor, Urbana F. de. Isla de Cuba, Paris, 1852. 

"Una Accion Heroica." London, 1865. 38 pp. (Library 
of Congress. Title page lost.) 

This pamphlet seeks to prove that a certain Colonel Ordo- 
nez, and not General Concha, "saved Cuba" in 185 1. Ordonez 
seems to have deciphered a cipher despatch from Lopez which 
fell into the hands of Concha and in 1865 had only received 
in return the queen's commendation. General Concha was 
Minister of War and yet, according to the author, would do 
nothing for his old servant. 

El Coloneo Ordonez y Cuba en 185 1. Paris, 1867. por Dos 
Cubanos (Carlos A. Rovira y Carlos Echevarne.) 

Although the pamphlet speaks of "Una accion Heroica" as 
only read through accident both pamphlets have the same 
tone and are probably written by the same author, perhaps 
Ordonez himself. 

"La Verdad." Cuba y su Revolucion. New York, 185 1. 
A pamphlet written to aid Lopez. 

130 



Lopez, Narciso. Contestacion del mariscal de campo D. 
Narciso Lopez, a varios cargos relativos a los sucesos ultimos 
de Valencia. Madrid, 1839. 30 pp. (New York Library.) 
_ The only work published by Lopez himself. It throws much 
light on his early career in Spain. 

Wilson, Thomas W. An Authentic Narrative of the Pirati- 
cal Descent upon Cuba. Havana, Sept., 185 1. 

This account is written by a rabid Spanish partisan. It 
seems to be a translation from the Spanish. 

History of the Late Expedition to Cuba, by O. D. D. O., 
one of the participants, with an Appendix containing the last 
speech of the celebrated orator, S. S. Prentis— "In Defence of 
General Lopez." New Orleans. Printed at the job office of 
the Daily Delta, 1850. 8vo. 89 pp. 

The copy in the Library of Congress has written across 
the face, "Deposited by J. C. Davis, in office of Clerk, U. S. 
District Court: Eastern District of Louisiana, New Orleans, 
August 8, 1850. (signed) Robert M. Lusher, Clerk." This 
would seem to be the earliest complete account published of 
the Cardenas expedition by a participant. Hardy, in his ac- 
count, publishes an appendix with selections from this pamph- 
let as by "an observing writer in the South." J. C. Davis 
was Captain of Company B, Louisiana regiment, and the 
internal evidence leaves no doubt that he is the author. The 
account is written in a semi-humorous style, evidently by a 
man of some education. It seems, on the whole, a trustworthy 
account of the main incidents, though differing considerably 
at some points from Lieutenant Hardy's account. Since Davis 
sailed on the Susan Loud and Hardy on the Creole, the 
two accounts are supplementary to each other. The speech by 
Prentis is evidently the one delivered in defence of Lopez 
when he was arrested at Savannah. 

The account of O. D. D. O. purports to be founded on a 
diary; but the whole has been considerably changed. Pas- 
sages are inserted in quotation marks from "The Diary of a 
Liberator." 

Hardy,, Lieutenant. The History and Adventures of the 
Cuban Expedition, From the First Movements down to the 
Dispersion of the Army at Key West, and the Arrest of Gen- 
eral Lopez. Also an Account of the Ten Deserters at isla de 
Mugeres (sic). Cincinnati, 1850. 8vo, 94 pp. 

This account by Lieutenant Hardy of the Kentucky Battalion, 
is the best source for the Cardenas expedition, though the 
author displays strong dislike for certain of his comrades. It 
contains in an appendix "official" reports to Adjutant General 
Gonzales from the various officers in which each describes the 

13 1 1 



special part taken by his own troops in the battle of Cardenas. 
The reports are by (i) Colonel O'Hara, of the Kentucky 
Regiment; (2) Lieutenant Colonel Pickett of the same; (3) 
Lieutenant Colonel Bell of the Louisiana Regiment; (4) Re- 
port of Major Hawkins, Kentucky regiment; Report of Major 
Hardy, Kentucky regiment. 

Kimball, R. B. Cuba and the Cubans, comprising a history 
of the island Cuba, its present social, political, and domestic 
condition; also its relation to England and the United States. 
New York, 1850. 

A book of very little value, chiefly a compilation from 
Turnbull. 

Life of General Narciso Lopez, together with the detailed 
history of the attempted revolution of Cuba from the first 
invasion at Cardenas down to the death of Lopez at Havana. 
By a Filibustero. New York, Dewit and Davenport, 32 pp. 

Ballou, M. M. History of Cuba; or Notes of a Traveller 
in the Tropics. New York, 1854. 

Jones, Alexander. Cuba in 1851. 80 pp. New York, 1851. 

About one-half of this work is devoted to facts and statis- 
tics regarding Cuba, collected from more or less reliable 
sources. The second part is a publication of newspaper clip- 
pings relating to the expedition of 1851, with no attempt to 
estimate the truth of the reports printed. 

Schlesinger, L. Personal Narrative of Adventures in Cuba. 
Democratic Review, Vol. 31, 209 ff., 352 ff., 553 ff. 

One of the chief sources for the expedition of 1851. This 
account agrees in the main with other sources and seems to 
be fairly reliable. 

Thoughts upon the incorporation of Cuba into the American 
Confederation in contraposition to those published by Don 
Jose Antonio Saco. (Translated from Spanish.) 30 pp. 
N. Y. 1849. 

Taylor, J. G. The United States and Cuba; eight years of 
change and travel. London, 185 1. 

Freret, William. Correspondence between the Treasury 
Department, etc. 

In relation to the Cuba Expedition and William Freret, late 
collector. New Orleans, 185 1. 46 pp. 

Round Island Expedition — Defence of the Navy. Mobile, 
1849. Reprint of two articles signed "Truth" from Mobile 
Daily Advertiser of Sept. 18 and 19. 

132 



This pamphlet is an indictment of the attitude of the Delta 
toward the suppression of the expedition, which the writer 
regarded as wise and necessary. 

Eliot, Edward Granville. Papers relating to Lord Eliot's 
Mission to Spain in the Spring of 1835. London, 1871. 

These are letters and reports, including the diary of Colonel 
Gurnwood, and relating to the English embassy sent to Spain 
during the Carlist war to try to secure better treatment from 
each side to prisoners. There are a number of interesting 
references to Lopez and to his friend General Valdes. 

Organization of the Lee Monument Association, Richmond, 
Va., Nov. 3 and 4, 1870. Richmond, 1871. 

This pamphlet contains a speech of Jefferson Davis in 
which he describes Lee's hesitation when offered the command 
of the Cuban expedition. 

Bosquejo Economico Politico de la Isla de Cuba. By Don 
Mariano Torrente. 2 vols. Madrid, 1852-3. 

This work was written as a direct result of the Lopez expe- 
ditions ^to call attention to the need and condition of Cuba. 
The author was an economist of some note who had occupied 
the post of Intendant of a Province in Cuba, living in the 
Island for several years. 

Torrente and Lopez were together in Cuba in 1843, so that 
the former may be considered a first-hand authority on this 
part of Lopez' career. This work was originally published as 
a series of papers in Madrid in La Espana and serves as an 
index of the public opinion of a large class in Spain at the 
time of the expedition. 

Duncan, Francis. The English in Spain or The Story of 
the War of Succession between 1834 and 1840. Compiled 
from the letters, journals and reports of General W. Wylde, 
etc. London, 1871. 

Contains references to Lopez' activities as a general. 

Lobe (M. Le Chevalier Guillaume Lobe). Cuba et les 
grands puissances occidentales de l'Europe, ou identite qui 
existe entre les interets et l'importance actuels et futures de 
l'ile de Cuba, a l'egard du nouveau monde, et en particulier des 
Etats Unis. 

A collection of letters sent to Madrid by the Dutch consul, 
in Havana. Paris, 1856. 

F. Contemporary Newspaper and Magazine Articles 
The New York Sun, July 4, 1850. 
Strongly favorable to Lopez. 

133 



Southern Quarterly Review, 1842 (April). Article — "State 
of Education in Cuba." 

The Cuban Expedition. Brownsoris Quarterly Review, 
Vol. 4. Boston, 1850. 

Severely critical to Lopez and the Cuban propaganda. 

General Lopez, The Cuban Patriot. Democratic Review, Feb- 
ruary, 1850. XXVI, 97 ff. 

The materials for this article were "derived from friends" 
of Lopez and therefore it cannot be regarded as impartial, 
though the chief facts seem to be substantially correct in so 
far as they can be checked from other sources. For example, 
the story of Lopez' dictatorship at Valencia is fully borne out 
by his own defense of this act, printed at the time. (A copy 
of this pamphlet, which is very rare, is in the Astor Library, 
New York.). 

Cuban Debate (The). Democratic Review, XXXI, 433- 
456, 624. November and December, 1852. New York. 

The Order of the Lone Star. United States Review, Janu- 
ary, 1853. 80. 

The Spaniards at Havana and the Whigs at Washington. 
Democratic Review, XXXI, 326-336, N. Y., 1852. 

Jamaica, Democratic Review, December, 1850. 

This article reviews "Jamaica in 1850; or The Effects of 
Sixteen Years of Freedom on a Slave Colony," by John Bige- 
low (Putnam's, New York), showing the commercial deca- 
dence in the British West Indies and ascribing it to abolition, 
incidentally throwing light on Cuban slavery. 

The Late Cuba State Trials. Democratic Review. XXX, 
April, 1852. 307-319. 

Reynolds, Thomas C. Cuba, Its Position, Dimensions and 
Population, — Position with reference to the United States, 
Territorial limits and extent of the island, Progress and Sta- 
tistics of Population, etc. De Bow's Review, VIII, 313, 1850. 

Reynolds was connected for years with the American lega- 
tion in Spain. 

A Spanish Account of the Invasion of Cuba. From the 
Official Sources. By Xavier A. Isturiz, Spanish Minister to 
England. Printed in the Times Sept. 9, 1851. 

Cuba, 1849-1851. A Series of Articles on the Cuban Ques- 

134 



tion, published by the editors of La Verdad, New York, 1849- 
1851. 

These articles are arguments for the annexation of Cuba to 
the United States, discussions of the status of slavery in Cuba, 
criticisms of the Spanish government in Cuba, and after the 
expedition in 1851, a defence of the Cubans with respect to 
their attitude at that time. 

"Eighteen Fifty-two and the Presidency." Democratic Re- 
view. Jan. 1852. 

This article discusses relation of Cuban movement to the 
coming election. 

Ely, Dr. A. W. The Island of Cuba, Past and Present. De 
Bow's Review. N. O. 1853, XIV, 93. 

A careful and trustworthy account of the resources and 
economic conditions of Cuba. 

Ely, Dr. A. W. Cuba as it is in 1854. De Bow's Review 
XVII, 219. 

Founded on Pezuela, "Compendio de Geografia fisica, pol- 
itica, estadistica, y comparada de la isla de Cuba." 

De Bow, J. D. B. The late Cuba Expedition. Military 
■ Spirit of our Country ; its dangers ; our neutral duties and the 
questions which arise under our treaties with Spain. De 
Bow's Review. 1850, IX, 164. 

This article commences with a warning against the spirit of 
aggression engendered by the Mexican war; but this warning 
is weakened by a long argument to prove that Lopez cannot 
be punished under Sec. 6, Act of 1818. It closes with a pro- 
phecy of our ultimate acquisition of Cuba. 

Sykes, W. J. (Tennessee) Cuba and .the United States. The 
Policy of Annexation Discussed. De Bow's Review. New 
Orleans. 1853, XIV, 63. 

This is an argument against annexation from the South- 
ern point of view. The chief points are (1) Cuba already 
has sufficient slaves and would not, like Texas, offer a market 
for slaves. (2) Cuba as a state would be a dangerous com- 
mercial rival to the Gulf states. (3) The slavery question 
would be reopened and the North would attempt to annex 
Canada, as an offset. 

Sykes, W. J. Independence of Cuba. De Bow's Review, 
N. O. 1853. XIV. page 417. 

Walker, Samuel R. Cuba and the South. De Bow, XVII, 
519 (N. O. 1854). 

The author exclaims: "What a bright gem will she, "The 
Queen of the Antilles," be in the coronet of the South, and 
how proudly she will wear it!" 

135 



Broivnson's Quarterly Review, 1850, VII, 490-510. 
A review of "Cuba and the Cubans" in which the reviewer 
discusses the whole question of Cuban Annexation. 

Narciso Lopez and His Companions. Democratic Rez'iew. 
XXIX, 291, Oct. 1851. 

A scathing arraignment of the Whig Administration for 
"repressing the struggles of white men" for liberty. 

The Piratical Expeditions of American Citizens against the 
Island of Cuba, and the Relations of the United States with 
Spain Resulting from them. Br owns oil's Quarterly Review, 
1852. IX, 66-95. 

An arraignment of the administration for weakness in the 
matter of the expedition. 

II. Secondary Authorities 

Sagra, Ramon de la. Historia fisica, politica y natural de 
la Isla de Cuba. Paris 1842-1861. 12 tomos y suplemento. 

Called by Aimes "probably the greatest work ever published 
on Cuba." 

Saco, Jose Antonio. Historia de la esclavitud de la raza 
Africana en el Nuevo Mundo y en especial en los paises Amer- 
ico-hispana. Barcelona, 1879. 

An unfinished work by a great scholar which was republish- 
ed with important additions by Dr. Vidal Morales in the 
"Revista de Cuba," Havana, 1882-1893. 

Perez, Luis M. Estudio sobre las ideas politicas de Jose 
Antonio Saco. Habana, 1908. pp. 71. 

This in an admirable, although very brief, exposition of the 
development of the political ideas of Saco. It shows thorough 
knowledge not only of Saco's writings but of the whole history 
of Cuba in the nineteenth century. It serves as a guide to the 
liberal and yet cautious spirit of a large number of Cubans. 

Sedano (y Cruzat), Carlos de. Cuba; Estudio t s politicos. 
Madrid, 1872. 

This is a work by a careful scholar, invaluable in a study of 
Cuban political conditions. 

Rodriguez, Jose Ignacio. Estudio Historico sobre el origen 
etc. de la idea de la anexion de la isla de Cuba a los Estados 
Unidos de America, Habana, 1900. 

Ahumada y Centurion, Jose. Memoria historica politica de 
la isla de Cuba, redactada de orden del senor ministro de 
ultramar. Havana, 1874. 

136 



Pezuela, Jacobo de la. Diccionario geograficio, estadistico, 
historico, de la Isla de Cuba. Madrid, 1863-6. 4 tomos. 

An extensive and impartial work by a scholar of note, thor- 
oughly familiar with Cuban conditions. 

Zaragoza, Justo. Las insurrecciones en Cuba. Apuntes 
para la historia politica de esta isla en el presente Siglo. ""Mad- 
rid, 1872, 2 tomos. Vol. 1, pp. 783, Vol. 2, 844 pp. 

"Zaragoza is an impartial and painstaking historian, and 
his work is of very great importance in the history of Cuba." 
(Aimes). This work is written from the official Spanish 
point of view, a fact which must be taken into account in es- 
timating its statements, e.g. the connection of the English con- 
sul Turnbull with the conspiracy of 1844. (pp. 545). 

Valiente, Porfirio. Reformes dans les isles de Cuba et de 
Porto Rico. pp. 409. Paris, 1869. 

Contains some historical material on the period of the Lopez 
expedition. Valiente claims that Polk's failure to buy Cuba 
for $100,000,000 was the result of English influence, the secret 
having leaked out in an after dinner speech of the interpreter 
of the American minister to Madrid before the Spanish cabinet 
had thoroughly committed themselves. 

Claiborne, J. F. H. Life and Correspondence of John A. 
Quitman, major-general, U. S. A., and governor of the state 
of Mississippi. New York, i860, 2 vols. 

A valuable source for information regarding the Southern 
attitude to Cuba in 1850. 

Bourne, E. G. Spain in America. (American Nation 
Series, Vol. III). New York, Harper and Brothers, 1906. 

The last half of this volume serves to give a clear idea of 
methods of Spanish colonial administration and of social con- 
ditions in Spanish America before 1820. 

Quisenberry, Anderson C. Lopez Expeditions to Cuba, 
1850-1 Filson Club Publications, No. 21. Louisville, Ky. 
John P. Morton and Co. 1906, pp. 122. 

Callahan, Cuba and International Relations, Baltimore, 1899. 
Contains a useful Bibliography. 

Chadwick, F. E. The Relations of the United States and 
Spain — Diplomacy. Scribner's, N. Y. 1909. 8vo, pp. 609. 
A very valuable authority in its own field. 

Latane. Diplomatic Relations of U. S. and Spanish Amer- 
ica. 1899. 



tT> 



Hart, A. B. The Foundations of American Foreign Policy. 
N. Y. 1901. 

Aimes, Hubert H. S. A History of Slavery in Cuba, 151 1- 
1868. Putnam's New York, 1907. IV and 298 pp. 

This is a careful study based on extensive research, although, 
necessarily, not detailed. The point of view is generally fav- 
orable to the Spanish administration in Cuba, in one or two 
cases unduly so. The bibliographies are very good. This 
seems to be the only work in English which gives a view of 
any importance of the economic history of Cuba. Aimes fol- 
lows very closely official Spanish documents and gives a rather 
glowing account of Spanish government in Cuba without tak- 
ing sufficiently into account the real dissatisfaction which 
existed. For example, compare his account of O'Donnel, pp. 
161, with that given by Morales. 

Robinson, A. G. Cuba and the Intervention, Longmans, 
New York, 1905. Chapter IV, entitled "America's Past At- 
titude," deals with the view of such men as Clay, Webster, 
Buchanan, and other American statesmen. 

Curtis, G. T. Life of Webster, 2 vols. N. Y. 1870. 

Coleman, Life of Crittenden. 

Long, Life of Robert E. Lee. 

Von Hoist, Constitutional History of the United States, 
Chicago, 1892. Ill, 466, IV, 46-58. 

An account which is extremely unjust to both the Taylor 
and Fillmore administrations. 

Rhodes, James Ford. History of the United States, Vol. I. 

Smith, "Parties and Slavery," American Nation Series. New 
York, 1906. 

Chap. VI, 'Diplomacy and Expansion' treats Lopez' ex- 
peditions, pp. 82, 83. 

Schouler, .History of the United States, New York, 189 1, 
V. 215, 253. 

McMaster, History of the People of the United States. 
Volume VIII. 



9 " 



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